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generosity that we may here attempt to demystify the 
concept of '’middle class" and see real people.
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Santana under a pseudonym. All names of individuals in 
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The main purpose of this work is to describe the 
lives and careers of a number of middle class families 
residing in the neighborhood of Santana, Sao Paulo city, 
Brazil* The research was undertaken in order to evaluate 
the assumption common to many writers that the middle class 
plays a "vital'* or "decisive" role in the political and 
economic evolution of developing countries.
A background assumption of the study is that 
changes in a nation’s political and class structure reflect 
the nation’s position in a changing world economy.^ This 
means that an historical perspective is necessary to 
account for the variety of economic and political forces 
which may affect the formation of a middle class— that is,
*An example of this prirciple is to be found in 
Wallerstein's (1972) description - ? developments in Poland 
and England during the 15th and loth centuries. Both had 
"defeudalized" during the 14th century population decline, 
and both had relatively similar class structures. England, 
however, developed multiple economic activities and an indus­
trial base directed by a capitalist class involved in sheep 
raising, farming and industry. England developed a middle 
level of "intermediaries" for these activities. Poland, on 
the other hand, entered the world market as an exporter of 
wheat and so "refeudalized" its economy and developed the 
kind of capitalist class associated with latifundia econo­
mies. Poland destroyed its intermediaries. It became a 
neocolonial state, with its surplus drained abroad through
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a group which is discrete from both a lower working class
2and an upper ruling class --and its eventual role in the 
development process. Therefore, the method employed here 
is the display of family histories and careers against the 
backdrop of Sao Paulo and Brazil’s political and economic 
development over the past seventy years. I shall explore 
periods during which people from middle income sectors 
could have played the decisive roles attributed them by a 
number of social scientists, and attempt to gauge their 
actual influence during these periods.
The results of this study show first, that it is 
not useful to consider the role of middle classes in deve­
loping nations without precise reference to the urban, na­
tional and international systems which determine the forma­
tion, position and opportunities of specific middle classes. 
The histories of the families studied suggest that until 
recently there was no middle class in Sao Paulo: the va» 
rious middle income groups which may now be said to compose 
a middle class in that city were often "created," that is, 
defined (or redefined) in their social positions by politi­
cal forces over which they had no control.
the kind of international debt peonage familiar to students 
of Latin American development (See also Frank, 1969; Cardo­
so and Falleto, 1970; lanni, 1970; Wallerstein, 1974).
^See below, pp.25-28 , for the way in which the 
terms "class," "middle class" and "middle sectors" are 
being used in this thesis.
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Second, because Che formation of middle income 
groups and a middle class reflect shifting political and 
economic forces, the roles of middle income people in the 
development process shift as well, and their political and 
economic influence has had specific limitations over time. 
Third, the middle class families studied have had less di­
rect influence in the economic and political development of 
Sao Paulo than many writers might suppose. The research 
shows that families like these were never close to top level 
power, but that periodically different groups among them 
have been included in different ways at intermediate levels 
of power. Over the past fifty years, in fact, these fami­
lies have been progressively marginalized from spheres of 
power as well as from strategic economic resources.
Before exploring these conclusions further, this 
chapter will first discuss the literature on middle classes 
in the development process of Latin America and describe 
the assumptions about class and middle class which were 
used in this study. It will close with a brief discussion 
of the neighborhood and population studied.
The importance of the role of the middle class has 
been most strongly asserted by authors using modernization 
models. The concern with modernization grew together with 
the development of the Gold War and the emergence of the 
United States as a major economic and political power in 
search of new markets for its output in the nonindustrial
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In spite of 
all-inclusive assertions that "modernization is . . . a 
multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of 
human thought and activity" (Huntington, cited in Tipps, 
1973:200),** the causal agent for modernization was seen 
as "economic take off" (Rostow, 1960). For many writers 
it was the economy which was seen as the independent vari­
able to which the political and all other systems had to 
adapt (Apter, 1965:460; Lerner, 1958:401; Rostow, 1962:316; 
La Palombara and Weiner, 1966:20; Anderson, 1967:iii, 369). 
In order to understand the take off process, modernization 
theorists turned to the European pattern of development
for insights into the conditions of change in the nonindus-
4trial countries of the twentieth century.
Part of the pattern included the alleged economic 
dynamism of European middle classes to which Weber had
Cf. Tipps (1973:200): "The concept tends to be a 
summarizing one rather than a discriminating one, as every 
effort is made to specify its meaning in terms which are 
sufficiently general to avoid excluding any of the possible 
ramifications of this "multifaceted process." Attempts at 
definition are aimed more at telling us what modernization 
is (or might be) rather than what it is not."
^Cf. Tipps (1973:201): "The influence of . . . r e ­
ceived traditions is particularly evident in the case of 
Modernization theory. Though their terminology may be 
somewhat novel, the manner in which modernization theorists 
tend to approach the study of social change in Non Western 
societies is deeply rooted in the perspective of develop­
mental ism which was already firmly established in the con­
ventional wisdom of Western social science well before the 
end of the 19th century."
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alluded in The Protestant Ethic.and the Spirit: of Capita* 
lism."* Because it was assumed^ that the nonindustrial 
countries would have development patterns similar to 
European patterns, the “role of the middle class11 became, 
as Stepan (1965:87) has noted, an "independent variable 
associated with modernization."^
5Cf. Weber (1965:65): "We shall see that at the 
beginning of modern times, it was by no means the capita^ 
listic entrepreneurs of the commercial aristocracy who 
were either the sole or the predominant bearers of the 
attitude we have called here the spirit of capitalism. It 
was much more the rising strata of the lower industrial 
middle classes. Even in the 19th century its classical re­
presentatives were not the elegant gentlemen from Liverpool 
and Hamburg with their commercial fortunes handed down for 
generations, but the self made parvenus of Manchester and 
Westphalia who often rose from very modest circumstances.
As early as the 16th century the situation was similar.
The industries which arose at that time were mostly created 
by parvenus."
6The assumption was by no means universal, even 
among economists. See Gerschenkron, (1970) and Fishlow 
(1970).
strong tendency to idealize the role of the 
middle class in Western development was already present 
in American sociology. See for example Corbin (1922:88): 
"Alone among the classes, the middle class has consistently 
been praised: it has been conscious of its might and asser­
tive of its right. Aristotle observed that the chief power 
of the state may most wisely be entrusted to it. As leader 
of a newly risen middle class Pericles crowned the great 
age of Hellenic history, building the Parthenon, in Rome 
the middle class gave the blood that conquered the ancient 
world, the brain that laid the foundation of all law.
When the lamp of antiquity flickered out in the Dark Ages, 
it was the middle class that led mankind forward to the 
new day. It was the middle class protestant who brought the 
conscience of the world to bear upon the life of the spirit. 
When England set its constitution above the King, when the 
American colonies established the people as the origin of 
ail justice, when France built up the foremost European 
republic, it was always the middle class in whom the move-
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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The emergence of Latin American middle classes
was expected to increase economic dynamism and stimulate
political development, very much as the emergence of the
European middle classes was thought to have done. Thus,
the American sociologist, John Johnson, held that one of
the most profound developments in Latin America
was the emergence of urban middle sectors as an 
aggressive political force . . . urban middle groups 
are vitally, if not decisively important in an 
area where one still commonly hears and reads 
that "there is no middle class to speak of" (1958: 
2,vii; see also Ratinoff, 1967:61).
According to the American sociologist, Seymour Lipset,
the growing middle class in these countries /Latin 
America./, like its 19th century counterpart supports 
a democratic society by attempting to reduce the 
influence of the anticapitalist traditionalists and 
the arbitrary power of the military (1960:138).°
However, a few social scientists who undertook 
research among middle income sectors in Latin America 
were baffled at the social picture presented in these 
countries. Thus, Lowry Nelson (1950:47), writing on Cuban
ment began and ended. The institutions of civil liberty 
are the creation not of the proletariat, nor yet of the 
capitalists, but of those who are neither rich nor poor 
. . . the middle class is distinguished above all others 
for its political independence, its caution, its solid 
practical intelligence, its steady industry, its high 
moral average . . . "  (See also Corey, 1935:13).
8See also Segovia (1950:35-40), Bouchereau (1950:6), 
Palza (1950:15), Vega (1950:91). For country by country 
analyses, see Johnson (1958).
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middle income sectors expressed the sense that society had 
not yet "set or jelled" in the expected way. Other writers 
with similar experiences in Latin America concluded that 
in these countries the middle class had not yet taken up 
their ^real role of mediator in the phenomenon of the class 
struggle" (Carvajal, 1950:38. See also Dupouy, 1950). Latin 
American countries were simply not developing economically 
or politically according to the presumed model.
Explanations for this failure were sought first in 
local culture and then in the area of psychological predis­
position. Among those who concluded that Latin American 
resistance to modernization was cultural in origin (Gillin, 
1965; Rosen 1962, 1964; Greenfield, 1969; Greenfield and 
Barros, 1965), Frank Bonilla found Latin American culture 
"disappointing" --as measured by the number of Nobel Prize 
winners and canonized saints (sic. Bonilla,1967:240,239). 
Other writers did not go so far in their disapproval; Lipset 
wrote
The relative failure of Latin American countries to 
develop on a scale comparable to those of North 
America has been seen in some part as a consequence 
of variations in the value systems dominating these 
two areas (1967:4).
Yet other writers pushed the chain of causality 
further away from economics and introduced an element of 
circularity in the argument by focusing on people's psyches. 
Drawing on McClelland's research (1953; cf. also Hagen, 
1962), some writers postulated that certain ideological or
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout permission.
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psychological prerequisites must exist among critical groups
before economic growth can take place (eg. Lipset, 1967:3-4).
These groups appear in the literature variously under the
names of “the middle class," a “new middle class" or “new
elites," who are expected to generate the economic growth 
9necessary for modernization. Yet it is frequently left 
vague or ambiguous whether such groups should be or are in 
fact a nascent industrial bourgeoisie, or whether they re­
present the “increasing numbers of middle level functio­
naries" (Barber,1968:295; Hoselitz, 1965; Weinberg, 1969:
4) necessary for modern industrial society.
Consequently, there arose a concern with educatio­
nal systems--or as Bonilla (1967:236) tellingly puts it, 
with “non-coercive cultural control"— which would create 
or instill the values consonant with modern economic 
development (e.g. Coleman, 1965)?^ Such systems should pro-
See the exchange between Halperin (1969, 1970) and 
Perlmutter (1967, 1970) for a similar discussion on the 
role of the middle class in the Middle East.
*®Leeds (1971) and in a personal communication has 
pointed out that the concern with culture traits as intrin­
sic to the psyches of given populations, rather than as 
variables depending on specific structural constraints, is 
peculiarly American. The concern for “education" and 
“values," however, among modernization theorists appears to 
have been an alibi for the real concern which was with 
power. Modernization theory has recently received scathing 
criticisms on the empirical, conceptual and ideological 
levels, some of which are mentioned in the text (Bendix, 
1967; Weinberg, 1969; Bodenheimer, 1970; Frank, 1972; Tipps, 
1973; Walton, 1972). Empirically some descriptions of 
the modernization process have been found to be overly
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vide the skills for advancement based on "achievement" ra­
ther than the "traditional" advancement based on "ascrip­
tion." They would thus prepare the way for the formation of 
pluralist groups, or a "civic culture," in the words of 
Almond and Verba (1963), and for the formation of "new 
elites" (cf. Nadel, 1956), in contraposition to the "tradi­
tional oligarchies" of Latin American countries to direct 
the process of modernization (Apter, 1965:447). Latin Ame­
rican universities were scrutinized and reforms suggested 
which would foster "modern" values (Lipset, 1967:42). As 
Solari wrote,
as academic education is universalized, it is somehow
linked with the democratization of society and even
simple or misleading (Tipps,1973). As a whole, these wri­
tings are plagued by ethnocentricity, a unilineal scheme of 
evolution and disregard for historical context. It should 
be pointed out, however, that modernization models are more 
than mistaken theories developed to explain social change. 
During the period of North American expansionism in the 
1950's and 1960's, modernization writers often played the 
role of "counselor to the king" (see Halberstam, 1969:192- 
200). In this context, the theory and its promulgation 
abroad can be seen as a self serving ideology, justifying 
North American expansionism and blinding foreign as well as 
native social observers to the realities of power and capi­
talist development. See for example, Shils (1965:503), on 
the importance of "modern humanistic scholarship:" " The - 
existence of cultural movements inherited from the past, 
either by physical survival or by traditional transmission. 
requires interpretation. To interpret them in a modern way, 
highly qualified persons, well learned in the techniques of 
modern humanistic scholarship, which are of universal validi­
ty regardless of the parochiality of the subject matter, 
must be available. The inherited culture is not rich enough 
in itself either to serve as the cultural complement of a 
modern society, or to engender the self respect demanded by 
modernity."
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout permission.
18
in Latin America it is accompanied by greater plura­
lism and a wider division of power (1967:48 , emphasis 
added).
But again, when the claims were checked through research 
they were proven dubious at best. The new elites did not 
fulfill these expectations (Bonilla, 1967; Ribeiro, 1967; 
Soares, 1967; Gouveia, 1967); they appeared too bound to 
tradition to accept their "historical mission."
In the light of the search for a "new" middle class 
or elite to direct the transition from tradition to moderni­
ty, the modernization literature on immigrants is especial­
ly interesting. European, largely Southern European, immi­
gration to Argentina, Brazil and Chile in particular, was 
especially heavy at the turn of the nineteenth century.
These immigrants are frequently described as "cultural de­
viants" because of their lack of traditional Latin American 
outlooks (Lipset, 1967:23-24; Willems, 1975:192) and as 
unconscious and unwilling bearers of modernization (Germani, 
1950:15-17; 1970:309; Bresser Pereira, 1962; Lipset, 1967). 
While immigrants were relatively successful in Latin America, 
Willems has recently attributed to them a "revolutionary" 
role in the economic and social development of these coun­
tries, which is similar to expectations for modernization 
imputed to a middle class. Indeed, drawing on Dean's 
(1969) study of the industrialization of Sao 
Paulo, Willems emphasizes the role of upwardly
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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mobile middle class immigrants in the industrial growth of
that city.11According to him, the overall role of immigrants
has not been restricted to the implantation and de­
velopment of an industrial technology. /The immigrant 
trajectory/ implies a good deal of upward social 
mobility. Through the institutional channels of 
business and industry, people of the most variegated 
cultural origins moved to social classes higher than 
they had occupied when they first settled in Latin 
America. And by doing so they revolutionized the 
very class structure of which they had become integral 
parts. 'They not only changed the culture or life 
style of the traditional classes, social mobility 
itself became a highly pervasive structural element.
This of course happened only in the few countries 
such as Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and to a lesser ex­
tent, Chile and Venezuela, which attracted large 
numbers of immigrants (1975:197, emphasis in the ori­
ginal).
The relative success of some immigrants in Latin 
America notwithstanding, we cannot accept a middle class- 
immigrant or otherwise— as prime mover in Latin American 
development because we are never told what a middle class 
might be, might have been or might arise from. While the
it should be pointed out, however, that while 
Dean writes that the "immigrants who came to engage in 
trade and industry were by origin petit bourgeois or middle 
class," several paragraphs,later he writes that the majori­
ty of the immigrants to Sao Paulo "had little chance to 
rise out of the lower class: at best they might reach the 
level of the retail trade or crafts shop. Those immigrants 
who acquired fortunes and came to equal the coffee planters 
in social position were of quite different origins...many 
arrived with capital in some form...and as a rule the immi­
grant bourgeois came to Sao Paulo with resources that placed 
them far ahead of their fellows /and apparently not just in 
the middle7 and practically determined a prefabricated 
class structure" (Dean,1969:50-51).
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basic assumptions of modernization theory have been 
severely criticised by a number of writers (Bendix, 1967; 
Weinberg, 1969; g©deriheinter, 1971; Frank, 1972; Tipps, 
1973; Walton, 1972), the concept of a politically effective 
middle class continues as a kind of ideological amoeba 
with claims and counterclaims being made for ©r against 
its role in particular historical events.
Thus, a number of critics of modernization theory 
have attacked its unilineal evolutionary bias and its use 
of the ,,traditional,,-,,modernH dichotomy, as though, in 
Gouldner's words, the past were “a convenient contrast with 
the present rather than...a preparation for it“ (1970:120). 
For many critics of modernization theory, the kind of 
economic development any Latin American country may under­
go is a function of its past political and economic de­
pendence on the already developed capitalist countries: 
that is, the so-called underdeveloped countries are 
already modern. Their poverty has been generated by their 
dependency relations with the wealthier countries. For 
dependency theorists, it is the power relations of capi­
talism which are the independent variables; the indivi­
dual economies and class structures of the nonindustrial 
countries are seen as a reflection of them (Baran, I960; 
Stavenhagen, 1968; Frank, 1969, 1972; Stein and Stein,
1970, Wallerstein, 1974; Leeds, 1973). In a succinct re­
ply to modernization theorists* position on the Latin
with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout permission.
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American middle class, Stavenhagen pointed out that while
the term ostensibly refers to a statistical aggregate, it
is most often used as a euphemism for the ruling class or
bourgeoisie (1968:24-5). When it does not refer to ruling
groups, it refers to groups which are dependent on the
ruling class (Stavenhagen, 1968:25; Adams, 1967; Horowitz,
1987; Pike, 1968; Petras, 1965; Stepan, 1965). While many
critics of the modernization position on the middle class
do not deny the existence of middle income groups which
belong neither to the ruling class nor to the property less
working class, they do not see them acting even remotely
like their 19th century counterparts in Europe. Thus R. N.
Adams writes that
while it is possible to distinguish a growing middle 
income sector, the older and basic dual structure 
of prestige and value systems has not changed as much 
as has been supposed. Rather, the apparently new 
middle group is only an extension of the traditional 
upper class, both in terms of economic position and 
basic values. It is possible to understand many 
aspects of contemporary Latin America if one sees 
individuals operating in terms of one of these two 
major sectors (the upper or the lower); while it is 
quite impossible to do so by insisting on the emer­
gence of a new middle class (1967:16. See also Leeds, 
1964, 1965, 1973).
However, modernization critics have made counter­
claims and often seem to share the assumption about the 
existence and effectiveness of Latin American middle classes. 
Thus Pike (1968) argues that in Chile a middle class 
might have contributed not to economic growth as moderniza­
tion writers expect, but to economic stagnation. Moreover,
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the middle class Pike describes for Chile is left as 
unspecific in its composition as is the modernization 
version of a middle class. One is unsure as to whether 
it consists of an industrial bourgeoisie intermarried 
with a landed aristocracy— distinctions within a ruling 
class12-- or whether it consists of downwardly mobile 
but socially aspiring poor relatives.
The theme of downward mobility (as opposed to the
upward mobility implied by modernization theorists) in the
creation of a middle class appears in the literature on
Brazil in the writings of Marques de Saes (1973) and
Jaguaribe (1973). Marques de Saes, for example, argues
that many of Brazil's middle income sectors represent
economic “fallouts" from bust periods of that country's
economic cycles.
The end of each economic cycle condemned the aristo­
cratic stratum which had risen to economic ascendance 
to decadence and impoverishment. However, the social 
status and the political prestige which they had 
con q uered during these periods did not permit ether 
dominant sectors to regard the danger of their pro­
letarianization with indifference. Thus arose a 
welfaristic state, ready to absorb all decadent 
groups in bureaucratic corps and armed forces
As a result of such bureaucratic employment in a
12Angel Palerm's discussion of a Mexican middle 
class in the 18th century also uses the term middle class 
to refer to what appears to be a bourgeoisie (Palerm,1952).
13All translations from Brazilian materials are 
the writer's.
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14sinecure or "Cartorial" state , Jaguaribe (1966) argues 
that the Brazilian middle class had significant influence 
during critical periods of Brazil's development. The re­
lationship of the middle class with the military bureaucra­
cy was raised recently by Jose' Nun, who concludes (1968) 
that far from being an inherently democratic force, the 
middle class in Brazil joined with the military in 1964 
to prevent "premature democratization." His argument is 
based on the assumption that since military officers tend 
to be of middle Olass origins, the military tend to repre­
sent middle class interests.^ However, a recent analysis 
of the Brazilian military (Stepan,1971:47) clearly suggests 
that soldiers protect not their origins but their achieve­
ments, and that far from acting as representatives of any 
group, the military acts primarily to defend itself as an 
institution.
However, despite all the claims with regard to the 
role of the middle class in the development process of
14"The term is derived from the old colonial notary 
publics whose functions and status have remained almost un­
changed to the present day, and who have a legal and socio­
logical importance which goes far beyond that of their 
Anglo Saxon counterparts" (Jaguaribe, 1966:168).
^S e e  also Wagley (1964:315): When "faced with a na­
tional crisis or the threat of rapid change, the Latin Ame­
rican middle class ultimately acquiesces; it remains passive 
before a military regime that guarantees stability or it 
actively supports a political party or a coalition of par­
ties aimed at the status quo." See also Horowitz (1967:157- 
158).
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various Latin American countries, we are told very little 
about any actual middle class in any of them. The confu- 
sion as to what a middle class did or might do arises out 
of the confusion as to whom a middle class might consist 
of and how its "middleness" is defined against classes 
above or below it. The definitional difficulty thus crea­
ted has been ignored by most writers through a global 
extension of the term to include a variety of groups which 
might compose a middle class (cfe Johnson, 1958:3; Rati- 
noff, 1967:90; Stavenhagen, 1968:23-24; Stepan, 1965:87).16 
As Leeds has pointed out, evasive terms ("middle sectors, 
middle statuses, middle levels, middle elements, middle 
groups, middle segments, middle components, middle masses") 
which refer to no structurally or functionally delineated 
unit have proliferated (1973:49).
One purpose of this study is to continue the cri­
ticism of modernization theory's expectations for a middle 
class role in Latin American development by bringing to 
bear ethnographic data from middle income families in Sao 
Paulo, Brazil. Another is to suggest some ways in which the
^See Johnson (1958:ix): "The terms "middle sec­
tors," "middle groups," "middle components," "middle ele­
ments," used interchangeably were settled upon to convey 
the idea of middleness without paralleling any fixed cri­
teria of middleness employed in areas outside Latin Ameri­
ca . .  . their membership ranges upward from the poorly 
paid white collar employee in government with a limited 
education and often a lack of helpful family connections, 
to the wealthy proprietors of commercial and industrial 
enterprises on the one hand and to the educated professio-
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concept of "middle class" can usefully contribute to our
understanding of the developmental process.
It seems to me that in order to speak of a middle
class in Brazil, Latin America, or elsewhere, one must
reconcile an historical and political view of class with a
functional view of classes and descriptive strata. With
E. P. Thompson, I see class as
an historical phenomenon, which in fact happens (and 
can be shown to have happened) in human relationships.
The relationship must always be embodied in real people 
and in a real context . . .  class happens when some men, 
as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), 
feel and articulate the identity of their interests as 
between themselves and as against other men whose inte­
rests are different (and usually opposed to) theirs.
The class experience is largely determined by the pro­
ductive relations into which men are born— or enter 
involuntarily (Thompson, 1964:9).
We call the experience of class "class consciousness*" but it
is always embedded in a particular cultural matrix:
If the experience appears as determined, class conscious­
ness does not. Consciousness of class arises in the 
same way in different times and places, but never in 
just the same way (Thompson,1964:10,emphasis in the original).
However, while the class experience is a relation­
ship which waxes and wanes among men, I agree with Leeds 
(1973:53-5) that in the capitalist world functionally and 
structurally defined classes have emerged over time, and 
that these have developed differently in different places. 
Thus, in the industrial community, one can discern the
nal men, teachers and high level government bureaucrats, 
usually from old established families on the other."
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evolutionary emergence of bounded aggregates of 
people divided off from and standing over against 
each other by virtue of organization, position 
occupancy and network interaction, as well as by 
cultural mechanisms. The bounded aggregates appear 
in their broadest and most simply understood forms 
to be a "proletariat,"... a structurally defined 
and segregated "middle class" and an "elite" (Leeds, 
1973:53).
In the industrial nations, Leeds argues, the
functions of the middle class are what
one might call "lubricatory:" the making effective 
of transactions involving the strategic resources of 
society, the implementation of the exchanges of 
resources, including money: collection of information, 
transmission of knowledge, the processing of information 
for ultimate users.... the function of these activities 
is the linkage of the positions and organizations 
structuring the proletarians and elites in such a 
way that the necessarily interdependent societal 
functions of these two aggregates can be made to oper­
ate more or less predictably (1973:53).
In the industrial North Atlantic community; scales measu­
ring the distribution of income, power and prestige
tend to concentrate medium levels of the measures 
with the middle class, low ones with the proletarians, 
and high ones with the elites (Leeds, 1973:53; see 
also Leeds, 1967:347).
However, Leeds argues that such a three layered 
structure of classes did not evolve in the countries 
which developed in dependency relations to the industrial 
nations.
Turning to Latin America in general, I see no 
sets of functions separately attached to structurally 
differentiated corporate social bodies of the kind 
discussed above. That is, as.it all state societies. 
the functions exist, but they are not systematically 
£*Q&Qd,out sep^atel^feq$..gther functions.,,.,,,,—catrtftfl, w   s„nteg.,.„ip-Bygop?afl f rej-ftfitaa andthey are not carried out by a systematically segre-
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gated body of specialists: a functionary or lubri- 
catory, that is, a middle, class (Leeds, 1973:54, 
emphasis added). *7
He argues that in Brazil and other dependent countries
only two classes developed, proletarians and elites, or
‘'masses1' and "classes" (1973:57; 1965:384). This is not
to say that there are no middle sectors on a descriptive
scale measuring the distribution of wealth, power and
prestige in Brazil. These exist by definition, since
they are imposed methodologically, and indeed, Willems
has shown that in Sao Paulo state, at least, there
has always been since the 1820*s
a social stratum which cannot by any stretch of the 
imagination be confused with the upper class of 
wealthy landowners or with the lower class of slaves, 
laborers, paupers, mendicants and vagrants (1970:46).
It would seem, however, that Willems is here 
using the words 'fclass" and 'fc tat us" co-terminous ly, in a 
usage which we will avoid. Leeds has shown that many of 
these middle income strata or sectors are functionally 
and structurally integrated into the elite, through a 
series of networks, linkages and patron client relation­
ships; and he has noted that the individuals,
It may be pointed out that Leeds (1964, 1965 and 
1973) departs fairly radically from Leeds (1957). In the 
earlier work on cocoa plantations in Bahia, he describes 
two classes defined by their differential relation to cru­
cial resources, and a third "which is independent of these 
resources" (1957:276). The people in the third class 
"occupy a position essentially independent of the produc­
tive structure, and could logically, even if inconveniently
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qua individuals who compose the oligarchies are not 
necessarily in the least at comparable income, pres­
tige or power levels: these common stratification 
criteria are social-structurally irrelevant here 
(1965:384).
In Brazil, increasing status within the elite is associa­
ted with larger networks and with a denser distribution 
of functions rather than with the delegation of functions 
as in the North Atlantic community (1973:56). Personalist 
networks extending through middle and upper income strata 
are a fundamentally important resource for the upper 
echelons of the elite, for information, political payoffs 
and political control.
Thus, in the context of this discussion, I shall 
only use the term "middle sectors" as a descriptive term, 
referring to middle income strata with no assumptions as 
to their class relations. The object of the research 
was to discover whether a class relation existed, or, in 
Thompson's words, whether class was "happening" to middle 
income sectors, many of which are assumed by Leeds to form 
part of the "classes," or the elite. For, with the par­
tial exception of primate urban centers such as Sab Paulo,
be dispensed with" (1957:253). The third, functionary, 
or middle class "serves, so to speak, as the cog wheels 
which mesh the owning and working classes into a single 
productive machinery and lubricates this machine to 
insure its effective operation" (1957:258).
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Leeds sees
no convincing evidence anywhere A n  Latin America^ of 
a bounded, segregated middle class exclusively exer­
cising a set of societal functions, and ... no evidence 
that such construction of boundaries is increasing or 
even taking place (1973:57-58).
This thesis, however, does present such evidence.
The research embodied in it suggests that a middle class 
is indeed being segregated from classes above and below it, 
and that this is occurring in response to changes in Brazil's 
position in the world economy. That is, the bulk of the 
thesis demonstrates that middle income sectors which in the 
past were discrete, have come to resemble each other 
structurally, as well as to share similar experiences and 
ways of feeling about these experiences. However, this 
middle class is very different from that hoped for by moder­
nization theorists. The groups which compose it have had 
very little initiative in Brazil's development. Its values 
are not like those attributed to European middle classes of 
the 19th century. The emerging consciousness of class which 
the research suggests is radically different from an upper 
ruling class consciousness or a proletarian one, because 
while it arises out of the shared experience of exclusion 
from oportunities for enrichment or political influence of 
one, it does not have the material resources of the other to 
defend.
Moreover, this middle class consciousness of class 
is necessarily inchoate because the cultural idiom in which
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it is expressed is controlled by a very dominant and secure 
ruling class, and because mechanisms and institutions which 
were previously available for the political expression of 
their individual interests, have now been removed. 1 shall 
argue that this kind of consciousness of class contributes 
indirectly to Brazil's present phase of economic development 
and to many of the "fascist" overtones which characterise it.
These conclusions derive both from the kinds of 
questions I began my field work with and from the quality 
of the neighborhood in which I worked, iln order to ascer­
tain whether modernization theories about a middle class 
were correct, I wanted to know:
1. If there is a middle class in Sao Paulo, how did it 
develop? How can it be differentiated from groups 
"above" or"below" it? How could one account for the 
variety of groups within it, to which all writers 
paid lip service, while still referring to a single 
"middle class" which could affect the development 
process?
2. If immigrants were more modern (oriented towards indus­
trial capitalism) than the native population, why was 
this so? How much would this affect upward mobility?
In other words, how valid was a Horatio Alger vision 
of the middle class?
3. If the downwardly mobile "poor relative" model of 
middle class formation were correct, could it be shown
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
31
that such people were more conservative and that they 
therefore preferred traditional bureaucratic employment 
to the risks of business enterprise? More broadly, 
how much weight should be given to "origins” in 
explaining subsequent behavior?
Sab Paulo city, Brazil, was chosen to research 
modernization expectations on the middle class role 
in developing nations because its size, industrialization 
and political history would ensure the presence of every 
variety of middle sector discussed in the literature: immi­
grants, downwardly mobile poor relatives, businessmen and 
bureaucrats. Sao Paulo is the most rapidly growing indus­
trial city in the world, the industrial center of Brazil 
and the largest industrial center in Latin America. Accor­
ding to the 1970 census, the greater Sao Paulo area had a 
population of over eight million, of whom between thirty- 
seven and sixty-four per cent are classified as "classe 
media11 (middle class) by the weekly Vela magazine (VeJa. 
1975(380):59). Brazil and Sao Paulo have undergone an 
extraordinarily high rate of growth since 1968, which 
seems to have expanded the city's middle income sectors. 
Again, according to Veia.
Of a total of almost 30 million Brazilian workers 
counted in the 1970 census, about 8.2 million, that 
is twenty eight per cent of the total, belonged to 
the so-called "middle sectors." For the first time 
in Brazilian history, this mass inhabiting the towns 
and the countryside has surpassed the number of pro­
letarians, which at the time was counted as 8 million
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people (Veia.1975(380);59).
If Sao Paulo was ideal in terms of its sociological 
parameters for the kinds of questions I was asking, it was, 
however, problematic from the standpoint of anthropological 
fieldwork. Working in a city made it much more difficult 
to fit into the lives of the people I wanted to study than 
if 1 had worked in, say, a peasant community, jfhus many 
more families came to be known through interviews than by 
participant observation. Many more of the anthropological 
dimensions, specifically those concerned with revealing 
the quality of life of informants* had to come from key 
informants, especially women, than 1 had anticipated.
In addition, it was at first difficult to find 
a population as opposed to isolated families, that was 
willing to be studied. In the field I used the term 
“middle class'1 (classe media) as a status term which could 
be claimed or ascribed to others, as a way to discover the 
principles used in differentiating persons (cf. Silverman, 
1966). I hoped in this way that 1 would be able to dis­
cover the various stylistic, social and political ways in 
which informants themselves used the term “classe media11 
and whether it referred to any structurally differentiated 
category of people. I also used the term descriptively, 
that is, referring to people who were neither very rich 
nor very poor. This was done on the assumption that I 
would be more likely to find a middle class situation
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among the middle income sectors of Sao Paulo, an assumption
which was somewhat qualified by the results of this research
since the income levels of the families interviewed were
in general above the middle income strata of Sao Paulo. ^
During the early period of research in Sao Paulo,
I discovered that the term "classe media" had become a 
19heavily publicised notion related to levels of consump­
tion allegedly made possible by Brazil's phenomenal economic 
growth since 1968. It is also a highly politicized concept: 
by Government sponsorship it appears on television shows as 
a category of people earning a given sum of money per month, 
in the press as the people responsible for left or right 
thinking governments; and most clearly in Government spon­
sored civics courses at the University level, where 
according to students that I spoke to, the slasgftjpffdjyi 
appears as those people who maintain a politically stable 
and growing economy.
However, the "not too rich> not too poor" speci­
fication was useful to sidestep gross misdirections in the 
search for a middle class, such as suggestions that 1 in­
terview domestic servants who had bought sewing machines 
or refrigerators on the installment plan, or self styled 
"middle class" resident North American businessmen with 
significant real estate and industrial holdings and inter­
national financial connections.
19I was repeatedly referred to the novel, Sramos 
Seis by M. L. Dupre' for a portrait of middle class life. 
Published in 1942, the book describes the life of a nuclear 
family between 1915 and 1942. At the opening of the story, 
the husband is a salaried employee in commerce. He is pay­
ing a mortgage on a house in a central city neighborhood.
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At that time, a number of people were willing to 
discuss the ideological implications of the term "classe 
media" and a few were even willing to claim that status 
within the context of the discussion. Understandably, very 
few, however, were willing to submit to a North American 
stranger's inquiries into their antecedents, household 
economies and social networks. I was told repeatedly that 
the classe media was very closed (fechada) with social 
contacts limited to their families, work places and clubs 
(familia. trabalho e clubes). and that it would be most 
unlikely that I would find the close contact situation I 
was hoping for.
The people who were ultimately studied lived in 
Santana, one of the forty eight subdistricts in the dis­
trict of Sao Paulo. Santana is located north of Se, the 
center of Sao Paulo city, across the Tiete River on the 
lowlands by the river and on the foothills rising to the 
Serra da Cantareira mountains beyond. In 1970 its popula­
tion was 200,490 people, and it was the fourth most popu-
While the wife earns extra money by making sweets 
for festivities at the homes of wealthier relatives and the 
children do not have university educations, but rather 
"normal" or "commercial" courses beyond high school, this 
is not a working class family, but rather a family belong­
ing to middle income sectors. Nonetheless, they refer to 
themselves as "pobres" (poor). They are so in relation to 
their wealthier relatives, and the links with these are 
describedyas tenuous indeed. This suggests that the term 
"classe media" as applied to middle income sectors has a 
relatively short historical depth among Brazilians.
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lated subdistrict of Sao Paulo (IBGE, 1970:90; see Figure 
3 and Appendix I).
Until the 1930*s Santana's character was that of 
a predominantly rural appendage to the metropolis of Sao 
Paulo across the river. Today the rural character of 
Santana has disappeared. There are a few unpaved roads 
left in the ere- ices between the hills which are settled 
by pocket favelas (shantytowns or squatments). Much of 
the area is cut into by major traffic arteries which lead 
away from the city. The previously rural countryside is 
now occupied by two story residences and small commercial 
and industrial establishments. The swamps along the 
river have been filled and periodic flooding by the river 
is largely controlled. The military airstrip along the 
river borders on an air force residential compound as well 
as on the Parque Anherabi, the largest convention and 
industrial exposition center in Latin America. In addition, 
the center of Santana houses the northern terminus for the 
new Sao Paulo subway system which was finished in 1974.
The center of the subdistrict, "Aouele miolo do 
bairro11 (literally, the •'brain'* of the neighborhood), is 
heavily commercial and extraordinarily busy with motor 
and pedestrian traffic during the day. It is located on 
the blocks around the north-south axis of the area, Ave- 
nida Voluntaries da Patria, where it crosses the east-
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Figure 3. Map of Greater Sao Paulo.
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Municipality of Sao Paulo
D is t r i c t  of Sao Paulo
■ Santanam C i ty  Cen ter
SOURCE: Hochtief, Montreal & Deconsult (1970:20).
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
37
west axes. Rua Dr, Gessr and Rua Alfredo Pujol (See Figure 
4 ). Commercial establishments along the main streets 
include carpentry shops, bakeries, household appliance 
stores, meat and fish stores, bars, clothing and shoe 
stores, professional offices, two local newspaper offices, 
several office supply stores, record shops, musical instru­
ment shops, a guitar factory, beauty parlors, pharmacies,
20branch banks and an umbanda shop.
On the side streets commerce is limited to a few 
supermarkets, pharmacies, bars and occasional small textile 
stores and “armarinhos11 (literally, “little closets,M small 
stores sailing sewing supplies, paper goods and toys,). 
Residential building plots are generally long and narrow; 
the houses are most often two story stucco buildings with 
small tiled or concrete front gardens sporting a few 
formal flower beds. Most have no garages and tin carports 
are frequent additions to the front gardens. Larger plots 
may have a garage with servants' quarters above it and 
a concrete backyard (quintal) between the main building 
and the garage. This often serves as the household's 
laundry area.
The monotony of the rectangular two story buildings 
is relieved by a few more elaborate houses, modeled after 
"palacetes" (literally, “little palaces'1) built by
20Umbanda is a syncretic Afrc=Brazilian religious 
cult (Brown,1974).
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Figure Center of Santana,
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coffee barons in more central neighborhoods of the city 
early in the century. These may have porches, spiral co­
lumns and even minarets, albeit generally on a smaller 
scale than the mansions they were built to emulate. The 
largest of these on the top of the Santana hill is a red 
brick construction in the style of a swiss chalet crossed
with a medieval castle, which now houses a private materni-
21ty hospital and a children*s library. Most of these older 
and more distinctive buildings, however, were shabby with 
disrepair and blended with the simpler two story houses. 
Occasionally private houses had small signs announcing 
lessons in music, French and English. Others also doubled 
as small knitting factories and retail outlets. Most, how­
ever, were single family dwellings exclusively.
The interior of the houses and apartments I visited 
are not characterised by any single style. Except for the 
older more elaborate houses, public and private rooms are 
rarely larger than twelve by sixteen feet. The living and 
dining areas were frequently located in the same room. Fur­
nishings could vary between stark modern leatherette, modern
21Large residential mansions dating from the 1920*s 
often have been converted to business purposes. In the for** 
mer upper class^sections of town (Higienopolis, Avenida Pau- 
lista, Consolapao and Campos Eliseos, for example) such 
mansions often house banking, real estate and publicity con­
cerns. In Santana, one housed a hospital, another a language 
institute. Slowly and inexorably, however, such buildings 
are being replaced by skyscrapers.
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synthetic plush, and, among a very few older informants, 
dark and heavy Victorian. Decorations in all public rooms 
might include crochet doilies, plants and flowers, bric-a- 
brac and paintings of landscapes, religious scenes or 
animals. According to informants, the presence of a few 
silver items among older families indicates twenty-five 
years of marriage. Among younger families, new and shiny 
silver ashtrays, canape picks, candy trays and animal 
figurines create a decorative effect which is taken to 
indicate upward mobility.
There is a great deal of morning activity on the 
residential streets. By six thirty in the morning long 
lines form to wait for the busses which take people to 
work in the city. Later on, women chat with each other at 
their garden gates while waiting for the fruit and vegetable 
vendor, on their ways to and from shopping on the commer­
cial streets. Children play under the ubiquitous tin car­
ports, or, in the quieter areas, right on the streets.
Twice a week women may be on the streets as early as six 
thirty in the morning with their shopping carts to go 
to the open air markets (feira). These activities peak at 
mid morning, when the women disappear to prepare lunch—  
often with the assistance of their maids--for which husbands 
with cars return home. Then children follow to have lunch 
and to get ready for afternoon sessions of school. The 
afternoons are quieter. Men return to work, women rest
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or go to the city for shopping, or to charity or religious 
organizations. By nightfall the houses are shuttered, the 
Volkswagens are in the carports and the silence is only 
broken by the drama of television soap operas.
While this impressionistic description might
^  22 characterise a number of Sao Paulo's subdistricts, San­
tana was a logical and interesting area in which to work. 
Most of the families studied had lived in Santana for be­
tween twenty and seventy years: thus, many of the indivi­
dual careers reflect and are related to the development of 
the subdistrict as well as of the city. The distinct 
groupings and interrelations over time among the consti­
tuent families which the research revealed might not have
23been as visible in older or redeveloped areas. These
are dominated by high rise rental buildings characterised
by the rapid turnover of anonymous nuclear families who
have no longstanding ties to each other.
Although Santana's image on the southern side of
the Tiete River is that of a distant, inaccessible place 
24with a poor population, and it is surrounded by neighbor-
2^For example, Vila Mariana, Pinheiros, sections
of Lapa.
^Velho (1973) describes the isolation and anomie 
of apartment dwellers on Rio de Janeiro's Copacabana beach.
24This was the case not only for the inhabitants 
of the wealthier sections of the city, such as Jardim 
America, Jardim Paulista and Cerqueira Cesar
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hoods poorer than itself (See Figure 5 and Appendix I), 
Santana informants themselves consider the neighborhood 
typically middle class ( tfpicamente classe media ). In­
deed, a survey of the city using 1968 census material 
revealed that Santana was far from a poor neighborhood 
(Hochtief, Montreal, Deconsult, 1970). It ranked just below 
the midpoint of the forty-eight subdistricts of the city 
when ranked by income and number of automobiles (twenty- 
seventh and twenty-sixth respectively. See Appendix I).
Except for the large number of students and bureaucrats in 
the area, Santana was in 1968, more or less "middle" among 
all the subdistricts of the city (See Appendix I and Figure 
5).
While Santana is thus statistically in the ••middle" 
of a range of subdistricts, its development was relatively 
late. Santana's history is similar to that of many of the 
older subdistricts of the city. The original settlement of 
Sao Paulo by the Jesuits in the sixteenth century included 
not only the "paramilitary village" of Se (Wilhelm, 1965:11), 
but numerous other sparse hamlets around Jesuit missions or
(See Figure 5 ), but also for some of the government 
personnel dealing with the construction of the subway termi­
nal in Santana and the modernization of the area surrounding 
the terminal. Santana probably has this image because it 
is surrounded by poorer neighborhoods, because few of Sao 
Paulo’s rich ever go there and because to get there from the 
center of town one must undergo traffic jams of legendary 
proportions caused by road and subway construction.
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Figure 5. Income distribution in Sao Paulo 
sub-districts.
Is Subdi
SOURCE: Adapted from Hochtief, Montreal & 
Deconsult (1970:20,47,213-25).
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ehacaras (small farms) which were all linked to the central
25parish of Se" (See Figure 6 ). The hamlets were linked by 
trade routes used by the Bandeirantes^ in the seventeenth 
century, who in search for anything at all to sell, roamed 
west for Indian slaves and north for gold. Sao Paulo*s
27economy provided barely enough for its own subsistence.
It was no major export center"itself, but engaged in com­
merce with the country*s principal centers of production, 
export and import: east to the port of Rio de Janeiro, 
south to the port of Santos, north to the mining region, 
south and west to the leather, mule and cattle complex, 
and later with western sugar producing regions of Sao 
Paulo province.
Until the nineteenth century then, Sao Paulo was 
a minor trading center composed of dispersed settlements 
over a large territorial expanse (See Figure 6 ). Its 
urbanization consisted not of centrifugal expansion from 
the administrative center of Se, but rather of territorial
^■*"The phenomenon of the town's multinucleated 
population had its origins in a few indian villages, foun­
ded initially by the Jesuits and grouped around chapels 
built by /Portuguese/ landowners. Embryonic agglomerations 
and new neighborhoods or parishes, even new towns ... for­
med around many of these missions or chapels" (Marcilio, 
1968:62, 68-69).
^ S e e  Morse (1965) on these quasi bandit explorers.
^Neighboring towns reserved part of their produc­
tion for consumption in the capital. These included Ati- 
baia, Bragan^a, Nazare', Jundiai and Parnaiba (Marcilio, 
1968:46).
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shrinkage towards the center, through a process of filling 
in the empty spaces between existing nuclei. At the peri­
phery many nuclei became independent towns (Marcilio, 196S: 
16). Within the area which now comprises Sao Paulo city, 
many subdistricts were relatively independent rural communi­
ties, which were linked by the city's growth during the
late nineteenth century and the twentieth century. Typical-
28ly, this occurred when local landowners developed parts 
of their lands creating new nuclei, such as Arouche, Campos 
Eliseos, Consola^ao, Sta. Efigenia, Braz and Bom Retiro, 
which are all subdistricts of Sao Paulo today (Wilhelm, 
1965:13; Marcilio, 1968:16; Mendes Torres, 1969; 1970; 
Dertonio, 1971; Masarolo, 1971; Jorge, 1970).
Thus, Santana's growth resulted from both Jesuit 
settlement in the seventeenth century and local landowner 
real estate development during this century. The Fazenda 
Sant'Anna was originally a Jesuit estate established by a 
land grant from the Portuguese government in 1673 as well 
as by various subsequent private donations. After the ex­
pulsion of the Jesuits in the eighteenth century the land 
reverted back to the crown. The site of the Fazenda Sant' 
Anna became a seminary and a trade school for impoverished
^Outside developers also played a role. For exam­
ple, the British based City Company bought huge tracts of 
land on the southern side of the city in the early part of 
the century for future development. These are now the 
wealthy subdistricts of Jardim America and Jardim Paulista.
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youths and in 1893 a barracks for the army. The population 
of the area appears to have been small and relatively cons­
tant (See Figure 7 ), consisting of landowners, slaves, 
tradesmen, wavers, vagrants and beggars (Mendes Torres, 
1970:24-33). The local economy was based on agriculture 
and pasturage.
Figure 7. Population of Santana from 1765 to 1825.









SOURCE: Mendes Torres (1970:22-33).
At the turn of the present century, Santana's 
population was included in the census of the parish of 
Sta. Efigenia in the center of the city, and Santana did not 
even appear on the city maps (Mendes Torres, 1970:70, 81), 
although one of the principal exits from the city to the 
trade routes to the north passed through the area. San­
tana 's relatively slow growth at the end of the nineteenth 
century may be inferred from the figures for the neighbo­
ring district of Nossa Senhora do 0 (See Figure 8). During 
the twentieth century Santana's development was marked by 
tremendous population growth, real estate development and
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Figure 8. Population growth in center city neigh­








N. Sra. do 0 2023
Sad Paulo 23243
SOURCE: Mendes Torres 
Morse (1970:238).
*includes Santana.
29shrinkage of the district’s territory.
The rapidity and shallow historical depth of San­
tana’s development made it possible to discover among the 
families studied three different trajectories towards the 
formation of a contemporary middle class in Sao Paulo.
Two of these trajectories have been discussed above and in 
the literature on middle classes in Brazil: the "upwardly 
mobile immigrant" trajectory and the "cartorial" trajecto­
ry, or the absorption of downwardly mobile rural elites 
into expanding bureaucracies. A third trajectory, which
Santana’s dimensions had extended^from the Tiete 
River north to the Municipality of Mairipora, west to the 
subdistrict of Nossa Senhora do Cf and east to the Municipa­
lity of Guarulhos at the turn of the century (Mendes^orres, 
1970:96). During the course of this century Tucuruvi 
(1925), Pari (1934), Vila Maria (1938), Casa Verde (1938), 









(1969: 112, 1970::66, 76);
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to my knowledge has not been previously described, consists 
of the history of a'local elite" in Santana--one of Sao Pau­
lo's nucleated hamlets--during this century's urbanization 
process.
Families representative of all three trajectories 
were present in Santana by 1930 and the relationships bet­
ween all three over time are clarified when placed against 
the historical backdrop of the four political epochs of Sao 
Paulo and Brazil's history during this century. These are the 
First Republic (1889-1930), the Vargas years (1930-1945), the 
Second Republic (1946-1964) and the post 1964 military dic­
tatorship. Each epoch created opportunities for different 
groups among the families studied. Besides revealing the 
careers of Santana's local elite, this method also demonstra­
ted interrelationships between bureaucrats and immigrants 
which have not been previously discernible because the two 
categories are usually treated separately. The use of an 
historical perspective suggests the dialectic by which, over 
time, middle income sectors were included or excluded from 
Sao Paulo's "classes" and the latter's mechanisms of domina­
tion. Finally, it shows the way in which groups of 
entirely disparate origins have come to form at present
Cachoeirinha (1965) were split off to form new subdistricts. 
Santana's area is presently of 2,106.7 km^ (Mendes Torres, 
1970:95-100).
3^See Chapter Three for a description of this group 
and my usage of the term "elite."
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a single, more or less homogeneous group.
The Santana families interviewed were friends and 
friends of friends: except at the outer reaches of the 
networks many know each other, or know of each other.
While differences of origins and wealth existed between 
these families, the sample may be biased, then, towards 
shared attitudes and values. These families are clearly 
not a representative sample of all possible middle class 
families in Sao Paulo. 1 am assuming at the outset, how­
ever, that the family careers described here are paradig­
matic of the formation of a middle class in Sao Paulo: 
that is, the social forces which shaped the lives of my 
informants affected the lives of other middle income 
families in similar ways.
A total of ninety householders was formally 
interviewed. Interviews with the first twenty of them 
consisted of three parts and in many cases were spread out 
over several weeks, even months. First, a genealogy was 
collected for both sides of the family where possible, 
going back as far as informants were able to remember.
This memory span rarely exceeded more than three genera­
tions. These genealogies yielded data on ethnic origins, 
regional and international migrations and employment for 
between forty and three hundred individuals per family, 
with a greater emphasis, of course, on the career of the 
particular informant.
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Second, information was collected on household 
composition, income, property and source thereof, educatio­
nal level and consumption patterns. Third, informants were 
asked a number of open ended questions on Brazilian economic 
and political development, on their visions of Sao Paulo's 
social structure and on their own positions and those of 
their friends and relatives in that structure. Towards the 
end of the research period I carried out seventy additional 
short form interviews in order to get strictly comparable 
data and expand the corpus. In addition, close personal 
contact was maintained with several families who included 
me in family and neighborhood activities, involving rela­
tives and friends, many of whom had been or were later 
also interviewed.
While the average per capita income in Santana 
was NCr. 514.24 per month (at 1973 exchange rates of NCr. 
6.22 to $1,00, this was equivalent to $82.35 per month, 
or an annual income of $988.20), the ninety families 
interviewed were considerably better off than the average 
for the neighborhood, or indeed, most of the city, in terms 
of their consumption patterns and incomes. According to 
the Plaflp y^banistigo .frasiso (PUB, 1968:144, 148), house­
holds like these were part of the 1.7 per cent of the popu­
lation of Santana with family incomes of ever NCr. 1,500.00 
per month ($241.15 per month, or $2,893.89 per annum. See 
Figure 9). They were well within the top 10.6 per cent of
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Figure 9. Monthly family income distribution in 
Santana, 1968 prices.
Income Strata in NCr. Percentage of Population
A and B over 1,500.00 1.7
C 501.00 - 1,500.00 37.7
01 201.00 - 500.00 45.5
02 0 200.00 15.1
SOURCE: PUB (1968:148).
listed family incomes above NCr. 1,500.00 in Sab Paulo 
city (See Figure 10), and most family incomes were well 
above NCr. 4,000.00 a month ($643.08 per month or $7,716.96 
per annum). Besides these relatively high incomes, most
^  Figure 10. Monthly family income distribution in 
Sao Paulo, 1968 prices
Income Strata in NCr. Percentage of Population
A and B over 1,500.00 10.6
C 501.00 - 1,500.00 36.2
D1 201.00 - 500.00 41.3
D2 0 200.00 11,9
SOURCES: PUB (1968:144), Pessoa de Barros (1974:19).
(87.8 percent) of the families interviewed owned their own 
automobiles (.97 per cent automobiles per family), all owned 
at least one television set (1.73 per cent televisions per 
family), radios, stoves, refrigerators, washing machines, 
vacuum cleaners and various other durable consumer goods.
As a group, the families interviewed provided employment for
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forty-four live-in servants and sixty-three day workers, 
as cooks, chauffeurs and laundresses. More than half 
(53.9 per cent) have their salaries or pensions supplemented 
by rents from properties they own and just under half (46 
per cent) of the families have additional properties besides 
those rented out, ranging from weekend or vacation houses 
to plots of land on which they wish to build or which they 
wish to sell at a profit at a later time (See Figures 11, 
12, 13 and Appendix 111).
Figure 11. The percentages of income strata in 








A1 2 2 4 7 3 2
A2 9 11 7 12 8 8
B1 6 10 11 g 11 10
B2 23 26 28 29 29 31
Cl 14 14 23 15 14 16
C2 25 20 21 18 22 22
D1 10 7 3 8 7 6
02 13 10 3 3 6 5
SOURCE: Associacao Brasileira de Annunciantes, 
cited in Veia (1975(380):59).
■^iNote the discrepancy between the proportion of 
the D stratum in Figure 11 in Sao Paulo (11 per cent) and 
in Figure 10 (53.2 per cent). The 1975 figures suggest a 
vast improvement in the earning power of 1968*s D stratum.
In view of studies which have shown increasingly inequitable 
income distribution (Fishlow, 1972; Langoni, 1973), this 
improvement is surely illusory, resulting from changing 
the cut off points of the strata. There is considerable 
overlap between the strata Cl and C2 in the 1975 chart 
and the D stratum in the 1968 chart. For example,
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Figure 12. Family income, education and consumption 
strata in Brazil, 1975.






A1 3 12,000 95% U.A. 
85% U.G.
90%: TV, ref, tfax, aut, 
mix, dam, wash, vac 
50%: TVc
A2 9 5,600 80% U.A. 
50%:U.G.
90%: ..TV, rrdf, max, aut 
75%: mix, dam 
50%: wash, vac 
25%: TVc
B1 9 3,600 50% U.A. 
20% U.G.
90%: TV, ref, wax 
50%: mix, dom, wash 
75%: aut 15%: TVc
B2 28 2,200 30% U.A. 
majority H.S.
90%: TV, ref 75%: wax 
50%: aut 5%: TVc
Cl 16 1,400 majority H.S. 90%: TV, ref 50%: wax 
1%: TVc
C2 21 1,000 40% inc. H.S. 
majority inc. 
Primary
90%: TV 75%: ref
D1 7 700 60% inc. H.S.
40% inc. Primary
50%: TV
02 7 400 100% inc. Primary 
or illiterate
SOURCE: Shotgun Nestle: Associapao Brasileira de 
Annuneiantes, cited in ye la (1975(380):59).
NOTES : U.A. - University Attendance H.S. - High School
U.G. - University Graduates inc. - incomplete
TV - television ref - refrigerator
wax - electric waxer aut - automobile
mix - electric mixer W e - doior^Wdom - domestic servant wash - washing machine vac - vacuum cleaner
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Figure 13, Monthly family incomes and consumption indices of Santana families interviewed 
1972-1973,
Income brackets in 
thousands of NCr. 1.5-2 2-4 4-6 6-8 8-10 10-12 12-14 14-16 16-18 18+ Totals
No. of families with 
incomes between 6 20 15 17 8 10 2 2 3 7 90
No. families owning 
own house or apt. * 5 16 15 13 7 9 1 2 3 7 78
No. of automobiles 1 10 8 18 12 10 4 3 7 14 97
No. of TVs* 9 28 21 28 18 18 5 5 10 12 154
No. of live-in- 
maids * - 3 4 7 4 10 3 1 2 8 42
No. of day maids* - 13 12 11 7 8 1 1 3 7 63
No. families wi£h 
rented property 2 8 5 9 5 7 2 2 7 49
No. families with, unrented property 1 7 8 5 7 5 1 - 2 6 42
*Within each income bracket column.
56
For most of the families interviewed this relative 
wealth was derived from salaried positions in commerce, 
the liberal professions or the various city or state 
bureaucracies. A few individuals had independent busi­
nesses, some times in addition to their regular jobs.
Most married women did not work outside their homes.^1 
Of all the women over thirty in all of the households 
studied, thirty-eight or 34.86 percent, had or had had 
careers. Most of the single women in the sample had work­
ed as teachers, social workers or secretaries, but many 
were now retired on pensions. Almost needless to say, 
all members of the families interviewed were literate 
all children attended school, generally private school, 
and all parents expected their children to continue on
C2 in the 1975 chart earns approximately $154.00 a month 
(1,000 t 6.885 = 145.24), whereas the D stratum in the 
1968 chart earns about $130.00 a month (500 ? 3.83=130.54). 
This equivalence is further reinforced when real wages are 
computed, since not only has the cruzeiro devalued, but 
so has the dollar (by approximately twenty per cent from 
1972 on). Using the 1968 dollar as base we could argue 
that the $145.00 a month earned by C2 in 1975 is equiva­
lent to 112.00 in 1968 dollars.
•^Miller (1976), who has studied middle class fa­
mily organization in Belo Horizonte, writes that "many 
middle class women have careers which take them outside 
the home, and often their income is what really allows 
the household to maintain a middle class life style" (1976 
:64). In her sample, twenty per cent of married women 
worked outside their homes (1976;70).
32Except for one eighty-four year old individual.
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to university. The incidence of university attendance 
among interviewees declined as their ages increased.
Figure 13 shows that there are significant 
differences of family income among the families inter­
viewed, and that as a whole the families range upwards 
through the B2 to A1 strata in Figure 12. However, the 
range of the Santana families' relative wealth and the 
foregoing figures should only he taken as a rough indi­
cation of their economic rank on a graded scale for Sao 
Paulo and the nation. This information says nothing about 
the emergence of a middle class separate from classes above 
or below it. In order to demonstrate this emergence, the 
dissertation relies primarily on the in-depth interviews 
which reveal the quality of the families' historical tra­
jectories and the quality of the emerging consciousness of 
--middle--class.
In order to discuss the questions raised in this 
chapter, the rest of the dissertation is organized as 
follows: Chapter II discusses the distinct political and
economic phases which have characterised Brazilian history 
during this century and attempts to assess middle class 
influence on Brazilian development. It argues that a 
middle class could not have played the role attributed to 
it by modernization theorists for a number of reasons. It 
also suggests the ways in which middle income sectors 
were generated by various political and economic forces,
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and that the transition from a two to a three class system 
is a progressive but recent phenomenon. The next two 
chapters discuss the three trajectories identified in 
Santana, towards the formation of a single middle class. 
Chapter V describes those feelings and attitudes among 
informants which I am here calling “consciousness of class." 
Drawing on recent analyses of the television industry in 
Brazil, it shows how such a consciousness is manipulated 
by the government so as to propagate an entirely false 
vision of society. The final chapter elaborates on the 
conclusions presented earlier and suggests areas for 
future research.
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CHAPTER II
POLITICAL PHASES OF BRAZIL'S DEVELOPMENT 
AND MIDDLE CLASS FORMATION
It is customary to discuss the history of Brazil in 
terms of the distinct political phases which have charac­
terized it. Modernization writers tend to emphasize the 
role of a middle class in effecting the transitions from 
phase to phase during this century, as well as in the 
industrialization which has marked recent Brazilian history. 
This chapter will present an overview of the political 
phases of Brazil's growth during this century and then 
discuss the effects of each on the formation of middle 
income groups. In each phase (First Republic, 1889-1930; 
the Vargas years, 1930-1945; Second Republic,1 1945-1964; 
and military dictatorship, 1964 to the present), Brazil's 
position in the world economy changed; the political phases 
reflected these changes, as did adjustments in the class 
structure. The world system perspective adopted and recent 
historical research demonstrate that middle sectors were not
^I am following the more general usage in ascribing 
the term “Second Republic" to the years between 1945 and 
1964. Technically, the Vargas years between 1934 and 1937 
are the Second Republic (Carone, 1973).
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as important for the transitions between epochs, nor for 
the industrialization process,as writers favoring moderni­
zation theory suppose.
In addition, the chapter argues that in spite of 
oscillations, the overall trend in Brazilian history during 
this century has been towards progressive centralization of 
the Brazilian government and polity. This political trend, 
as well as various economic forces, significantly expanded 
urban middle income sectors, as each phase brought an ex­
pansion of administrative functions and a growth of middle 
level positions of influence, thus preparing the ground 
for a transition from a two to a three class system.
However, in spite of the growth of such middle income 
sectors, the material suggests the hypothesis that the tran­
sition from a two to a three class system, with an increa­
singly large middle class being shunted away from power 
and manipulated to serve the ends of centralization, is a 
recent, if progressive phenomenon, and culminates in the 
definition of a middle class as a politically powerless but 
consuming group.
Although Brazil’s recent history is one of the most 
successful industrial import substitution efforts in the 
third world (Bergesman, 1972:71), during most of this cen­
tury, its history has been linked to that of coffee on the 
world commodity market. Thus, the First Republic (1889- 
1930) spanned the years when Brazil's economy was neocolo­
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nial, dominated by the export of coffee. Industry, which by 
1920 was strongest in Sao Paulo, was closely linked to the 
prevailing coffee interests. Electoral politics were con­
trolled by agricultural economic interests and national 
power was dispersed among the key states of the federation. 
In spite of chronic overprdduction, falling prices, increa­
sing urban unrest and political factionalism, the coffee 
interests, largely drawn from Sao Paulo state, were pre­
eminent in government until the 1929 crash, which precipi­
tated the 1930 military coup that brought Getulio Vargas 
to power.
The Vargas years are commonly pointed to as the 
critical period in which the government undertook an 
explicit policy of industrialization. However, the early 
years of the Vargas regime were marked by an effort at po­
litical centralization which aimed to maintain Brazil's 
position as an exporter of primary products and as an 
importer of manufactured goods. After a series of finan­
cial crises a dictatorship was declared and the growing 
state apparatus was mobilized to foment internal industrial 
development in a highly favorable international context. 
During the fifteen Vargas years there were no direct presi­
dential elections. The dictatorship, declared in 1937, 
further concentrated political power in the presidency. The 
urban political movements which had developed during the 
previous years were encouraged and manipulated, only to be
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finally outlawed under the dictatorship.
In 1945, Vargas was deposed by the military which 
had brought him to power. While coffee remained the most 
important source of foreign exchange, Brazil's economy was 
increasingly penetrated by North American industrial inte­
rests, which contributed to the import substitution process. 
Politically, Brazil returned to a direct electoral system, 
this time with an expanded electorate which was manipulated 
and controlled by clientelism and demagogery. In spite of 
the increase in state and municipal autonomy and the elec­
toral opening, further centralization of power occurred 
through increased government intervention in development 
planning.
Political centralization reached dramatic new 
levels after 1964, when a military coup overturned the 
previous populist regime. Through the process of what 
Cardoso (1973) has called "associated dependent development," 
much of the economy has become dominated by multinational 
corporations. Politically, the regime maintains a facade 
of electoral democracy at the legislative levels, but the 
realities are those of an authoritarian regime (Linz, 1962, 
1973), if not an outright dictatorship. The effects of 
these centralizing processes on the development of a 
middle class will be examined in more detail in the rest 
of this chapter.
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The, F igst,Rgp,qbliS,( 18.89^930)
Of all the political phases in Brazil during this 
century, the First Republic is the one most linked to the 
fortunes of coffee, which was grown primarily in the 
states of Sao Paulo and Hinas Gerais. Although from the
turn of the century on the coffee economy was in a chronic
2crisis of overproduction, Sao Paulo and to a lesser extent, 
Minas, dominated national politics and the government 
artificially supported the price of coffee. The 1929 crash 
and the drastic decline in coffee prices provided the con­
text for a military coup which was organized by other 
previously excluded regional interests in the country, 
and which removed Sab Paulo from its position of dominance.
Because of blight in Asian coffee fields, in the 
1890's Brazil became the world's leading coffee producer 
for an expanding market in North America and Europe,(Dean, 
1969:4; Carone, 1972:29). In the early nineteenth century 
coffee began its spread in the Vale dOiParaiba in the 
state of Rio de Janeiro and moved west and north to Sao
In 1906, when the government began .to buy coffee 
surpluses, Brazil produced 20,000,000 bags of coffee.
World consumption in that year was only 12,000,000 bags 
(Margolis, 1970:25). Because of artificial incentives, 
coffee production continued to increase during the first 
three decades of the century, although exports remained 
stable. In 1929, the year of the crisis, 28,941,000 bags 
were produced and only 14,281,000 were exported, at a 
price which was almost forty percent below that of the previous year (Furtado, 1965:197-8).
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Paulo and Minas Gerais, where planting conditions were 
best (Stein, 1957: Dean, 1969:3-4; Nicholls and Paiva, 
1970:21ff; Margolis, 1970:25 ff). Sab Paulo city funneled 
coffee production from the interior of the state to the 
port of Santos, and as a result of the financial and indus­
trial infrastructure which developed with the coffee 
economy, the city grew dramatically (Morse, 1972:227, 159, 
164-5)3
During the First Republic, Sao Paulo*s population 
increased as a result of a massive displacement of labor 
from Europe to Brazil.** In the decade which saw the 
abolition of slavery, 1880-1890. more than 1,500,000 immi­
grants arrived in Brazil to work on Sao Paulo's coffee 
plantations. Most of the immigrants were desperately poor, 
but the conditions they found on the plantations were 
grim enough to force many to re turn--or escape—  to the
3 ~Prior to the coffee boom, Sao Paulo had undergone
a minor sugar cane boom (1765-1851). However, the sugar was 
of poor quality and commanded a low price on the world mar­
ket. While the expansion of sugar areas north^and west of 
the capital (Itu, Campinas, Sorrocaba, Piracicaba, Mogi- 
Guacu, and Jundiax) prepared the "economic infrastructure 
that later permitted the rapid expansion of coffee fields 
i . . many observers attributed the substitution of cane 
with coffee by the growers to the unsatisfactory conditions 
of the roads, which offered little security for the trans­
portation of a highly perishable product under adverse 
conditions" (Petrone, 1968:224-5).
^Cf. Hall (1971:3): "The disastrous competition of 
cheap American grain in Italian markets, when added to the long standing malaise of Italian agriculture and other fac­tors, created a ready supply of desperate potential emi­
grants ."
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city for employment.-* The effect in the city and country­
side alike had been anticipated by the coffee planters: a 
general lowering of wages because of the oversupply of 
labor provided by the immigrants.^ Although by 1942 only 
twelve percent of the city's working class was foreign 
born, in 1900, ninety-two percent of the industrial workers 
in^Sad Paulo were foreign born, and eighty-one percent 
were Italians. By 1920, well after the end of the heavy 
immigration period, fifty-two percent of the city's work­
ing class was foreign (see Hall, nd:2; Rodrigues, 1968; 
Simao, 1966).
Industry, as Dean (1969:13) has shown, grew in 
direct relation to the coffee economy. The coffee economy 
created a money market and foreign immigration had provided 
both laborers and consumers for industrial production.
-*They were chosen, because they were poor; by Brazi­
lian immigration services. One way passages to Brazil were 
paid for whole families of agricultural workers. "The sub­
sidy was limited to families in order to reduce the inci?* 
dence of reemigration, . , . Immigrants willing to come 
to Brazil tended to be those without any resources at all, 
and it was thus very difficult for them to raise the rela­
tively high price of a return passage for a whole^ family 
if they became dissatisfied with conditions in Sao Paulo" 
(Hall, 1971:2).
6Cf. Hall (1971:3): "They were brought to Brazil 
for one purpose alone: to provide the coffee planters with 
cheap labor. As one Sao Paulo deputy phrased it shortly 
after abolition, 'We need laborers . . .  in order to in­
crease the competition among them and in that way salaries 
will be lowered by means of the law of supply and demand.'"
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From rather simple beginnings in the import sec ten:, by 
1920, Sao Paulo had become Brazil*s most important indus­
trial center as well as agricultural export center.
The dominance of Sao Paulo and coffee interests 
was reflected in the political contours of the First Re­
public. The Politica dos Governadores (governors* or 
states' politics), as the politics of the First Republic 
became known, involved the domination of national politics 
by state governors. According to Assis Barbosa (1968), the 
Politica dos Governadores arose from Brazil's precarious 
international financial situation and internal political 
situation: the early years of the Republic were marked by 
regional civil wars and partisan violence. While Brazil 
dominated the coffee market, the expansion of coffee plan­
tations required capital investments which the government 
found abroad. These loans were repaid by the Federal gov­
ernment and not by the states—  namely Sao Paulo--for 
whom they were made. Thus, when the price of coffee fell 
between 1894 and 1900, the states retained their revenues, 
but the government's foreign debt mounted. The debt be­
came increasingly unwieldy because the internal price of 
coffee had been protected from external price fluctuations 
by the devaluation of the cruzeiro. That is, as the cru­
zeiro became worth less, coffee exporters got more of them 
per unit of foreign exchange earned by their
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exports.7 Conversely, however, the government required 
more cruzeiros per unit of foreign exchange necessary to 
pay the national debt. The devaluation of the cruzeiro 
reached extreme limits by 1898, and this policy could no 
longer be used to protect the profits of coffee exporters 
(Furtado, 1965:195). Subsequently these profits were 
protected by a valorization program, initiated by the Acordo 
de Taubate in 1906, by which the government bought coffee 
from the planters and only sold it when the international 
price was more favorable (Fausto, 1971:228-9; Carone, 1972: 
33-35, 38; Furtado, 1965:195). In 1898, however, the then 
President Campos Salles (1898-1902) was unable to get con­
gressional support for various stabilizing financial 
measures (including the Funding Loan of 1898) without 
granting the states complete autonomy in dealing with 
their internal political affairs (See also Carone, 1971: 
174-7; 1972: 114-6, 302-4).
Not only did the states keep their revenues, they 
were also allowed to form state militias, comparable in 
every respect to national armies.** Consonant with the
7Furtado (1958:195) writes that the planters were 
“socializing their losses** with this exchange policy, because 
as the cruzeiro became worth less, prices for all consumer 
goods became higher.
^Fernandas (1973) documents the growing militarism 
of all Brazilian states following the declaration of the Republic. Violence organized by regional oligarchies was not new in Brazil, What was new was its professional orga-
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federalism of the time, the administration of government
was highly decentralized and dominated by the states'
oligarchies. Graham writes that
As a consequence of the weakness of the central 
government a highly diffuse network of state adminis­
trative systems emerged and took priority over an 
only partially effective federal administration.
These regional administrative systems were entirely 
at the service of the rural patriarchs who controlled 
the patronage power (1968:21-22).
In addition, the Federalist Constitution of 1891 
introduced direct presidential elections and replaced a 
property requirement for suffrage with a literacy require­
ment. Direct presidential elections guaranteed a shift of 
political power from the numerous and poor northern states 
--which would have profited from a system of state elec­
tors— to the richer, more developed and more populous 
states of the south, which were fewer in number (Torres, 
1965:80-84; Carone, 1972:285-7). Increasingly, the presi­
dency came to alternate between the two richest states,
Sao Paulo and Minas, to the relative exclusion of other 
9states.
nization and the elaborate European training which these 
militias received.
9For a more complex picture of the balance of power 
between the state# during the First Republic, see Love (1971), 
Della Cava (1970), Carone (1971, 1972), Fausto (1972). The 
alternation between Sao Paulo and Minas' control of the 
presidency was known as the Caf£ com Leite policy, coffee and milk, after the dairy interests of Minas ana the coffee 
interests of both.
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At the local level, within each state, the system 
was implemented by coronelismo10 or local bossism, as 
well as by patronage and clientelism. In return for local 
favors, rural bosses or coroneis guaranteed the election 
of the state governors and legislators. These would not 
seat opposition candidates in the legislature11 and the 
governors of the states decided among themselves on the 
next president, whose election in turn was guaranteed by 
the state political machines. Needless to say, the system 
involved a good deal of electoral fraud and local level 
violence (Nunes Leal, 1948; Santos, 1961; Cruz, 1959; 
Nogueira, 1961; Torres, 1965; Queiroz, 1967; Pang, 1969, 
1973; Della Cava, 1970; Nason, 1973). Torres (1965:103-5) 
tells of a town in Minas Gerais which only discovered that 
elections had been held in it by reading about the candi­
date^ landslide victory in that town in a Rio newspaper
The military titles of coronei^ (literally, 
colonels), derived from participation in pre-republican 
state militias and less often, in the Paraguayan War.
11Cf. Carone (1972:302-7) and Marques de Saes (1973: 
39). Because of regional conflicts and fraud in elections, 
each successful candidate had to be approved by a commission 
of Verificacao de Poderes (a confirmation committee). This 
was a committee which reviewed the voting records of each 
election, verified whether or not they had been fraudulent 
and proclaimed the winning candidates. As part of the deve- 
lopn&ent of the Politica dos Governadores. the control of 
this committee was given to the states, who systematically 
deluded all opposition candidates. The '’presumption was, 
except when proved to the contrary, in favor of the candi­date who claimed to have been elected by the dominant 
party in each respective state" (Carone, 1972:306).
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some months later. However, regardless of fraud and 
violence, the system guaranteed that the new suffrage 
requirements of the constitution would have no unsettling 
"democratic" consequences; it perpetuated regional oligar­
chies, and perpetuated itself by systematically excluding 
all opposition.
This was,of course, obvious in the case of the 
working class. While the foreign colony in Sap Paulo was
extremely difficult to organize politically (Hall, nd: 3),
12strikes did occur both in the city and countryside. 
Political opposition from this sector was countered by the 
availability of scab labor and the effectiveness of the re­
pression by Sao Paulo's state militia, the Forga Publica de 
~ 13Sao Paulo. Working class or peasant rebellions in other 
states were also physically repressed (Della Cava, 1970, 
1968; Faco^ 1963). As President Washington Luis was to say
^According to Hall (nd:3), strikes in the country­
side were more like peasant iaqueries than organized poli­
tical movements.
^Sa o  Paulo's Forca Publica had already played a 
decisive role in ascertaining Sao Paulo's prominence in the 
first years of the Republic (ef. Hahner, 1967, 1969). It 
was reorganized in 1901, and trained by a French military 
mission in 1906 in preparation to oppose a federal inter­
vention, which never occurred because the Federal government 
finally accepted a plan to subsidize the pricejsf coffee. 
The principal duties of the Forca Publica de Sao Paulo were 
to guarantee the autonomy of thfe state against other states 
and the Federal government, to maintain order in the cities 
during electionssand to control strikes and keep rural 
labor from migrating to the cities during slack periods 
(Fernandes, 1973:194; Hall, nd:10).
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towards the close of the First Republic, “The Social 
Question" (i.e., the growing number of strikes and incidents 
of urban disorder), "is a matter for the police."
Repression of dissent was also clear in the case of 
the most vocal opposition to the Politica dos Governadores. 
Sao Paulo's Partido Democratico (PD). The PD was founded 
in 1926-27, after a dispute over appointments to the Coffee 
Institute (Carone, 1971:235). It was apparently a splinter
group separated from the dominant Partido Republieano Pau-
14 ~li s ta (PRP) oligarchy. It did not question Sao Paulo's
dominance within the system, or the country's linkages 
with foreign and dominant economies, because its constitu­
ents formed part of an elite which depended on them. It 
was distinguished primarily by its anti-industrialism1^ and
1^1 am not aware of a history of Sao Paulo's PD and 
its consistently liberal, that is, dependent, tendencies 
over time. In the 1930's it became the UDB (Uniao Demoera- 
t^ca Brasileira) and during the populist years it became 
the UDN (Uniao Democratica Nacional).
^The PD espoused Manchesterian liberalism, which 
it hoped would protect the Brazilian consumer from the high 
prices associated with tariff protection. "We must be 
aware that Brazil still upholds a basic law, derived from 
liberal inspiration, which does not permit privileges of 
any sort, especially those which mortally assault the prin­
ciple of free competition. Neither we, nor anyone of good 
sense^ would wish industry to disappear entirely from Brazil. 
We thin£, however, that the /proposed tariff./ exploits the 
consumer and will probably assist those industrialists who 
have not prepared themselves for the struggle, those whom 
the English would call 'unfit.' In this way . . . the pro­
ject would impede natural selection which would be disas­trous for the cause of progress" (cited in Fausto, 1972:35). 
Fausto suggests a more immediate reason for the PD's anta­
gonism towards the industrialists: many industrial entre­
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its demands for reform of the existing system which so 
effectively excluded its constituents. Because electoral 
machines and results were so firmly controlled by the PRP 
in Sao Paulo and by the regional oligarchies in other states^ 
electoral politics perpetuated those in power and excluded 
all other contenders. ^
The relative stability of the Politica dos Governa- 
dores and its systematic exclusion of opposition calls into 
question the modernization position on what ultimately 
brought down the First Republic. According to a number of 
writers, middle class dissatisfaction1  ̂during the First
preneurs and coffee exporters were of foreign origins and 
the "opposition characterised itself by an attitude of xeno­
phobia . . .  to contrast with the cosmopolitan openings of 
the 'old oligarchy'" which dominated the Republican party 
(Fausto, 1972:36). Fausto provides an example of their 
rhetoric: "Foreign cads, putrid drippings of overseas town- 
lets, assassins, bought by the money of those who have be­
trayed their nationality, foreign mud and pus, come to 
sully the lands of our fathers" (Fausto, 1972:36). This is 
a kind of nationalism, but subject to the dependency rela­
tions of Manchesterian liberalism.
^According to Parahyba's (1970) measurements of 
the growth of literacy, urbanization and the electoral rolls 
during the First Republic, more people could and did vote 
than before. But, until 1930, access to the ballot was li­
mited to a minuscule proportion of the population. No more 
than 5.7 percent of the population ever voted in a national 
election (Love, 1970:9). In addition, while there was an 
absolute increase in the numbers of the electorate, its 
size relative to the regional populations decreased every­
where, except in Sao Paulo, Espirito Santo and Rio Grande 
do Sul (Parahyba, 1970:96).
^Responsibility for the political instability of 
the First Republic was attributed to middle classes as 
early as 1933 when Sta. Rosa (1963:32-54) identified their
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Republic was a “basic underlying cause" of the military 
coup which brought Getulio Vargas to power (Poppino, 1968; 
256; cf. Jaguaribe, 1966:59; Alexander, 1956:234; Johnson, 
1958:162; Wirth, 1964:165; Carone, 1965:11-12, 46; Furtado, 
1967:585). These writers tend to identify as “middle class" 
visible, more or less organized groups with some claim to 
political resources. Fausto (1972) examines the alleged 
role of the middle class in the 1930 coup, and reduces it 
to two sides of the same coin: a “middle class" is either 
identified with the vanguard of the bourgeoisie, in ineluc- 
tible opposition to agrarian (“traditional") interests, or 
a "middle class" acted through the Tenentes (rebellious 
army officers) in its own nationalist and reformist interest 
but failed to create more than a "limited" revolution. He 
concludes that both views are wrong.
Drawing on Warren Dean*s study of the industrializa­
tion of Sao Paulo, Fausto (1972:46) points out that there 
was no opposition between planters and industrial entrepre­
neurs because industry grew out of the coffee trade. Sao 
Paulo*s industrialists formed part of the PRP which repre­
interests with those of the Tenentes. The role of the 
middle class in the declaration of the Republic is discussed 
by Villela Luz (1964) and Marques de Saes (1973). Villela 
Luz* study of two middle class politicians during the early 
years of the Republic suggests that the role of such a class 
was minimal during these years. Marques de Saes argues that 
far from representing middle interests, the army acted ah a 
protector of its own and oligarchic interests throughout 
the First Republic (cf. Stepan, 1970).
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sented both agrarian and industrial interests. After the 
1930 coup they remained cool to the new government and in 
1932 industrialists actively participated in Sao Paulo's 
revolt against it.
The Tenentes. on the other hand, were a group of 
young army officers responsible for revolts in 1922 in Rio, 
in 1924 in Sao Paulo and Amazonas, and in 1928 in Sab Paulo. 
Although they did participate in the coalition which over­
threw the president in 1930, they cannot be identified with 
the interests of middle income sectors. In discussing the 
Tenentes. Fausto points out their absolute isolation from 
and suspicion of the civilian population (1972:58-9)--of 
any class--and the lack of organizational ties between them 
and the opposition parties such as the Sao Paulo PD (1972: 
61-65; cf. also Carone, 1975). Urban middle income sectors 
in Brazil cannot, then, be identified with specific groups 
like the oligarchical industrialists or the rebel Tenentes.
What was actually in the middle, between the working 
class and the ruling class was a far more amorphous and 
undef ined population, which was itself a precipitate of 
the boon and bust way in which coffee was planted. The 
development of such middle income sectors has frequently 
been described, most recently by Marques de Saes (1973).
The complexity of the processes involved in the creation of 
such sectors is suggested in Lucilla Hermann's study 
of Guaratingueta', a city in the Vale do Paraiba,
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itself the cradle of the coffee b o o m . H e r m a n n  shows 
clearly how the decline of one group and the splitting 
of estates through inheritance made possible the appearance 
of smaller parcels of land on the market. While estates 
could be reconsolidated by marriage or purchase in more 
prosperous areas, in Guaratingueta, which was in economic 
decline, the appearance of smaller parcels of land on the 
market led to the economic ascension of other groups to 
middle levels of economic stratification (Hermann, 1953:84- 
89; 1943:37-40; 1950. See also Nicholls and Paiva, 1970). 
Thus, through complex mechanisms a local boom and bust 
cycle created several avenues to middle levels of economic 
stratification.
The coffee economy brought several waves of down­
wardly mobile migrants to Sao Paulo. Under prevailing 
methods of cultivation, the fertility of coffee trees de­
clined radically after thirty years, by which time the soil 
was exhausted and the land subject to extensive erosion, and 
fit only for grazing cattle (Stein, 1957). As Dean (1969:42; 
cf. also Margolis, 1970:330) has pointed out, coffee planters
^During its three hundred year history the area 
underwent economic cycles based on subsistence agriculture, 
sugar cane and coffee production for export. Finally it 
entered a period of decline in which for decades the only 
jobs available were in bureaucratic and administrative 
positions (Hermann, 1943; Nicholls and Paiva, 1970).
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were obliged to reinvest in new lands and move on to new 
plantations. Some did so and were able to remain on the 
crest of the coffee economy; others emigrated to the city 
with their families, while their economic and social for­
tunes were still high enough to assure them of university 
education for their children and careers in the liberal 
professions and politics. Although such families were no 
longer oligarchs themselves, they participated in the oligar­
chy and its institutions. Although they were economically 
downwardly mobile, they formed, in Leeds' terminology, a 
part of the "classes1* (1965).
Others, however, stayed on longer and saw their 
estates dwindle in productivity and undergo division by 
inheritance. Eventually they, too, came to the city, be­
cause cattle grazing required a far smaller labor force: the 
end of coffee plantation depopulated the land, leaving 
behind grass, cattle and the ghost towns described by 
Monteiro Lobato (1959) for the Vale do Faraiba (See also 
Nicholls and Paiva, 1970; Margolis, 1970). For migrants 
who had undergone serious economic decline before coming to 
the city, there was no hope at all of acquiring university 
educations, since at the time there were no free state 
universities. Nonetheless, these migrants were not at all 
like the impoverished rural migrants who were to swarm to 
the cities after World War II. Although they were poor, 
they still owned land, and although they had no higher
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education, they were literate * In 1920, when no more than 
one quarter of the Brazilian population was literate (Havig- 
hurst and Moreira, 1965:86; Smith, 1963:662), this distin­
guished them from the bulk of the population, but it implied 
only the degree of wealth and power which was lost through 
the decline of their plantations. In spite of their litera­
cy, then, many of the migrants who came to the city after 
their agricultural fortunes were depleted are perhaps best 
considered as forming a part of the "masses'1 (cf. Leeds, 
1965) for the First Republic provided no means of political 
expression for people like these.
Urban unrest existed throughout the First Republic 
and increased in the 1920's. These were years of brutal
rises in the cost of living (Carone, 1972:185-6; Fausto,
191972:94) and employment must have been difficult to find
in Sab Paulo*s glutted labor market. However, although
the Tenente movement provided a focus for the expression
of dissatisfaction, one cannot, in Fausto*s words,
infer from popular sympathy for the Tenentes. the 
existence of close ties between the movement and 
the so-called middle sectors. The diffuse support
19In Sao Paulo, "in 1924 there were . . . popular 
manifestations against the high cost of living: the movement 
began when the bakeries closed their doors, demanding an in­
crease in the price of bread. Popular pressure . . . led the 
government to require stocks of flour in the bakeries and to 
Install new butcher shops and fish markets, to reduce the 
taxes on wheat, milk, potatoes, flour, beans, etc.: and to 
cheapen transportation costs on certain foodstuffs"(Carone, 1972:190).
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accorded to the Tenentes derived above all from 
its apparent identification with civilian dissi- 
dence . . .  it was perceived as the armed sector 
of civil dissidence (1972:62-3, emphasis added).
Thus, while the Tenente rebels were received by 
popular acclaim during the 1924 revolt in Sao Paulo, four 
days later not even the legislature or the newspapers knew 
what the revolt was about (Fausto, 1972:58-59). Further, 
when the rebels appealed to the city's population for 
volunteers to help repel a bombing attack by Federal forces, 
the effort failed, in spite of the acclaim accorded them 
earlier by street crowds. It is fairly clear then, that 
middle income sectors had little recourse during the First 
Republic: the electoral politics of the Politica dos_.Gover­
ned ores effectively disenfranchised them, and there was 
no means or mechanism through which they could express 
their dissatisfaction effectively, much less topple the 
regime.
The forces which destroyed the First Republic were 
rooted in the 1929 financial crash and in its own economic 
and political structure. 1929 was the year of greatest 
overproduction of coffee and following the crash, the value 
of exports decreased by almost forty percent below its 
1929 price (Furtado, 1965:197; Dean, 1969:181; Levine, 1971: 
12, Fausto, 1971:242). As we have seen, the Politica dos 
Governadores had established the center of power in the 
major coffee states of Sao Paulo and Minas, excluding other 
states. In 1930, the unwritten rule of presidential
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alternation between these two states was broken with the 
election of yet another Paulista president to succeed the 
Paulista Washington Luis. This, and the inability of the 
president to extend credits to the coffee planters after 
the 1929 crash, provided the cirevenstances which led to the 
coalition which toppled the regime. The political leaders 
of Hinas Gerais united with other excluded regional oligar­
chies, disgruntled coffee planters and all other groups 
opposed to the regime, including Sao Paulo's Partido Demo­
crat ico. These groups formed the Liberal Alliance, which 
put an end to the First Republic (Fausto, 1972:102; Queiros, 
1967:52-53; Dean, 1969:182). Their success depended on the 
support of the military: the Tenente rebels, many of whom 
were in exile and could only return to political careers 
with a successful revolution, and the Army officer corps, 
which only intervened when the revolution promised to be
successful, although it had participated in the conspiracy.
9Q(Fausto, 1972:103; Marques de Saes, 1973:92).
It is interesting that the electoral fraud which 
presumably led to Vargas' electoral loss in 1929 did not 
activate the coup: rather it was activated by the assassina­
tion of his running mate after the election returns were 
accepted (Tiller, 1965). Against the backdrop of a world 
depression, this act is best understood as an expression of 
coronelismo. which had been typified by such acts of vio­
lence. Fausto (1972:97) writes that the internal contra­
dictions of the polity of the First Republic would have 
brought it to an end without the 1929 crisis: he sees a 
readjustment of elites occuring during the Vargas years. 
While that is certainly the case, it remains a moot point 
whether it could have occurc&d without the 1929 crash, which
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The 1930 revolution was not, then, the result of 
dissatisfaction among urban middle income sectors, but 
rather the result of the internal oppositions of the 
Politica dos Governadores at a particular national and 
international economic conjuncture. The 1929 crash made 
it impossible to support the price of coffee: the Paulistas 
themselves had no stake in a regime which failed them to 
this degree. It was this context which united regional 
oligarchies and previously excluded groups such as the 
PD and the Tenentes into an alliance against the regime, 
and which brought Getulio Vargas to power.
The Vargas years (1930-1945)
The dominance of Sao Paulo in the politics of the 
First Republic had reflected Brazil's dependence on coffee 
exports. The 1930 coup represented a realignment between 
the states' oligarchies and the government in the face of 
the financial crisis incurred by the 1929 crash. Not only 
did the price of coffee fall, but the foreign capital which 
had been essential to protect the internal price during 
previous fluctuations disappeared (Fausto, 1971:242). In­
deed, Britain, to which Brazil was deeply in debt, regarded 
Brazil as a "conquered country" because of its fiscal 
dependence on coffee sales (Hilton, 1975:50).
provided the opportunity for all the regional elites to 
unite against Sao Paulo's dominance.
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Basically two strategies were available: to diversi­
fy agricultural exports or to increase Brazil*s industrial 
capacity. One scholar of the Vargas years, Hilton (1975), 
argues that industrialization was an immediate goal.
Dean (1969) has shown, however, that an explicit policy 
of industrialization did not develop until all the possi­
bilities of the agricultural export economy were played out, 
Moreover, Hilton's own data suggest that regardless of 
Vargas' personal intentions, Brazil could not have industri­
alized in the absence of a highly favorable world context. 
This context began to emerge in the late 1930's and especial­
ly during the Second World War. It is useful, therefore, 
to conceptualize the Vargas years in terms of two phases, 
separated by the declaration of a dictatorship in 1937.
In order to deal with the financial crisis and to 
maintain itself in power, the Provisional government's 
first actions in 1930 were directed towards an immediate 
centralization of economic and political power. Many of 
these actions anticipated the imposition of the Estado Novo 
dictatorship seven years later. The expansion of government 
power redefined relations between the state and society, as 
well as between classes, by the creation of a political 
structure based on a strong presidency, state corporations 
and corporativist syndicates and welfare institutions. By 
the close of the Vargas years in 1945,
virtually the entire urban sector (with the conspi-
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cuous exception of domestic servants) /had/ been 
incorporated into a welfare system more comprehen­
sive than that of many developed economies (Skid­
more, 1973;34-35).
The process of centralization began eleven days
after the new government took office, with the fusion of
legislative and executive functions of government and the
institution of a new hierarchy of authority between the
21central government and the states. Lowenstein comments 
that the result was as “spick and span a specimen of a 
streamlined dictatorship as any produced before1' (1942:19), 
and it swiftly redefined the position of states' oligarchies 
towards the central government. Electoral machines and 
Governors' politics were obsolete. State politics were 
now controlled by a presidentially appointed interventor, 
responsible only to the president. The central government 
could no longer be captured to express a particular interest 
above all others, as it had been by the coffee oligarchy 
during the First Republic.
^"The Chief of government was to decide exclusive­
ly on the appointment and dismissal of public officials.
All representative and deliberative assemblies (federal, 
state and municipalities) were dissolved. Constitutions, 
federal as well as state, remained in force, subject to mo­
difications to be decreed by the government. Otherwise 
the administration of justice was to function as before.
The chief of government may appoint for each state a fede­
ral delegate (interventor). The interventor acts for his 
state as does the president for the whole union. He excer- 
cises jointly all legislative and executive powers. He is 
the executive authority of the union within the state; he 
may be recalled by the federal government. On the lower 
level of the municipalities, the mayors are appointed and
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Between 1930 and 1935 man/ of the states lost con­
trol of their agricultural production and natural resources
to national institutes. In spite of government interven-
22tions in favor of agriculture, crises persisted in the 
coffee, sugar and cocoa economies. A National Institute of 
Cocoa was created in 1931 and the Institute of Sugar and 
Alcohol in 1933. While credits were restored to the coffee 
planters, planters in both Minas and Sao Paulo were con* 
stantly forced to appeal to the central government for assis­
tance, and finally between 1934 and 1935, both relinquished 
their production to the control of the National Department 
of Coffee (Carone, 1973:125-155). In 1934, the Mining and 
Water Codes were promulgated, placing these resources as 
well under the control of the government. In the same year 
the Federal Council of Foreign Trade was formed.
It is generally accepted that the size of middle 
income sectors increased as a result of the growth of 
Vargas' centralizing institutes and bureaucracies (Jaguari- 
be, 1965:169). Chaffee (1970) shows that the growth of 
middle sectors in Brazil is associated with the increase in
dismissed by the interventor” (Lowenstein, 1942:18).
22E.g., The Decree against usury (7/4/1933) 
and the Decree reducing agricultural debts (1/2/1933) 
(Carone, 1973:119-123).
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23the budget for administration during the Vargas years 
and Vieira da Cunha (1963:116) has documented the increase 
in public employment between 1920 and 1940 (See Figure 14).
Figure 14. Number of public servants per 1000 
in the population in selected states between 1920 and 
1940.
1920 1940
Sao Paulo 5 13
Rio de Janeiro 6 15
Federal District 4 59
Minas Gerais 2 8
Rio Grande do Sul 8 17
SOURCE: Vieira da Cunha (1963:116).
As Federal bureaucracies and Federal control replaced the 
loose network of state bureaucracies which had charac­
terised the First Republic (Lowenstein, 1942:100-10 3; 
Dalland, 1968:334; Graham, 1968:25; Dean, 1969:230;
Siegle, 1966:46-7), the new bureaucrats became dependents 
of the central government and instruments of the govern­
ment's domination. Much government employment was limited 
to the Brazilian born (Johnson, 1958:166), and it is
23»it should not be forgotten that there would be 
a historic tendency for the administrative budget and the 
size of the middle class to correlate, independent of any 
direct relationship . . . /'but] the fact remains that 
the extreme correlation is beyond any simple explanation 
of the historic growth of two relatively independent fac­
tors. A correlation of .99 indicates that in reality 
the same phenomenon is being measured by two indices. 
There may be no cause and effect relationship, but if not it would be expected that a third factor is strongly 
related to both factors" (Chaffee, 1970:122-3).
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highly probable that it extended to the literate "masses" 
which we have seen were created by the downswings of coffee 
plantation during the First Republic, and who had been 
virtually disenfranchised by the Politica dos Governadores. 
These previously excluded groups now participated in the 
mechanisms of domination which increasingly reduced the 
states to the "status of territorial subdivisions under 
full central control" (Lowenstein, 1942:51; Hilton, 1975:23).
Of all the regions of Brazil, Sao Paulo was most 
affected by the centralizing measures of the Vargas years.
For example, in addition to losing control over their 
agricultural production, the elite of Sao Paulo city also 
lost control over industrial labor. Whereas prior to 1930, 
industrial labor unrest^ had been a matter for the atten­
tion of the police or individual industrialists (Fausto, 
1972:108; Dean, 1969:151-167), labor was now controlled by 
the government. The new labor regulations aimed not only 
at disorganizing and controlling the working class (Fausto,
1972:107), but also challenged the "excessive individualism"
«v 25of Sao Paulo's industrialists. So as to make labor depen-
^^Rural labor unrest had often expressed itself 
through banditry and messianic movements and had frequently 
been of political utility to state political machines, es­
pecially in the Northeast of Brazil. In 1938 such movements 
were destroyed swiftly and expeditiously by Federal troops 
(Della Cava, 1970; Faco, 1963).
^Vargas wrote that "the excessive individualism of the past century needed to be limited and corrected, predo­
minantly in the interests of the whole society. In this
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dent on the state, in 1930 a Ministry of Labor, Industry 
and Commerce was formed, separate from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, which had previously handled urban working 
class affairs. A number of unions were outlawed: those 
surviving were brought under government control. The right 
to strike was abolished and a loyalty oath was imposed.^ 
Finally, the working class was split by nationalistic 
appeals to its ethnic origins— ostensibly to protect the 
native Brazilian worker's standard of living against immi­
grant labor— but in fact to discriminate against Italian 
workers who were felt to be responsible for anarchist
ideas and labor unrest (Fausto, 1972:108-109; Dean, 1969:
27188; Levine, 1971:25, 33). The process of the incorpora-
attitude there is no hostility to capital. Quite to the 
contrary, capital must be attracted, supported and guaran­
teed by the public powers. But the best way to support 
and guarantee it, is precisely to transform the proleta­
riat into an organic force of cooperation with the state, 
and not to leave it abandoned by the law and the state, and 
at the mercy of the destructive actions of perturbing 
elements which are destitute of feelings for the fatherland 
and the family”(cited in Fausto, 1971:253).
^Elected union officials had to be recognized by 
the Ministry of Labor before they could take office, and 
a syndical tax of one day's salary was imposed on Jill wor­
kers, whether they were union members or not (Simao, 1966: 
Rodrigues, 1968:348; Dean, 1969:187-91; Erikson, 1970:52- 
55; 1972:142-44).
^These measures included imposing a limit on the 
number of foreign third class passengers who could enter 
the country and the passage of the “Two Thirds” Labor Law 
in 1930, which required industries to show that at least two thirds of their employees were Brazilian born. In 
fact, the Italian colony in Sao Paulo was not particularly
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tion of labor was continuous from 1930 to 1937. A struc­
tural change occurred in the position of labor: it became 
a petitioner to the central government, whereas previously 
it had been at the mercy of Sao Paulo's industrial oligar­
chy.
Furthermore, although Vargas had restored credits 
to the coffee planters, Paulistas were enraged at increased 
taxes and the imposition of exchange controls. These 
measures were necessary to pay off foreign debts that 
"were largely incurred by Paulista presidents" under the 
Politica dos Governadores (Dean, 1969:192). After two 
years, Sao Paulo reacted to Vargas' political and finan­
cial measures with the Constitutionalist Revolt. The Pau­
listas had expected Vargas to convene a Constitutional 
Assembly and had assumed that a new constitution and a 
return to electoral politics would restore them to their 
previous political as well as economic autonomy. The focus 
of their outrage was the Tenente military interventor which
revolutionary and was extremely difficult to organize 
(see Hall, nd., and Carone, 1972 for organized working 
class movements). Nonetheless, the divisive political 
rhetoric flowed. The new Minister of Labor said that one 
"of the most deplorable aspects of the injustices committed 
against the Brazilian laborer, and of his exploitation, 
is that of the foreign workers who come to our country, 
pushed out by the poverty of their own countries, and take 
jobs away from Brazilians, because so many employers con­
sider nationals to be inferior workers. Not content with 
this, the foreigner delivers himself to subversive pro­
paganda, which is frankly despicable in the light of na­
tional dignity" (cited in Fausto, 1972:109).
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Vargas had imposed on them. The opposition Partido 
Democratico. which had supported the coup against Washing­
ton Luis and the First Republic, formed a united front 
coalition with the ^ ^ ■ ^ P , & ^ p b J . ^ a ^ P a y l i ^ t a , and 
between them they incited a general political euphoria 
in favor of Sao Paulo's rights and the Constitutionalist 
cause. £xcept for the working classes (Carone, 1965:120- 
21), the city's population was mobilized in support of 
what was essentially a hopeless cause, which would benefit 
only the oligarchy.
In Hay of 1932 street riots led to several deaths. 
In June the Constitutionalist Revolt broke out in Sao 
Paulo against the Federal government. It was led by a 
dissident army general and the SeTo Paulo oligarchy, and 
fought by the Sao Paulo Forga Publica. aided by countless 
volunteers. Although the population was enthusiastic, and 
Sao Paulo geared itself to produce for civil war (Morse, 
1972:326-8), there was simply not enough war materiel and 
the aid expected from sympathetic states never materia­
lized. Sao Paulo lost the initial advantage of the sur­
prise attack, found itself unprepared to continue the 
fight against the Federal government on various fronts, 
and surrendered in three months (Silva, 1932).
The defeat represented the end of all hopes of 
a return to the status quo ante for Sao Paulo: but it 
also began the period of accomodation between the state's
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oligarchies and the central government. The expansion of 
the central government into areas which had previously been
under the control of individual states, or under private
2 acontrol, ultimately benefited the oligarchies economi­
cally, in that their markets were assured and protected 
where possible. While Sao Paulo continued being the 
major industrial and coffee producing region in the nation, 
its revolt guaranteed that its own interests would not be 
ignored (Fausto, 1971:249). It is significant that in 
1935, when other states were embroiled in turbulent elec­
toral battles over centralization versus federalism, Sao 
Paulo was "conspicuously removed" from the struggle 
(Levine, 1971:54). For the time being, Sao Paulo had
tacitly accepted the situation whereby it was asked 
to supply significantly less than its proportional 
share of national political leadership in terms of 
its economic power (Levine, 1971:55).
The political and economic centralization of the 
Vargas years was more or less continuous from 1930 to 1937. 
During the Constituent Assembly of 1933 the Paulista dele­
gates attempted to preserve at least the appearance of 
states' rights, but before the final vote on the new 
constitution was taken, all the centralizing measures of 
the Provisional Government (1930-1934) were approved and
28See Carone (1965:98-102, 132; 1975) and Fausto 
(1971:250-252; 1972:107) for the loss of influence of the 
Tenentes in the coalition which had made the 1930 coup.
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removed from judicial review (Palmer, 1950:86; Lowenstein,
1942:22; Levine, 1970:10). In the Estado Novo constitution
of 1937, Federal hold on the states was tightened even
further. According to Lowenstein,
although the appearances are carefully preserved, the 
states are reduced to the status of territorial 
subdivisions under full central control; particularly 
in fiscal matters, their rights are severely curtailed 
(1942:51).
This kind of centralization appeared necessary if
Brazil were to cope with its internal regional tensions and
29the economic warfare of the 1930*s. In 1934 two main 
contestants for Brazil's raw materials and Brazil's market 
had defined themselves: Germany and the United States. 
Germany needed raw materials, but it could only pay for 
them with ''compensation marks," that is, money which 
could only be used to buy an equal value of manufactured 
goods from Germany (Hilton, 1975:40; Carone, 1970:116).
The United States wanted to export its industrial produc­
tion to Brazilian markets. Germany offered Brazil decreased 
dependence on a single crop, coffee, through its own grow­
ing need for Brazil's sugar, rubber, cotton and other 
primary products. The United States, primarily interested 
in lowered tariffs for its exports and in Brazil's coffee, 
offered foreign exchange. Hilton's (1975) study of Bra-
29Vargas noted in 1930 that "diplomacy is increa­
singly orienting itself in the direction of economic prob­lems." In 1935 a Minister of the Foreign Trade Council 
observed that "Brazil found itself in a period of economic
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zilian maneuvers between the opposing interests of the two 
powers, describes its efforts to avoid having to make a 
commitment to either country which would exclude the other 
(see also Wirth, 1970:17-51), Until the war, Germany 
bested the United States in its competition for the Brazi­
lian market (Hilton, 1975:227), but until 1937, Brazil 
remained peculiarly dependent upon the United States and 
coffee because these were its principal suppliers of 
foreign exchange.
Clearly, the centralization which occurred prior 
to the dictatorship represented in part an effort to "play 
out the alternatives of the export economy" (Dean, 1969: 
205). Brazil was attempting to regain a trade position
based on diversified agricultural exports and not to
30redirect the economy towards industrialization. That
war in a time of peace" (Hilton, 1975:8-10),
^S e e  Dean (1969:180-206) for the measures affec­
ting industry taken by the Vargas government between 
1930 and 1937. While in the long run Paulista industry did 
not suffer, the increased financial and social interven­
tions of the government were "not designed to accelerate 
the process of industrialization" (Dean, 1969:205), but 
rather to maintain social order. For examples of the "lip- 
service" given to the need for industrialization and the 
ignored opportunities, see Dean (1969:183-4, 203). Dean's 
book is an effort to qualify and refine the dependency or 
"external shock" theory of Brazilian development (see Fur- 
tado, 1963; Baer, 1965, Frank, 1967, 1969) and show the 
relations between external factors and the men who must 
adapt to them (Dean, 1969:15, 86-87).
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effort only occurred after the 1937 declaration of the 
Estado Novo. The effort to play out the alternatives of 
the export economy failed because of the basic dependence 
on coffee and the United States for foreign exchange, and 
the failure is expressed in the financial and political 
crisis which precipitated the Estado Novo.
In 1937 Brazil could not pay its debts. The 
economic liberalism of the predictatorial years and the 
need for free foreign exchange (i.e., not "compensation 
marks") in exchange for coffee had resulted in concessions 
to United States manufacturing interests and an "orgy of 
imports" in 1936 (Dean, 1969:208). The price of coffee 
fell, and because of deflationary policies introduced in 
the United States the same year, the flow of foreign ex­
change ceased (Dean, 1969:209). At the same time, and 
reflecting the liberal economic policy, Sao Paulo appeared 
to be attempting to regain a position of prominence in the 
nation through electoral means, by forming coalitions with 
key states in preparation for the 1938 presidential 
elections. According to Dean, the government could not 
have survived the crisis within the democratic framework, 
and only by "dramatizing the political crisis could the 
government be made to appear less culpable, and the ne­
cessary emergency powers be arrogated without a loss of 
confidence" (1969:208-9).
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Although the issue of federalism versus centra­
lism continued to be central to Brazilian politics, the 
crisis which the government dramatized was only tangen- 
tially related to regional aspirations. Between 1933 and 
1937 a good deal of visible political turmoil had been 
generated by two urban movements, the National Liberation 
Alliance (ALN) and the Integralists. Both the left wing 
ALN and the Fascist Integralist movement arose in the 
early 1930‘s among middle income sectors of Brazil's urban 
centers (Levine, 1970:63, 69, 73, 74, 90). Leadership for 
both movements was recruited from among university educa­
ted groups (Levine, 1970:64, 67, 87-89). Between them, 
they may have included from 170,000 to 300,000 active par­
ticipants in the whole country, concentrated in the capital 
cities (Levine, 1970:79, 95). The university education of 
their leaders indicates links to high levels of social 
stratification--to the "classes" rather than the "masses" 
(cf. Leeds, 1965). Furthermore, although neither movement 
had high operating expenses, both were financed by regio­
nal opposition politicians and industrialists (Levine, 1970: 
75, 95-96). Nonetheless, and in spite of the high poli­
tical visibility and frequent clashes between the ALN and 
the Integralists, neither group was able to mobilize the 
kind of support which the Sao Paulo oligarchy had genera­
ted during the 1932 Constitutional Revolt. The three 
separate ALN revolts in Natal, Recife and Rio de Janeiro
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in 1935 failed absolutely to mobilize popular support and 
were speedily suppressed (Levine, 1970:104).
If both movements were financed by regional oppo­
sition to the central government, both were also vulnerable 
to manipulation by the central government. In the context 
of the 1938 elections, both were used to create a climate 
which would require and justify a coup. The Integralists, 
in particular, were encouraged in an ongoing anti-communist 
crusade which began after the 1935 abortive ALN rebellions. 
These had resulted in the imposition of a state of siege and 
massive imprisonments of communists and suspected left 
wing sympathizers. When Vargas requested a continuation 
of the state of siege, which had ended in 1937, the Senate 
refused him. Its spokesman, who significantly was from 
Sao Paulo, affirmed that the country was peaceful and that 
a state of siege during an election year might imply coer­
cion (Carone, 1975:130). Vargas reacted by freeing the 
left wing ALN prisoners of 1935. In order to further in­
crease the climate of tension, the government created an 
incident based on a false document which purported to be 
a “plan'1 for a communist coup (Carone, 1975:130). In this 
context, the Integralists were encouraged in their anti­
communism and were sought out by Vargas* representatives 
to support a future coup. The Integralists fully expected 
to be officially recognized and to participate in the 
new dictatorial government (Carone, 1975:134-5). Instead,
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after the coup, the party was ignored, humiliated and 
finally abolished together with all other political parties. 
(Levine, 1970:160-1). In this way the two political groups 
which emerged from middle income sectors with regional 
political backing were manipulated to forestall a threat 
against centralization.
In this way also, by dramatizing a political crisis, 
Brazil cut itself off from fiscal dependence on the United 
States and coffee. Payment on the national debt was suspen­
ded ten days after the declaration of the Estado Novo. The 
new dictatorship also recognized that the country would 
have to begin to substitute domestic industrial production 
for imported industrial production (Dean, 1969:209). The 
value of imports decreased and new exchange controls favored 
the import of raw materials for domestic production at the 
expense of manufactured imports. The government developed 
new sources of public financing, and encouraged the deve­
lopment of enterprises which would increase Brazil's self 
sufficiency (Dean, 1969:209-215; Wirth, 1970:101-110).
However, the opportunity for the heavy, state 
sponsored industrialization effort represented by the Volta 
Redonda steel mill only became available with the British 
wartime blockade on German trade. Only then could Brazil 
successfully gamble on North American fears of German 
influence in the hemisphere and obtain the necessary funds
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31to build the steel mill. Thus, although the war caused 
shortages and dislocations, it also provided the context 
for the ''heroic” stage of Brazil's import substitution 
(Cohn, 1971:303), because the shortages protected Brazil's 
industries from foreign competition and stimulated exports 
to consumer markets in Latin America which were cut off 
from their regular suppliers (Dean, 1969:223).
The war also altered Brazil's relations with the 
United States. Although Brazil still owed unpaid debts to 
the United States, Washington launched a massive public 
relations effort in Brazil and Latin America as part of its 
effort to maintain hemispheric unity against the Axis. By 
the end of the war, the Rockefeller Office, as the office 
of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs became known, 
estimated that it controlled seventy-five percent of the 
news of the world reaching Latin America. Latin American 
and especially Brazilian public opinion leaders and busi­
ness executives were included in this network of influence,
31A Rio newspaper observed that what the United 
States had failed to do with its commercial and good neigh­
bor policy over years, the British blockade did in a matter 
of months (Hilton, 1975:212). In spite of political dis­
agreements, trade with Germany increased after the declara­
tion of the Estado Novo (Hilton, 1975:174?8). The United 
States did not retaliate first, because it hoped to regain 
its export trade to Brazil, and later because it wished 
to maintain the facade of hemispheric unity against German 
political expansionism (Hilton, 1975:226-7). It was only 
willing to underwrite the development of the steel mill 
after the declaration of the war (Hilton, 1975:219; Dean, 
1969:219).
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which constituted a “propaganda effort virtually unprece­
dented in the annals of American history” (Epstein, 1975:
50-52).32
Most important, however, to Brazil*s industrializa­
tion at the time, was the support now given by the United 
States as part of its own war effort. In addition to the 
finance for the Volta Redonda steel mill, this support 
included the building of bases and infrastructure in the 
Northeast, the exporting of machinery, and, with the Cook
32"To gain control over the media of Latin America, 
Rockefeller engineered a ruling from the U.S. Treasury 
Department which exempted from taxation the cost of adver­
tisements placed by American corporations that were co­
operating with the Rockefeller office. This tax exempt 
advertising eventually constituted more than forty percent 
of all newspaper and radio revenues in Latin America. By 
selectively directing this advertising towards newspapers 
and radio stations that accepted guidance from his office 
--and simultaneously denying it to media which he deemed 
uncooperative or pro-Nazi--he skillfully managed to gain 
economic leverage over the major sources of news in Latin 
America. Moreover, as the newsprint shortage became cri­
tical in South America, his office made sure that the 
indispensable newsprint licenses were allocated only to 
'friendly* newspapers . • . George Gallup, who later became 
famous as a political pollster, and a group of prominent 
social scientists quietly conducted systematic surveys of 
public opinion in Brazil. In a clear adumbration of the 
post war CIA, the Rockefeller Office arranged for a *re» 
search division* to employ clandestine observers from the 
Export Bureau of the American Association of Advertising 
Agencies in Latin America. . . . /These/ 'observers' sup­
plied the Rockefeller Office with data concerning ownership, 
editorial policy, personal opinions of the owners and edi­
tors of the newspapers and 'propaganda analysis.' Dossiers 
could thus be systematically organized about the opinions 
and operations of the major organs of public opinion in 
Latin America. . . .  To assure comprehension of the 'issues' 
being advanced in Latin America, the office sent 13,000 
carefully selected 'opinion leaders' a weekly newsletter
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Mission in 1942, a public commitment to the development 
of Brazil*s industrial system. "Never had the world be­
stowed so much prestige upon Brazilian efforts to industria­
lize" (Dean, 1969:223).33
If changes in the world market and adjustments 
between regional elites in Brazil dominated the Vargas 
years, propositions such as Helio Jaguaribe*s on the impor­
tance of a middle class during these years are clearly wrong. 
Jaguaribe has argued that a middle class was directly res­
ponsible for setting up the Estado Novo, and he associates 
the industrialization of the Vargas years with a middle 
class initiative. In his view, the middle class seized 
control of government in 1930, and in exchange for politi­
cal acquiescence to oligarchical groups, expanded govern­
ment employment opportunities for itself, through the crea­
tion of superfluous jobs in a "Cartorial State" (Jaguaribe, 
1969:169). For Jaguaribe, the
which was to help 'clarify' the news. The coordinator 
also arranged trips to the United States for the most in­
fluential editors in Latin America and later scholarships 
for their children" (Epstein, 1975:50-52).
33"The United States, urgently in need of an expan­
ded list of Brazilian raw materials, had in return guaran­
teed the delivery of manufactured goods to Brazil. Ship­
ping space was strictly rationed, however; it followed that 
it would be filled most efficiently, not with manufactures, 
but with machinery so that the Brazilians might produce 
the goods themselves. Throughout the war, the Bank of 
Brazil and the Office of Economic Warfare cooperated to 
this end" (Dean, 1969:222).
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Vargas revolution of 1930 . . . represented the 
political counterpart of import substitution: the 
country, no longer able to import the consumer goods 
it needed started to produce them at home (1969:169).
However, the middle class was
compelled by considerations of realpolitik to jettison 
its political principles with the anti-democratic 
coup of 1937 and the setting up of the Estado Novo 
(1969:170).
Jaguaribe's argument depends on the assumption of 
the existence of a middle class, on the misplaced identifi­
cation of middle class interests with the forces which made 
the 1930 coup and on a disregard of the regional readjust­
ments between Brazilian elites and the government in the 
context of a world economic system. Furthermore, the em­
ployment of middle income sectors in bureaucracies does not 
mean that they control them. Far from being created simply 
to provide for middle sector employment, the bureaucracies 
were the means of dominating and centralizing the nation's 
political and economic resources in the face of crisis.
While we have seen that political groups among middle income 
sectors acted and were manipulated so as to create a climate 
of unrest which justified the imposition of the Estado Novo, 
they do not appear to have been a separate class, but were 
rather linked to various regional elites. Neither the ALN 
nor the Integralists nor the new bureaucrats in any way 
"caused" the Estado Novo, nor can they be associated, as 
Jaguaribe would have it, with the subsequent policy of 
industrialization which the government adopted. That was
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the result of particular world circumstances, which 
changed at the end of the war.
In 1945 Vargas was deposed by the military and 
elections were reintroduced to Brazil. Brazil’s method of 
development during the next fifteen years was based on 
state investment and planning and foreign investment. This, 
intertwined with populist politics, had inherent consequen­
ces which led to a highly favorable context for a military 
coup in 1964.
By the war's end, Brazil was firmly under the poli­
tical and economic hegemony of the United States. The 
United States emerged from the war at the height of its 
economic powers, and no longer had any interest in Brazil's 
independent industrial development. Brazil's "heroic" 
import substitution, which had been supported by the U.S. 
war effort, a captive market and lack of foreign competi­
tion, was coming to an end. The United States began to 
favor the interests of its own entrepreneurs against the
nationalism and protectionism of the Brazilian government
34which had developed during the war years. For example,
^ A s  early as 1941, American entrepreneurs had 
begun to examine the advantages of partnership and capital 
association with Brazilian businessmen: "Foreign investors 
are verifying that the combination of their capital with 
that of national investors in the country which is being in­
vested in, yields a certain degree of security in view of
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North American entrepreneurs who wished to protect their
35trading and commercial positions in Brazil found their 
government more willing to assist their economic expansion 
than had been the case in the pre-war years, when it had 
frequently permitted debts to American exporters to remain 
unpaid (Hilton, 1975:227),
It is highly probable that the change in United 
States interests provided the context for deposing Vargas 
and reintroducing elections in Brazil. In other words, 
the reappearance of electoral politics in the post-war 
period was not merely a “return to democracy" in the flush 
of the Allied victory, as suggested by a number of writers 
(Pinsky, 1971:348; Odalia, 1971:358; Skidmore, 1967:79), 
but an incident in the realignment of hemispheric economic 
powers. In Brazil, such realignment required primarily 
the elimination or mitigation of Vargas' statist and 
nationalist policies (Ianni, 1971:79).
In accordance with United States interests in
excessive economic nationalism" (Feurlein and Hannan, 1941, 
cited in Ianni, 1971:137-8).
35According to Gordon and Grommers, "the major 
single motive for undertaking manufacturing activities 
abroad was the desire to secure or maintain a footing in a 
generally attractive market where government policies 
leave no means of accomplishing this objective other than 
by direct investment" (1962:147-8).
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Brazil, the American ambassador, Adolph Berle Jr., hailed
Brazil's return to a free press and anticipated return to
"constitutional democracy" at a luncheon given by the 
 ̂ j 36
Moreover, as we have seen above, the North American war 
effort had resulted in a considerable degree of influence 
over editorial opinion in Brazil. Stepan's (1971:99-101) 
analysis of editorial opinion reveals that in 1945 the 
legitimacy of the Vargas regime was being severely ques­
tioned. In addition, the military officers who made the 
coup against Vargas had developed close relations with 
American military officers as a result of joint service 
overseas (Stepan, 1971:128). After the coup, a spokesman 
for the UDN, which had supported it, recommended that the 
new government should
appeal to the foreign capital necessary for the 
undertaking of national reconstruction and above 
all for the development of our unexplored reserves, 
allowing equal treatment and freedom for the remit­
tance of profits (cited in Ianni, 1971:81)
Vargas had struggled^ with internal opposition 
since 1930, especially from Sab Paulo's free trade, anti­
industrialist PD, which by the end of the Sstado Novo had 
become the UDN. The UDN appears to have provided the core 
of civilian conspirators which finally brought down the 
Goulart regime in 1964. See also footnote 14, p . 71.
37By 1946 the United States State Department was 
able to report that "as far as foreigners are concerned, the 
present Brazilian constitution has abandoned the national­
ist perspective (which emerged in the 1934 constitution 
and had been strengthened in that of 1937), and has res­
tored a regime of equality among foreigners and nationals" 
(cited in Ianni, 1971:82).
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The return of electoral politics and the penetra­
tion of the Brazilian economy by foreign interests did not 
mean that industrialization stopped or that the Government 
abandoned its attempts to control the economy:^ both 
efforts continued, although as Ianni (1971) has shown, the
administrations elected in 1945, 1950, 1955 and 1960 alter-
39nated in their openness to foreign capital. Coffee and
agricultural exports continued to be the most important
sources of foreign exchange, but by the 1950*s, industry
was Brazil's most dynamic economic sector, limited only by
40the small size of the Brazilian consumer market. After
the first flush of post-war imports, which destroyed 
41Brazil's foreign credits, import restrictions were set up
38Schmitter (1973:184) coins the term "democradura" 
for ,fthe adaptation of a basically authoritarian polity to 
the minimal exigencies of a formal democracy." See also 
Leff (1968:109, 116-7, 125).
^Thus the Dutra (1946-1950), Kubitschek (1955- 
1960) and post 1964 governments' philosophies were “liberal" 
and inter-dependent. The Vargas (1950-1953), Quadros/ 
Goulart (1960-1964) governments attempted more autonomous 
nationalistic development schemes.
^Morely and Smith's (1973) experiments suggest that 
the smallness of the Brazilian market--because of inequi ­
table income distribution--need not have limited economic 
growth. Leff (1968:82-84) argues that by discriminating 
against exports, the protection of internal prices lowered 
growth and industrial development rates. His argument is 
especially interesting in the light of the export policy 
adopted in Brazil in the 1970's.
^ S e e  Baer (1964:45-48) and Furtado (1963:230-40). 
Dean believes the credits were squandered because the indus­
trialists fell out of favor with the Dutra regime, reflec-
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favoring capital rather than consumer goods imports. A 
general developmental policy emerged, based on the one hand 
on state planning and investment and on the other on the 
attraction of foreign entrepreneurs to build capital goods 
industries and consumer durables (Baer, 1965; Ianni, 1971: 
146; Cohn, 1971:308-9).
Many of the centralist policies of the Vargas years 
were abandoned after 1945. The 1946 Constitution gave 
states and municipalities far greater autonomy than had been 
theits between 1930 and 1945 (Richardson, 1969). However, 
this was not a return to the Federalism of the First Repub­
lic. The political system which coincided with the new 
general developmental policy depended on three interrelated 
phenomena: a strong president, bureaucratic expansion and 
electoral populism.
In 1945 there were no organized political parties 
except on the left (Singer, 1965:68; Skidmore, 1967:54). 
After a significant electoral victory in 1945, the Commu­
nist party was again outlawed in 1947 (Skidmore, 1967:65- 
76), and politics were dominated largely by the PSD (Par-
ting its liberal bias. Cohn (1971:305-6) disagrees with all 
three and argues that the credits were useless anyway be­
cause they were not transferable to pay the existing debt to 
the United States. "They could not be used in a more dyna­
mic manner to solve the internal and external disequilibria 
in the Brazilian economy (the British debt was used mostly 
to acquire railroads controlled by that country in Brazil, 
in a completely unproductive transaction)" (1971:306).
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tido.Social Deroocratico). the PTB (Partido Trabalhista 
Brasileiyo) and the UDN (Uniao Democratica Nacional). The 
PSD was artificially created by the Vargas government be­
fore it was deposed in 1945, and was drawn from the remnants 
of old rural machines and new industrialists. The PTB was 
a government created, syndicalist labor party, and the UDN 
was formed out of the old Sao Paulo Partido Democratico 
and the Uniao Democratica Brasileira of the Vargas years.
The UDN united all anti-Vargas forces under its consis­
tently liberal banner. There were other parties, as well, 
but none, including the political machine of Adhemar de 
Barros (PSP— Partido Social Progressista). splintered off 
from the old Partido Republicano Paulista. could attain 
national expression without forming coalitions with one of 
the major three parties. Even these did not reach national 
prominence. Nonetheless, they monopolized the electoral 
and parliamentary aspects of politics (See Figure 15).
An electoral reform in 1934 had extended the suffrage 
to women and expanded the electorate. Nonetheless, the right 
to vote was still limited to the literate. Less than 
twenty percent of the population voted in the presidential 
elections of these years (See Figure 16). As Brazilian 
electoral democracy developed, politicians were elected on 
the basis of what material and ideological inducements they 
could offer their supporters. At the lower levels of 
society the inducements could include free food, medical
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Figure 16. Presidential elections in Brasil
Date of President No. voters %
Election Elected (millions) Pop,
3/1/94 Prudente de Morais .3 2.2
3/1/98 Manuel F. Campos Salles .5 2.7
3/1/02 F. Rodrigues Alves .6 3.4
3/1/06 Afonso Pena .3 1.4
3/1/10 Hermes da Fonseca .6 2.8
3/1/14 Venceslau Braz .6 2.4
3/1/18 F. Rodrigues Alves .4 1.5
6/13/18 Epitacio Pessoa .4 1.5
3/1/22 Artur Bernardes .8 2.9
3/1/26 Washington Luis Pereira 
de Souza .7 2.3
3/1/30 Julio Prestes 1.9 2.3
12/2/45 Eurico Gaspar Dutra 6.2 13.4
10/3/50 Getulio Vargas 8.3 15.9
10/3/55 Juscelino Kubitschek 9.1 15.6
10/3/60 Janio Quadros 12.6 18.1
SOURCE: Love (1970:9).
assistance, jobs, football tickets and local improvements 
in public utilities. None of the parties organized formal 
mechanisms with which to develop a mass base, but developed 
rather— and only in a few areas-- a series of informal 
patronal ties to their constituencies (Leeds and Leeds, 
1975:205). Predominantly the electorate received lots of 
populist demagoguery and was maintained in a dependent 
position vis-a-vis the politician. Thus, for example, the 
favelas (shantytowns or squatments) of Brazil's major cities 
were used by politicians as “currais eleitorais11 (electo­
ral corrals). The residents of each curral eleitoral 
received favors from local ward heelers or politicians
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42in exchange for their votes.
While elected politicians could and often did 
create a climate of political unrest, they did not usually 
pose serious threats to the autonomy of the executive. As 
numerous writers on electoral politics have pointed out 
(A. Leeds, 1964, 1965; E. Leeds, 1972; Leeds and Leeds, 
1975; Galjart, 1964, 1965; Moraes, 1970; Medina, 1964), 
the populist politicians of the era expanded their electo­
rates by appealing to new groups, such as the peasants of 
the Northeast, or the urban poor. However, since the 
dialectic of populism was based on a limited and dependent 
electorate, accompanied by fear of losing control to the 
masses (Weffort, 1965:170; Ianni, 1970:198), a more secure 
electoral base for a given politician often meant the sepa­
ration and splintering off of that base from another group, 
thus preventing the development of class politics.^ For
E. Leeds (1972:53-56) describes the recognized 
utility of electoral corrals in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas.
An administrator attempting to remove a favela from the elec­
toral patronage system by offering various improvements and 
avenues to self help without requiring votes in exchange was 
summarily dismissed in 1962. "This attempt to grant politi­
cal independence to favelas was of course, most threatening 
to^legislators who depended on favelas for electoral support"
^Gross (1973) describes the cultural substratum of 
a patronage system through the analysis of peasant pilgri­
mages in the Northeast. He shows that among peasants, 
vertical ties predominate to the almost absolute exclusion 
of horizontal ties. See also Galjart (1964, 1965).
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politicians who did not develop patronal ties among the 
poor, politicians of the left,^ who did, appeared espe­
cially threatening because they had large lower class 
followings. However, all of the populist styles current 
in Brazil at that time--ge_tu.lismo, aflhemarismo, janismo.
nacionalismo. and most regional rural mobilization 
45efforts — operated to blunt class distinctions.
At the middle and upper reaches of society, patron-
client relations connected the administrative and electoral
systems. Singer has written that
each electoral position has a certain political 
weight which depends on the number of jobs the in­
cumbent can distribute, on the size of the budget 
he controls, on the electoral income that the posi­
tion can command through increased or improved public 
services. The ministries and /state/ secretariats 
of roads and public works are, for instance, considered 
to be positions of great political weight. This 
follows from a number of facts; 1) these positions 
permit the control of the railroads, which are consi­
dered to yield a high electoral income because of 
their large number of employees, 2) the construction 
of roads and public works (bridges, buildings, etc. ) 
also controlled by these positions permit the manage­
ment of enormous budgets, from which it is almost 
always possible to derive a considerable income in
^*For discussions of the weakness of the left in 
Brazil during this period, see Harding (1964), Arriaga 
(1964), Weffort (1965), Ianni (1965), Cohn (1965), Poerner, 
1968:197-200), Erikson,(1970:277-80), de Kadt (1970), Myhr, 
(1972). All labor, student and nationalist movements 
of any account were controlled by the government, whereas 
political parties of the left were disunited and had no 
independent popular bases.
. ^S e e  Weffort (1965), Singer (1965), Ferreira (1964), Medina (1964), Couto (196b), Beiguelman (1971), de 
Kadt (1970), on the various populist styles of the epoch.
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collusion with furnishers of materials and sub­
contractors (1965:81-82).
Elected politicians were in general far too busy satis­
fying their clients and maintaining their own power bases 
from above and below to formulate policy. Congress was 
placed in "the weak tactical position of reacting /to the 
president'sj initiatives, administrative decrees and 
faits accomplis.(Leff. 1968:125).
The developmental policy adopted in Brazil during 
these years led to a kind of "entrepreneurial plebicitary 
regime, with the president himself in the role of the
Great Entrepreneur . . . "  (Cohn, 1971:310). In order to
46implement the ideology of developmentalism which emerged
during these years, the presidents were able to establish
new "parallel bureaucracies" (Dalland, 1972:41-42), when
the existing ones were politically recalcitrant, or con-
47trolled by opposition interests. The bureaucratic reforms 
of the Vargas years were to some extent abandoned so as 
to permit a greater number of appointed positions (Graham, 
1968:140-42; Siegel, 1966).
46See Bonilla (1963), Debrun (1964). Weffort (1965: 
192); Ianni (1971:183-85), Leff (1968:139-45), on the deve­
lopment and functions of nationalist ideologies at this 
time.
^Motta (1972:217) writes that "bureaucracy became 
the institution that would revive the mechanism of elec­
toral clans" through panelinhas. Bureaucratic inertia as 
well as political opposition within given bureaucracies led 
to the creation of autonomous and parallel agencies.
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Public employment soared, especially in the early
1960's (See Figure 17), expanding the bureaucratic middle
income sectors, and with it the myriad series of informal
cliques that Leeds (1965) describes as "panelinhas" (little
saucepans). These informal and primary groups, formed for 
48mutual benefit, operated at every level of Brazilian
bureaucracies and electoral politics. Horizontally,
panelinha members took care of each other% needs; but
each panelinha was also inserted in vertical "tactical
corps of supporters" called an "isre-jinha" (a little church)
which allowed the benefits of patronage to flow up and
down the social scale (Leeds, 1965:392).
Several contradictory consequences followed from
this political organization. In spite of the political
opening and the re-emergence of re gional power groups, the
executive was strengthened. Although the 1950*s and early
491960’s had a politically unstable appearance, the process 
which Weffort was to call "the consecration of the State"
^Characteristically, a pane linha will consist of 
"a customs official, an insurance man, a lawyer or two, 
businessmen, an accountant, a municipal, state or federal 
deputy and a banker with his bank" (Leeds, 1965:393). At 
the lower or middle ends of the social scale, the profes­
sions need not be so exalted.
^ T h e  1950's and early 1960's were filled with ex­
plosive rhetoric on developmental, regional, constitutional 
and partisan questions (see Skidmore, 1967; Debrun, 1964; 
Hirschman, 1961; Ianni, 1971b, for examples). There were 
serious strikes (1953), a presidential suicide (Vargas, 1954), a presidential resignation (Quadros, 1961), and
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(1965:195) and the strengthening of the president was not 
impeded. The president's powers of appointment, bureau­
cratic creation and the clientelism which characterized 
electoral politics served in general to insulate him from 
serious political pressures (Leff, 1964:126).
Clientelism, rather than electoral politics,was 
the potential weakness in the system. As Scott has pointed 
out in the language of political science, clientelism 
and the attendant graft and corruption serve as “post legis­
lative mechanisms for interest aggregation" (1969:326).
This means that those functionaries who did not have direct 
access to situations in which policies were decided and 
made into law, could in myriad and secret ways affect the 
implementation of these laws in their own interests. The 
result was a drain on government resources and perhaps also 
on government policy.^ However, Erikson's analysis of the 
Labor Ministry in the early 1960's (1970;140ff) shows that 
clientelism could also be used programatically. This
constitutional crises in which on one occasion an elected 
president, and on another a vice president (Kubitschek in 
1955; Goulart in 1961) were almost prevented from taking 
office.
^®Leff goes so far as to suggest that the clien­
telism and corruption in Brazilian bureaucracies during the 
populist era acted as a kind of information tax on foreign 
interests and businesses, and thus unwittingly and indi­
rectly may have supported nationalist independent economic 
development.
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occurred under Labor Minister Almino Affonso, whose 
strategic use of patronage in the Labor Ministry and Social 
Security Institutes began to impinge on national policy 
making and to undermine the centralized, ultimately presi­
dential, control of labor. That Almino's efforts were 
perceived as a threat to presidential strength, regardless 
of the political ideology, is attested by his prompt 
replacement as minister.
Nonetheless, while there was little threat to 
presidential strength from within the political system, 
the Goulart regime was toppled by a military coup in 
1964. On the surface, the coup was the result of presi­
dential interference in military affairs and military 
discipline (stepan, 1970). His interference united civilian 
plotters with military plotters against him, and the 
military plotters with uncommitted or pro-Goulart officers 
within the army.
The underlying reasons for the coup, and for the 
existence of plotters, however, were more complex. By the 
1960's growth had ceased, and the economy was plagued by 
inflation. In an expanding economy it is possible that 
electoral populism and patronage might have been able to 
meet the claims and expectations raised. In a contracting 
economy, populism created aspirations and tensions which it 
could not resolve. These tensions themselves generated a 
fear of loss of control to the masses, a fear expressed in
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the civilian plot against the regime. Indeed, Jose' Nun 
has argued that the combination of decreased economic growth 
with increased working class organization and strength 
(Nun, 1967:91) led the military to act, in the interests 
of a middle class to overturn the populist regime to 
prevent "premature democratization" (1968:147).
Like other arguments which hypothesize a middle 
class initiative in Brazilian development, this argument 
depends on a number of fundamental misreadings of the 
Brazilian situation. First of all, as we have seen, 
populism did not lead to increased working class organi­
zation and strength. The tenuous hold that labor leaders 
had over rank and file workers, especially during the 
1964 coup, attests to populism's ultimate weakness in 
this respect (Erikson, 1970:280-84).
Second, although middle income sectors had in­
creased dramatically as a consequence of bureaucratic 
expansion associated with populism, especially in its 
later years, there is no evidence that these sectors 
as yet constituted a middle class. Expectations that such 
a class might form were characteristic of this period. 
However, as Leeds (1965) has shown, the expansion of middle 
income sectors reflected an expansion in the clientelistic 
networks of the "classes" rather than the emergence of a 
structurally discrete group. This is perfectly apparent 
in the mobilization techniques used by the civilian plotters 
of the coup to include middle income groups in demonstra­
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout perm ission.
116
tions against the regime. Siekman (1964) and Blume (1967) 
have shown that the civilian organizers of the plot 
against Goulart were a small group of industrialists and 
businessmen (newspaper owners, editors, bank owners and 
managers, lawyers, etc.) in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. 
Many were affiliated with the liberal UDN and with North 
American interests in Brazil. Recruitment to the study 
organization which they formed (IPES -- Instituto de Pes- 
quisas e Estudos Sociais) was conducted in a "personal" 
way (Blume, 1967:47). IPES drew on material from a North 
American foundation (Siekman, 1964:148) and launched a 
massive anti-communist and anti-Goulart campaign. The 
support which they generated among middle income groups, 
for example, in the March for the Family and Democracy 
in Sao Paulq was mobilized by personal telephone calls on 
the part of industrialists' wives, as well as by television 
and newspaper announcements (Foland, 1967; Blume, 1967).
Finally, it is interesting that Nun's position on 
middle class power, like that of most modernization theo­
rists, coincides with a neglect of foreign economic and 
political interests in the Brazilian situation. His ana­
lysis of the economic crisis suggests that Brazil was 
developing in a vacuum. According to Nun, the import 
substitution process "exhausted itself" without the country 
"having found a pattern of self sustained development" (1967: 
91). In fact, however, the economic crisis was inherent 
in Brazil's relationship to the world economy— specifically
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with North American expansionism. It is true that infla­
tion, which at first had played a significant role in 
generating the funds for Brazil's industrialization (Baer, 
1965:103-105; Ianni, 1971:190; Wogart, 1972:167),51 was 
reducing the buying power of lower income groups, increa­
sing the cost of production and thus deflating profits 
(Ianni, 1971:192). Monetary stabilization was politically 
impossible to impose and the economy had reached an 
impasse. Fishlow has shown (1973), however, that infla­
tion was the result of the monopolistic way in which the 
industrial sector was structured (1973:76) and of the 
Government tendency to raise prices for public services.
In addition, he argues, the economic impasse grew out 
of cycles inherent in the foreign dominated process of 
import substitution. This process is,
virtually by definition . . . bunched . . .
Import substitution introduces new lines of
51-In Brazil the redistributive effects of infla­
tion acted as a technique of forced savings (Ianni, 1971: 
171); working class salaries were held below price raises, 
with the effect of inflating profits and savings. "Wor­
kers did not necessarily suffer in their living standards, 
but the increase of the living standard was slower than the 
increase of the real national product. • . . The declining 
share of the wage sector contributed to the large retained 
earnings which were used by the private sector in its in­
vestment program, while the higher investment proportion 
of the government in comparison to its savings proportion 
suggests that through the inflationary process, the govern­
ment managed to transfer savings from the private to the 
public sector. It is clear that the redistributive factor 
of Brazilian inflation was able to work itself out because 
the wage earning sector was not strong enough to insure
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domestic production . • . such activities there­
fore experience initial rates of growth higher than 
those possible over the longer term. Accompanying 
inflation and balance of payments problems mask 
the problem until too late . . .  In Brazil, the 
import substitution investment boom of the late 
1950*s was soon followed by deceleration of product 
growth in the early 1960's and a diminished incen­
tive to invest . . . because much of it was foreign 
financed, the ultimate balance of payments crisis 
was intensified (1973:104-105).
National entrepreneurs became clients to the 
government, not only because of the size of government 
enterprises, but also because import substitution in con­
junction with foreign investment led to a substitution of 
entrepreneurs as well (Cohn, 1971:314; Dean, 1969:237; 
Ianni, 1971:177). As foreign companies came to control 
important sectors of production (automobiles, electricity 
and cigarettes were between eighty and ninety percent 
foreign; pharmaceuticals and machinery companies were 
seventy percent foreign /Cohn, 1971:314/), Brazilian 
entrepreneurs were increasingly reduced to the status of 
secondary partners to foreign capitalists and petitioners 
to the central government.
Nonetheless, it is interesting that before the
1964 coup, it was the foreign companies, despite all their
advantages which were hit the hardest.
The foreign firms often assumed that on the basis 
of their size, and especially their administrative 
and technical know how, they would be able to domi-
the constancy of its share in the national product" (Baer, 
1965:123-24).
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nate the local market . . . the foreign firms had 
special disadvantages of their own. Their larger 
size and expatriate managerial and technical staffs 
contributed to higher overhead costs. Because they 
employed a "cost plus" pricing policy which attemp­
ted to recover overhead costs in the markup, this 
often placed them at a competitive disadvantage. 
Furthermore, because of the foreign firms* reluc­
tance (stemming from fears about the exchange rate 
and political conditions ) to increase their capi­
tal commitments in Brazil, they usually did not bring 
with them sufficient working capital to provide sub­
stantial suppliers credits to local clients. Hence, 
they were sometimes at a competitive disadvantage 
vis-a-vis domestic firms . • . Because of these 
factors, when field investigation of the /capital 
goods/ sector was undertaken in 1964, the foreign 
rather than the domestic firms were bearing a dis­
proportionate share of its excess capacity and low 
profit margins (Leff, 1968a:36-37)•
This may help to explain the extremely favorable
environment provided by the United States for the 1964 coup.
More or less discreet efforts to co-opt leadership elites
had continued during the populist years as a continuation
of the pro-American propaganda campaign begun so success-
52fully during the World War II years. While American 
businessmen were too afraid to participate directly in 
the civilian plot to overthrow the government (Blume, 1967: 
222), the American embassy supported the civilian plotters*
See Poerner (1968:28, 253) on the State Depart­
ment's efforts to dominate the Brazilian Student Union 
(UNE) in the early 1950*s, and on the creation of AUI 
(Associacao Universitaria Interaroericana), a Brazilian and 
American business as well as State Department financed 
foundation whose objective was to introduce future politi­
cal leaders to "good capitalism, as it is exercised in 
the United States."
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53propaganda efforts. A year before the coup, the United 
States began to withold financial support from the Goulart 
government and to actively seek out the president's poli­
tical opponents to sabotage federal programs; these mea­
sures and its support of political opponents of the govern­
ment exacerbated the political and financial crisis (Stepan, 
1971:124-25; Skidmore, 1967:322-23; Roett, 1968:322). Mi­
litary aid was even offered to the conspirators, but it 
was refused. Because it was refused, American officials 
could state unequivocally that the revolution was "one 
hundred percent purely Brazilian" (Skidmore, 1967:325-26). 
Given the extent of North American interests and the in­
ternal political structure of Brazil, however, it is in­
appropriate to credit Brazilian middle income sectors with 
the initiative for the coup.
Military Dictatorship (1964 to the present)
The pattern of Brazilian development during the 
populist years was based on a strong executive, government 
investment and the attraction of foreign capital. These 
features continue as cornerstones of development policy 
after 1964 but on a scale not approached by previous 
regimes. In spite of the closeness of ties between the new
■^Specifically with the publication of UNS. Instru- 
mento de Subversao. by Sonia Seganfredo (Blume, 1967:215).
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Brazilian military government and the United States, ^
the course of Brazilian development after 1964 was not
that of a nation forcibly reincorporated into the hegemony 
55of United States imperialism. The pattern that emerged, 
most markedly after 1963, was that of a radically new kind 
of economic development, spearheaded by a rapidly evolving 
partnership between the Brazilian government and transnatio­
nal corporations. Increasingly, the country has become the 
site of manufacturing based on sophisticated technology, 
buttressed by the highest forms of f i n a n c e . P e r h a p s  more
^ S e e  Stepan,(1971:124-28), Skidmore (1967:322-30), 
Schneider, (1971) on the institutional and personal rela­
tions between the Brazilian and the American military.
^ T h e  nature of the political and economic changes 
which occurred in Brazil from 1964 on were not immediately 
apparent. Some writers felt that Brazil had come even fur­
ther into the American 11 imperialist" domain in a regime of 
"colonial fascism" (Ianni, 1971a:211; Jaguaribe, 1964:182; 
Frank, 1964, 1964a, 1965), or one of restoration of the 
corporativism of the Estado Novo (Schmitter, 1973; Erikson, 
1972; Skidmore, 1973:31-32). Others, as Cardoso (1973), 
Morely and Smith (1973) and Fishlow (1973:101) have noted, 
were concerned about the limits political conservativism 
would place on economic growth. If the argument put forth 
earlier is correct, the Estado Novo and the centralization 
which preceded it developed to protect Brazilian interests 
from the impersonal rationality of the world market, whereas 
the new Brazilian state exists to integrate Brazil into the 
world market in a different way, which entails high rates of 
growth.
^Technological sophistications appear in the forms 
of the capability of manufacturing in situ jet planes, which 
were hitherto imported. Testimony to the financial sophisti­
cation involved is the development of large investment banks 
which began to appear as of 1966 (As Grandes Cpmpanias. ......
1973:75-82, et passim).
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importantly, these massive infusions of capital and 
technology have been coupled with a major effort to pro­
vide a new economic infrastructure which would articulate 
the new economic order. Should this effort be successful, 
Brazil would stand alone in Latin America as a country 
capable of becoming a sub-imperial power in her own right 
for Latin America and with imperial aspirations of her 
own in the rest of the underdeveloped market.
It is the argument of this thesis that only in this 
context can we see the beginning of middle class formation: 
that is, the formation of a group structurally separated 
from the "classes" and performing distinct functions. Two 
functions are especially important. The first is to enforce 
in various ways the developmental and political policies of 
the central government. The second is to support the deve­
lopment of Brazil's industries by providing an insatiable 
market for consumer goods. Both of these functions grow 
out of the changing cirexamstances which followed the 1964 
coup.
In order to understand these changes and the Brazi­
lian "economic miracle," Cardoso (1973) has formulated the 
model of "associated dependent development." In this model 
he emphasises that the process of associated development 
cannot be understood as a function of purely national 
initiatives: indeed, the nation state is reduced to the 
role of a single administrative unit within an internatio­
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nal division of labor, increasingly controlled by trans­
national corporations (cf. also Wallerstein, 1974; Barnet 
and Muller, 1974). As the price for hosting technological 
and financial transfers, the nation state must attempt 
to guarantee internal stability while committing itself to 
infrastructural development."^
In this course of development, a premium has been 
put on speed by the government, probably prodded on by 
transnationals, whose investments are under considerable 
pressure elsewhere in the world from national governments 
and whose commitments to areas that do not suit their 
needs are notoriously fluid (Barnet and Muller, 1974:55-56, 
81-83, 189-210). No effort has been spared by the govern­
ment to make Brazil safe for transnationals, from which 
the successive governments believe that all the blessings 
of economic development will flow.
In its headlong rush towards development, the 
government has faced two major obstacles: 1) opposition 
from major Brazilian industrialists, expressed primarily 
in the arena of national politics, and 2) the problems 
of massing sufficient capital to underwrite infrastruetu-
^Infrastructural development under state owned corporations is the nature of the Brazilian government's 
commitment. But here also the transnationals are preemi­
nent, as the government itself is not capable of produ­
cing railroad engines, but General Electric is; nor is it 
capable of producing telecommunications equipment, but 
RCA is, to cite a few examples.
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ral costs, which are staggering. Symptomatic of the 
increasing opposition is the repression for which the 
government has become notorious since 1968. The capital 
accumulation problem has led to the overhaul of the 
Brazilian credit and taxation systems, accomplished pri­
marily under the aegis of Minister of the Economy, A. Del- 
fim Netto (1968-1974) (Fishlow, 1973). Let us consider 
each in turn.
Under populism, Brazilian industrialists participa­
ted in the national government, albeit as clients. Imme­
diately after the 1964 coup, in which many of them took 
part, it became clear that the new government was to leave 
the door wide open to the penetration of foreign capital 
and the rational workings of the market. In effect, the 
priorities of the government
were to the establishment of a functioning free 
market system, perhaps even more than to the struggle 
against inflation . . .  In the long run these goals 
were viewed as mutually compatible, indeed as indis­
pensably linked: in the short run, they might conflict, 
to the consistent disadvantage of stabilization 
(Fishlow, 1973:80).
Brazilian industrialists without transnational 
linkages needed some form of economic protection in order 
not to be gobbled up by the transnationals. The effect of 
the government's free market policies were not long in 
bearing bitter fruit as these industrialists began to be 
forced into bankruptcy, or were bought out by transnationals 
(lanni, 1971:262-65). Increasingly imperiled by the exe­
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cutive branch's free market policies, Brazilian business­
men sought to fight back through the legislative branch of 
government, in which they were still powerful. Public 
debate was focused on the issue of denationalization 
(desnacionalizapao) of the Brazilian economy (Moreira Alves, 
1972:163-78; Ianni, 1971:262, footnote 37). For four years 
(1964-1968) a feverish struggle ensued between the legisla­
tive and executive branches of government. In late 1968 
the executive branch made its definitive move: through
a series of repressive actions it removed Brazilian indus-
58trialists cum politicians from power.
A series of Institutional acts, notably Institutio­
nal Act 5 (AI-5) in 1968, removed politics to the near 
exclusive domain of the president and his military advisors. 
The political rights of many prominent politicians had 
been abolished in 1964 and 1965. The old parties had been 
abolished in 1965 and were replaced with two government 
parties, ARENA J f o n g Y f l l l f l C f l > and a loyal
opposition, MDB (jtoiasa£.9. POTlgfiCgVifiSJtegafeteitg) ° Indi­
rect elections for the president and state governors were 
instituted at that time. While the formalities of indirect 
elections are maintained, state governors were removed at 
the president's will. In 1968, however, federal, state 
and municipal legislatures were recessed, and when recon-
^ F o r  the "igniting spark" of the 1968 military 
shift, see Schneider (1970) and Moreira Alves (1973).
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vened, stripped of most of their power* Habeas corpus 
was suspended; official violence reached new proportions, 
with the aid of United States anti-insurgency training 
courses. While the poor had always been brutalized by 
the police, arbitrary physical abuse and torture was 
practised against members of the middle and upper income 
strata for the first time, in an effort to stamp out the 
wave of political terrorism which arose in response to the 
repression. Rigid censorship of the press and academic 
community was instituted, and the climate of fear and poli­
tical apathy which developed was shrouded by nationalist 
public relations symbols created or inflated by the govern­
ment. In addition, courses in political indoctrination
59are required at all educational levels.
The increasing control of political opposition 
permitted the implementation of fiscal policies supportive 
of capital accumulation. Although many had been developed 
before 1964, they had been at that time politically impos­
sible to pursue. These included policies to increase 
federal revenues and create a rational capital market
-*^See Schmitter (1970), Truskier (1970), American 
Committee (1970), Moreira Alves (1972, 1973), Rosenbaum 
and Tyler (1972), Bishops (1973). The celebration of the 
150th aniversary of Brazil’s independence included the 
repatriation of Emperor Pedro ll's bones from Portugal; 
these were sent on a funeral cortdge around the country. 
Other nationalist symbols include the building of the Trans- Amazonic highway and heavily publicized disputes with the 
United States over the price of soluble coffee.
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undistorted by inflation. Rationalizing the capital market 
created funds for government investment in infrastructure 
(e.g. minerals, electric power, communications, transpor­
tation. See Quern e Quem, 1972:75). Improved tax collec­
tion (Hinnichs and Hahar, 1972) and nominally redistribu­
tive (but actually instruments of forced savings and capi­
tal concentration) federal institutions (BNH, FGTS, PIS, 
PIN^) have vastly expanded federal revenues. Monetary 
correction and "crawling peg" devaluations have reduced 
financial uncertainty by preventing currency speculations 
and the devaluation of financial balances through infla­
tion (Rosenbaum and Tyler, 1972:17-18).*^ Because of
The BNH (National Housing Bank) was founded in 
1964 with an initial capital of one million cruzeiros. To 
these funds were added those of the FGTS (Guarantee Fund 
for Time of Service) formed in 1966 and based on an eight 
percent payroll tax levied on employers. The FGTS is a 
pension fund to which employees or their heirs only have 
access on limited occasions: marriage, house building, 
death or retirement (Hughes, 1972:128; Otero, n.d.t!09).
PIS (Program for Social Integration) is another pension 
plan paid for by employers to which workers also have limi­
ted access (Fishlow, 1973:11). PIN (National Integration 
Program) is an effort to resettle the Northeastern poor 
along the Trans-Amazonic highway. All of these plans are 
forced savings mechanisms which finance Government deve­
lopment programs.
61D. Kleinman*s letter to the New York Times 
(Business and Finance, Sunday, April 28, 1974) emphasises 
the creation or saving of capital rather than the halting 
of inflation as the prime motive among the economists—  
including himself--who developed the monetary correction 
scheme.
R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout permission.
12 8
government incentives, export revenues have increased and 
continued foreign investments have reduced Brazil's 
shortage of foreign exchange. Although the national debt 
almost doubled between 1964 and 1971 (Cardoso, 1973:150), 
international financial agencies have "found Brazil to be 
an exeqiary debtor, and have maintained high levels of 
lending" (Skidmore, 1973:24).
This style of economic development entails grave 
social costs. A number of writers have pointed out the 
increasingly regressive pattern of income distribution 
and the fact that the development of the industrial sector 
is not expected to significantly increase employment 
(Fishlow, 1972, 1973; Cardoso, 1973; Langoni, 1973; Hughes, 
1972:134). Even among the employed, the purchasing power 
of real wages has been reduced, although the effects of 
this may have been mitigated for some by increased credit 
facilities. Nonetheless, an increasing number of women 
and younger people have felt the need to supplement 
family incomes by joining the labor market, in spite of 
the low salaries they receive (Langoni, 1973:15, 58, 83, 
97). The labor structure was reorganized under tighter 
central control and the unions which had developed during 
the previous decade outside the official structure were 
abolished. Syndicate leaders were replaced by men amenable 
to the new government's wishes and political orthodoxy 
is required of all office holders in the labor structure.
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In a very real sense, Brazil's growth depends on a poor 
and politically docile population.
It is within this scheme that middle income 
sectors have been called upon to perform new functions. 
These sectors resemble their counterparts under populism. 
Indeed, the trend towards increased bureaucratic employ­
ment characteristic of that period continued after 1964, 
if at a somewhat slower rate (See Figure 17). Under 
populism, however, bureaucratic employment among middle 
sectors represented an extension of the ‘'classes*' and their 
clientelistic panelinhas. Since 1964 many of these net­
works have been broken through bureaucratic reform. Bu­
reaucracies have been systematically moralized and ratio­
nalized: they have been purgad of corrupt, clientelistic 
and other undesirable elements. "Influence," except at 
the highest levels, has sharply decreased. Whereas 
corruption and patronage had previously served as "post 
legislative mechanisms for interest aggregation," the 
bureaucrats are now expected to lubricate the system for 
"associated dependent development." To quote Delfim 
Netto, Minister of the Economy, and central architect of 
the Brazilian miracle,
As far as the direct action of the government is 
concerned, nothing is more important than 1) the 
development of a truly efficient bureaucracy which 
is conscious of and responsible for its actions,
2) the introduction of modern management methods 
in government enterprises, including the creation 
of a stable cadre of administrative and technical
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personnel. . • It is absolutely imperative to 
modernize public administration • . . so as to 
inculcate in the bureaucracy the values which are 
compatible with the society we wish to build.
Without modernization . • . it will never be pos­
sible to maintain the continuity of objectives, 
because it is clear that on the level that really 
counts . . . who administers the country is the 
bureaucrat: he is the one who decides who does and 
who does not pay taxes . . .  In the case of indi­
rect action, nothing seems more important to me 
than . . . /to/ free the entrepreneur from sibylline 
regulations, from contradictory economic policies 
and from the ppygr of t£e, a^gjj.aKed^bu^eaucrat11 
(emphasis added, cited in lanni, 1971:248-50).
In addition to their function as lubricators and 
enforcers of government policy, middle income sectors have 
been called upon to support the internal market through the 
consumption of luxury consumer durables which the present 
economic scheme emphasises (Cardoso, 1973:149). In this 
process, the concept of classe media (middle class) has 
become widely diffused through the media and is associated 
with life style (clothing, appliances, automobiles, all 
made in Brazil) and is increasingly identified with poder 
consumidor. the power to consume. Being middle class is 
a matter not of political participation, but of political 
neutrality and economic consumption.
Such a middle class is a far cry from that which 
appears so frequently as a prime mover in modernization 
theory. This chapter has shown that Brazil*s political 
and economic development has responded to changes in its 
relations with other actors in the world economic system, 
and not to initiatives from middle income sectors. Further­
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more, it has argued that until very recently, there has 
been no middle class, but only middle income sectors, 
which have been variously drawn into the privileged 
arena of ruling elites. This was true despite the expan­
sion of middle income sectors as a result of over all 
government centralization and economic growth, which 
created more middle income positions. Finally, recent 
Brazilian history suggests that conditions now favor the 
development of a middle class: we have hypothesized on the 
basis of the historical evidence that a class formation 
process has begun. The following chapters present 
fieldwork data in support of this hypothesis. They show 
how families of three distinct social origins (local 
elites, immigrants and bureaucrats) have been affected by 
shifting phases of Brazilian development in this century, 
and how despite their dissimilar origins and varied careers, 
they increasingly form part of a homogeneous class of 
consumers, even to the point of expressing a shared 
rudimentary consciousness of their position.
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CHAPTER H I
SANTANA, FROM THE TOP OF THE HILL, 1900-1930
The next two chapters will describe in detail the 
three groups which field research suggested constitute 
significant middle income sectors of Santana. It will be 
shown that the three groups--an old local elite, a foreign 
born commercial sector and bureaucrats of rural origins-- 
were distinct. They had different social origins, pursued 
different careers, emerged as politically visible actors 
in different historical periods, and on the whole recog­
nized their separateness from each other. Nevertheless, 
the three groups underwent, albeit in different time 
periods, a parallel process of progressive exclusion from 
political power with attendant economic implications. 
Chapter V will show that these processes are leading to 
what appears to be a shared consciousness of class based on 
a sense of exclusion. In Chapter IV I will concentrate 
on the second two groups--immigrants and bureaucrats.
The present chapter deals with Santana's old elite, 
which coalesced during the First Republic and was already 
in decline by the 1930's. The greater time depth in their 
family histories allows for a more complete analysis of 
the implications of political marginalization, and suggests 
a model for the understanding of the careers of the
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bureaucrats and immigrants. By the 1920's, Santana's 
elite families had become intermediaries and brokers in 
the larger political system of Sao Paulo. They stood on 
the lower fringes of the ruling class of the city as a 
whole. Their economic fortunes were intricately related 
to the growth of Sab Paulo city between 1900 and 1930. 
Political developments following 1930 sheared most of them 
off from the city's ruling groups, and left only the most 
fortunate with sufficient capital to be able to maintain 
themselves for a generation or two. Most of Santana's 
elite families lived through a brief period of local 
glory and then fell back anonymously into Santana's and 
the city's growing middle income sectors.
In 1934 Santana was the most heavily populated 
district north of the Tiete River, with 43,588 inhabitants.1 
At the turn of the century, however, the area appeared to 
have been hardly touched by the economic forces which had 
transformed the city of Sao Paulo into a metropolis. The 
city council barely concerned itself with the lands to the 
north of the city on either side of the Tiete River; its 
attentions were limited to the requirement that landowners 
keep a portion of their land in public service for open 
pasturage and road maintenance (Mendes Torres, 1970:43).
In 1880 public transportation did not extend beyond the
*The area was already reduced by subdivision. See above, Chapter I, p. 48.
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bridge which crossed the Tiete River: the urban and rural
zones were divided by the hog pens which were established
that year on the northern and western outskirts of town,
including in Santana (Mendes Torres, 1970:52). The main
building of the old Jesuit Fazenda Sant'Anna had been
decrepit and run down since 1863 when it had housed indigent
minors: ten years later it was more run down, housing
equally indigent smallpox victims. Such development as
had come to Santana appeared limited to the establishment
of Sao Paulo's first regatta clubs on either side of the
river (1905) and the building of the Colegio Santana,^ an
expensive girl's boarding school perched high on the hill
overlooking the Tiete valley and the city beyond. The
area appeared unpopulated and abandoned to the rich who
lived in the center of the city. A wealthy coffee
baroness recalls the Sao Paulo of her youth:
We would take long carriage outings through the 
suburbs. We went to Braz, to Gloria and principally 
to the Ponte Grande /Big Bridge to Santanq/ on dusty 
roads, crossing uncultivated lands and sighting 
here and there a poor hovel or a caipira 2hillbilly7 
passing by with his little donkey loaded with the 
sparse products of his garden, which he was going 
to try to sell in the city" (cited in Mendes Torres, 
1970:58).
2For many years the massive structure of the 
Colegio Santana and the adjoining chapel built by local 
landowners were the only reference points in municipal 
documents dealing with opening new roads or boundary dis­
putes in the area. Santana was beyond the city limits for 
many of the city's inhabitants.
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The baroness's impressions notwithstanding, Mendes 
Torres's history of Santana (1970) provides some indica­
tions that Santana's economy and population had in fact 
begun to grow before the turn of the century. Santana's 
population had risen from 970 in 1825 to 7,000 in 1900 
(Mendes Torres, 1970:11; Masarolo, 1971:85).3 Some of 
this growirh in population is attributable to foreign 
immigration. In 1877 the Provincial Government established 
in Santana a colonial nucleus for Italian immigrants* By 
1888 there were 136 persons in the colony (94 Italians 
and 39 Brazilians) who planted corn, beans, potatoes 
and vineyards. While foreign immigrants did not flood 
Santana as they did other central neighborhoods of the 
city, their contribution was not inconsiderable and con­
tinued well on into the new century. An 1893 analysis 
of the statistics of birth in Santana revealed that for 
107 births, only 48 were to Brazilian parents. By 1927 
more than half of the student population in Santana was 
of foreign extraction (Mendes Torres, 1970:66-67, 76, 110).
3Indeed, according to a local petition, the 
smallpox hospital was moved out of Santana in 1878 because 
of the “inhabitants of the /Italian./ colony of Santana, the 
large number of carters and mule train drivers that come to 
the capital from different parts of the state, the large 
numbers of immigrants residing in the neighborhood of Luz 
/across the river from SantanaJ and the large numbers of 
carters and inhabitants in Luz and Santana," who presumab­
ly might catch and spread the disease (cited in Mendes 
Torres, 1970:60).
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Santana's population growth was not only due to
foreign immigration, however. We may infer additional
growth in the population from the city records which
reveal that, beginning in the 1860's, land disputes and
requests to the city council for land increased in the
Northern Zone of the city. In 1869 lands which had been
abandoned and which had been in the public domain for
over forty years began to be enclosed and sold privately
(Mendes Torres, 1970:50). In order to prevent private
individuals from planting rapidly growing trees and thus
being able to claim the land as private property, the city
council ordered the area ploughed under (Mendes Torres,
1970:50). Disputes continued during the rest of the
century, with complaints to the city council about the
difficulty of maintaining boundary lines: markers were
constantly stolen, leaving the lands unenclosed, and
thus in the public domain. In 1881 a commission set
up to study the land claims concluded that
in reality the public has been in possession for a 
long time, but even when proven that a piece of 
land is of private ownership, it would be convenient 
to expropriate it for the public's utility (cited 
in Mendes Torres, 1970:56).
The meadow near the Ponte Grande over the Tiete was 
declared in the public domain, but the decision was over­
turned the same year by the Provincial Government, thus 
opening the way to increased settlement and real estate 
development in Santana.
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In 1889 on the eve of the declaration of the 
Republic, Santana was declared a separate district of 
the peace; by 1900 Santana was allotted 3.2 percent of the 
budget for city improvements (Masarolo, 1971:85). Trans­
portation to and from the district had improved. In 
1865 the Ponte Grande over the Tiete had been repaired, 
and in 1893 the Cantareira Railroad through Santana was 
inaugurated. It was built to improve contact between 
the growing city and the waterworks and reservoirs which 
fed the city's water supply from the Cantareira mountains 
north of Santana. But, by the beginning of the century 
it was being used by passengers, as well as to transport 
agricultural produce to the city's municipal markets 
(Mendes Torres, 1970:112). In addition, Santana was 
serviced by horse drawn trolleys which provided suffi­
ciently bad service to incite two riots in 1906. The 
animals were unhitched and the trolleys were set on 
fire and sent rolling down the hill. The service was 
replaced in 1908 by an electric trolley service 
(Mendes Torres, 1970:90).
A commercial center was forming in Santana
although the main street there
looked more like a road than a street, still 
travelled by mule trains and ox carts, with low 
wattle and daub houses, immense yards surrounded 
by bamboo or vine fences, and with little illu­
mination (Mendes Torres, 1970:90).
In between the fenced yards along the main street were
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hardware stores, grocery stores (secos e molhados). and 
saddle and leather goods shops and blacksmith and car­
pentry shopp. By 1913 Santana had its first movie 
house. In 1911 the center of Santana had 651 buildings.
By 1918 the number had more than doubled to 1707 and the 
main streets had been paved (Mendes Torres, 1970:93,102).
The area was fully electrified in 1922 along with the 
city’s more distant neighborhoods such as Jardim America 
and Ypiranga. In the early part of the century, Santana 
had sixteen public schools and by 1927, the student popu­
lation alone was at least 10,812 (Mendes Torres, 1970:84,111).
Mendes Torres is of little assistance in explain­
ing the reasons for Santana’s development during the first 
three decades of the century, beyond stating the obvious 
fact that the area's growth was a spin-off of the growth 
of the city. Santana was affected, just as other neigh­
borhoods in Sao Paulo were, by the city's growth. The 
family histories which I collected in Santana suggest 
some of the specific ways a growing metropolis affected 
the economy and social stratification of one of its 
outlying neighborhoods.
The lands north of the Tiete River, including 
Santana, were never coffee lands; they supported a mixed 
economy based on agriculture and pasturage. Landowners 
raised cattle, grew sugar, beans, corn, manioc and fruit. 
According to elderly informants in Santana, the larger
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establishments at the turn of the century, included lumber 
yards, carpentry shops and brick and charcoal factories.
In addition to this, the area's most important economic 
activity, dating back as far as the eighteenth century 
consisted of the fattening and sale of mule and horse 
trains which came from Braganya and Atibaia to the north. 
It was because of this trade that landowners had been 
required to maintain the roads in good conditions and 
allocate part of their lands for open grazing (Mendes 
Torres, 1970:43).
According to informants who had been part of the 
elite which emerged in Santana over the first two decades 
of the century, the city's growth affected their family 
fortunes in a number of interrelated ways. For large 
local landowners and animal dealers, who formed the core 
of the elite, animal sales increased as did trade in 
general. In addition, the area acquired urban real estate 
value which further stimulated commercial interests and 
construction.
As the city grew, an increasing number of horses 
and mules were sold to its expanding public services, 
which used them for transportation, sanitary and security 
services, at that time all based on animal traction. The 
most important buyer of animals was the growing Sao Paulo
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State Militia (Focyft.P.ybUE? d<j> gap.gsyjfl)4 which estab­
lished its headquarters on the city side of the Tiete 
River on the road to Santana in 1901. The market for such 
sales increased again in 1906 when the Forga Publica began 
its expansion under French military advisors.^ To meet 
this growing demand, local landowners, now with enclosed 
fields, either bought whole mule and horse trains for 
resale or rented out pasture land. At least two local
landowners introduced dairy cattle, selling the milk
6locally and across the river to the city. Other landowners 
and entrepreneurs established grocery stores and supply 
houses for the animal trade. Landowners who did this, 
often in conjunction with other activities, moved their 
families from their fazendas (large farms, rural establish­
ments) and built houses in Santana on the slopes of the 
hill.
^In 1909 an Army post for the 10th Pursuit 
Company was established in the old Jesuit fazenda house.
It had housed transient military contingents since 1893.
In 1916 the main house, slave quarters and other outbuild­
ings were torn down and a new fort was built. This insti­
tution’s need for animals must have contributed to the 
growth of the grazing and animal sales economy, although 
it was not mentioned by any informants as a purchaser of 
their families's animals.
^See Chapter II, p. 70.
^The home of one of these landowners, who was also 
a druggist in the center of the city, was frequented by 
law students who would spent "whole nights" having contests 
over who could drink most freshly drawn milk at a single 
try (Mendes Torres, 1970:83-84).
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We may estimate the importance of Santana's 
growing commercial center from the traffic which passed 
on its main street. Although in 1926 the use of Santana's 
local side streets by vehicles (either motorized or animal 
drawn) was among the lowest of the neighborhoods around 
city exits, Santana's main road, leading north to Atibaia, 
Bragampa and southern Minas Gerais carried almost as much 
traffic as the roads leading to the port of Santos or to 
Rio de Janeiro, albeit predominantly animal drawn (Mendes 
Torres, 1970:108-10).
In addition to the commerce which supplied the 
animal trade, another activity which contributed to the 
new elite's consolidation of wealth was local retail 
commerce. Santana's elite families supplied their own 
needs from the more prestigious stores in the center of 
the city:
Os comerciantes vendiam pro pessoal la de baixo, 
pra caipirada id do Juqueri, Atibaia, Braganja. 
Compravam na cidade pra vender aqui. Nos iamos 
pra cidade pra fazeras compras. Os outros compravam 
dos mascates . . . Sao Paulo era tab pequeno que 
compravamos da cidade, no Caltabiano, na Casa Machado 
. . . e, telefonava pra casa, e eles mandavam os 
meninos levar pra casa, e la escolhia. «
The storekeepers sold to the people down below, to 
the hillbillies from Juqueri, Atibaia, Bragan^a.
They bought in town for resale here. We would do 
our shopping in town. The others would buy from 
the travelling salesmen . . . Sao Paulo at that 
time was so small that we would buy in town, at 
Caltabiano, Casa Machado /stores which informants 
said were prestigious and expensivej . . • yes, 
we would telephone the store, and they would send a
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boy with the merchandise and we would select it 
at home.'
Besides selling animals, dairy farming and 
commercial retailing, many local landowners developed 
their lands, or sold them to real estate developers. The 
disputes with the municipality over the private as against 
public ownership of land, which were characteristic of 
the late nineteenth century, continued until 1918, when 
public and private domains were clearly demarcated north
of the Tiete, leaving most of the flatlands by the river
8and on the slopes of the hill in private hands. A 
modest real estate boom ensued as houses were built, sold 
or rented to Santana*s growing population (Mendes Torres, 
1970:107-108).
As far as one can tell from the names of early 
Santana landowners mentioned by Mendes Torres, many may 
have been relative newcomers to the area. Elderly 
informants are vague about how their ascendants acquired 
land other than by inheritance. In view of the undefined 
status of much of the land at the beginning of the centu­
ry, it is possible that unscrupulous means may have been
7Unless otherwise noted, all of the following 
quotations were translated by the writer from interview 
protocols.
QThe land on which the airfield was subsequently 
built remained in the public domain as a cavalry ground 
for the Forca Publica. The State penitentiary property 
was purchased from a private owner. See Chapter I, p.38.
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Qused. Some of the landowners were of foreign, generally
northern European, origins, although by the turn of the
century, and certainly by the 1920*s, they were considered
11 locals." Only the nicknames such as "Chico .Frances" or
"Pedro Alemao" (French Chico, German Peter) betrayed their
non-Brazilian heritage.
Depois, esses estrangeiros^acaipiraram se. 0 
franees, ou o alemao ja nao era lingua caseira.
Os frlhos e os netos todos casaram e ficaram aqui, 
e faziam parte das familias.
Besides, these foreigners became Brazilianized 
Aiterally, became hillbillies/* French or German 
was no longer spoken in the home. The sons and 
grandchildren all married and stayed here, and 
were part of the families.
The group also included foreigners of more recent 
arrival, also northern European, who were of relatively 
high socio-economic status. They were bank managers in 
the center of the city, liberal professionals, or ran 
commercial enterprises. Some of them acquired Santana 
land by purchase or through marriage into landed families.
Most of the liberal professionals, however, were 
Brazilians, not Europeans. These came with their families 
from areas in the interior such as the western part of the
For example, while informants are understandably 
vague on this point, there does seem to have been a cause 
celebre in the early part of the century involving the 
double murder of two sisters, both major land heiresses.
They were killed by their husbands, one of whom had migrated 
to the area, while the other was a landowner in his own 
right and an important animal trader. The murders were in 
the idiom of crimes passionals but observers were quick
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout permission.
144
v’ale do Paraiba or the north of the state which were in 
agricultural decline. These families were typical of the 
middle income type discussed by Marques de Saes (1973): 
migrants from areas in decline, but highly educated and 
politically well connected. Families such as these bought 
land in Santana, and provided valuable political contacts 
to the local elite's political "pool."
It is possible to describe the outlines of a 
"division of labor" among Santana's elite families: as we 
shall see below, the local landowners and entrepreneurs 
clearly controlled the most important economic resources, 
land and trade, as well as the grass roots mechanisms of 
electoral politics. However, the liberal professionals of 
Brazilian agrarian origins seem to have provided additional 
intermediary links to the larger political system beyond 
Santana. Heads of these families were not ward heelers 
or political bosses, but they ran the local party organi­
zations, both for the Partido Republicano Paulista (PRP) 
and the Partido Democratico (PD). For instance, the 
individual who owned the civil registry— an important 
political plum— had spent much of his early career 
acquiring ever larger, more important registries in the 
northern part of Sao Paulo state, presumably by participa­
te note the real estate sales and developments effected by the animal trader. The other husband went to jail.
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ting in rural electoral machines, before he came to Sao 
Paulo in the early 1920's. In Sao Paulo he acquired a 
labor accident registry in the center of the city, and 
later a civil registry in Santana. He lived and practiced 
medecine in Santana, where he was for many years the 
head of the local branch of the PRP.
In my sample, it was generally individuals like 
these who came to Santana from areas in the interior, 
who were cited by their descendants as having had per­
sonal contacts with prominent political figures of the 
First Republic, although, as we shall see, local indi­
viduals had them as well. Informants indicated that such 
connections, ranging from various degrees of cousinhood 
and god-parenthood, existed, and formed part of the 
social and political capital upon which they could draw. ̂  
Moreover, it appears that the wives of such individuals 
contributed significantly to setting the "tone" of local 
life. According to informants, they were far more pro­
minent than other local women in organizing the religious 
charities and festivities for which many informants 
remember Santana of the First Republic.
Yet, regardless of this rudimentary internal
^State governors and national presidents who 
were mentioned were Rodrigues Alves, Heitor Teixeira 
Penteado, Washington Luis and Julio PresteS. Mayors 
and deputies mentioned were Pires do Rio, Franco da Rocha, 
Francisco Morato, Alcantara Machado.
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division, the Santana elite appears to have been united 
and highly self conscious of its local position. For these 
families, the population consisted of “as families" (the 
families)--themselves--and "a italianada la de baixo" 
(literally "the Italians down below," referring to those 
of the colony and others who lived on the meadowlands by 
the river)— people who were socially as well as geographi­
cally at the bottom of the Santana hill.
In part, the consciousness and solidarity of the
elite was cultural and derived from a sense of what it
meant to be of "good family."
Santana era urn bairro bom. Naquele tempo nao tinha 
Jardim Europa, Jardim Paulista. Santana tinha urn 
dos melhores colegios: o Colegio Santana reunia 
meninas do interior de boa familia e as de recursos 
no bairro. Minha irma foi la. Era um bairro de 
familias medias, abastadas, os pobres estavam mais 
la pra baixo. Nao eram da elite dos juizes e des- 
embargadores, dos advogados la da cidade, mais 
eram de boa familia.^ Em Santana eramos mopas ricas. 
Tinha negrinha,pra so ve>de empregada.
Santana was a good neighborhood. In those days 
there was no Jardim Europa or Jardim Paulista /ex­
pensive neighborhoods in contemporary Sao PauloJ. 
Santana had one of the best schools in the city.
The Colegio Santana's students were girls from 
good families from the interior, and those of 
means in the neighborhood. My sister went there.
It was a neighborhood of middle families, well off 
families. The poor were further down ft he hill/.
The families weren't of the elite of the attorneys 
and supreme court judges of the city, but they 
were of good family. In Santana we were rich girls.
You should have seen the number of little black 
girls there were as maids.
Good families participated in religious and 
charitable efforts, such as the organization of bazaars
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and the maintenance of the chapel of the Colegio Santana 
at the top of the hill* We may surmise that the periodic 
festivities which often extended over several days contri­
buted to a sense of familism and class:
Levava uma vida social pacata e simples: os passeios 
da minha epoca era quermesse, bailes em casas conheci- 
das. Havia urn clube recreativo, mais o meu pai nao 
admitia que frequentava clubes . . .  a igreja era o 
lugar que convergia mais o sentimento do bairro.
Dona Albertina ajudava os padres^ organizava as irman- 
dades e as quermesses. Ela reunxa as mo^as pra fazer 
as barracas, se vestiaro de baiana . . . tinha core to 
com banda de musica, barracas de Maria Antonietas,  ̂
era Undo. Nos ficavamos olhando da jane la do carto- 
rio . . .  os homens de terno branco^com bengala de 
ebony . . . eram bem fiaquentadas, nao eram do povinho 
nao. Nao xa muito preto, era fino, podia ir mo^a 
sozinha. Ate os soldados que fam eram de boa familia, 
tinham dinheiro pra gastar. Assim que ganhavam os 
fundos pra acabar a igreja.
We led a peaceful and simple social life: the 
amusements of my era were church bazaars and balls 
in the houses of families we knew. There was a 
recreational club, but my father would not permit 
us /girls./ to go there . . . The church was where 
the neighborhood feeling converged most. Dona 
Albertina helped the priests, organized the brother­
hoods and sisterhoods11 and the bazaars. She got 
the girls together to decorate the booths, they 
dressed up as Bahianas . . . there was a bandstand 
with music, booths full of /women dressed in/ Marie 
Antoinette /costume§7, it was beautiful. We would 
watch from the window of the registry office, the 
men in their white suits with canes of ebony * . .
They were well attended, they weren't bazaars for 
the little people. Very few blacks attended; it 
was refined and young women could go alone. Even
^Religious lay organizations.
1^Regional Brazilian costume for women from Bahia.
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the soldiers who went Were of good family— they 
had money to spend. That's the way they got the 
money to finish the church.
In addition to religious functions, purely social
occasions set the elite families apart from others and
bolstered their sense of class:
As festas: as festas de Sao Joao, com trezentas ^ 
pessoas que vinham da cidade toda. 0 Chico Frances 
fez promessa, e fez por sete anos. Caro? Limao, boi, 
empregados, £e ja tinha. Abobora, batata, ja tem.
Hoje e caro por causa do uisque. Faziam baloes de 
forma de elefante, pioes . . • eram em casas grandes, 
com toalha de crochet amarrado com fita. Festas lindas, 
com fogo de artificios, bala de estalo que puxava e 
saia sorte, doces tradicionais; levava uma semana 
pra fazer cisne de bala, rosinha de papel pros convida- 
dos levar.
The parties: the St. John parties'^ with three 
hundred people who came from all over the city.
Chico Frames made a vow*5 and had a party every 
year for seven years. Expensive? Lemons,sides of 
beef and servants you already had. Squash and 
potatoes you had. Today its expensive because of 
the whiskey. They made b a l l o o n s i n  the shape of
13Finished in 1925.
1ATraditional festivity in June.
^According to Gross's (1971) study of religious 
vows and pilgrimages in the Northeast, a vow or a promessa 
"is a kind of private contract between a man and a saint 
whom he regards as particularly powerful." The object of 
the promessa is not to get something, "but rather to repay 
the saint for a prayer answered" (1973:142-3). The vow 
may involve a pilgrimage, a physical offering at the saint's 
shrine, money offerings, acts of penance and even musical 
offerings. In this case we do not know What moved Chico 
Frances to make his promessa. but he vowed to celebrate 
St. John's feast day with a party every year for seven 
years.
^Paper balloons, levitated by hot air.
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elephants, tops . . . the parties were in big houses 
with crochet tablecloths, twined with ribbons.
Beautiful parties, with fire works, party favors 
that exploded and told your fortunes, traditional 
sweets: it took a week to make candy swans and paper 
roses for the guests to take home.
Many informants compared Santana at that time to
a small town in the interior, where everyone knew everyone
else, and where owning land and a store entitled one to
leisure. A younger informant attempted to capture the
relationship between leisurely appearance and prestige:
Todos tinham fazenda e loja. Agora as lojas estao 
com mercadoria antiquissima, que ninguem compra. 
Chegavam la de terno branco, com bengala, abriam as 
vinte mil portas e sentavam pra ler o jornal . . .
£a e fechava pro almopo, fechando as portas outra vez.
Dax voltavam, abria outra vez, ficavam ax, lendo 
jornal, batendo papo no terraco, tudo muito quieto, 
muito distinto.
They all had fazendas and stores. Now the stores 
would have extremely old merchandise which no one 
buys. They arrived there in their white suits, 
with their canes, opened the twenty thousand doors, 
and sat down to read the papers . . . they went and 
then they closed for lunch, closing all the doors 
up again. Then they would come back, open up again 
and stay there, reading the paper, chatting, on the 
terrace. It was all very quiet and very distiiiguished.
The nostalgia and affectionate surrealism of 
such reconstructions significantly omit any reference 
to the mechanisms of power by which the Santana elite 
developed and maintained its local prominence as interme­
diaries in the larger political system. Clearly enough, 
members of this group did not simply plan parties and 
read the newspapers in a social and political vacuum.
These were merely the visible symbols of their less visible
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economic and political control of the neighborhood and of 
their links to higher political structures. Historical , 
genealogical and interview data suggest what some of 
these mechanisms were.
We have seen above in Chapter 11 that an important 
feature of political life during the First Republic was 
coronelismo. or local bossism. The literature on coronel- 
ismo in Brazil is extensive (cf. Nunes Leal, 1948; Santos, 
1961; Cruz, 1959; Nogueria, 1961; Torres, 1965; Queiroz, 
1967; Pang, 1969, 1973; Della Cava, 1970; Nason, 1973), 
and describes large patronage and kinship networks as well 
as a good deal of electoral fraud and local level violence 
especially in the rural interior. Coronelismo was the 
mechanism which guaranteed the Politica dos Governadores 
through local elites who acted as intermediaries in the 
larger system.1  ̂ Local elites and local coroneis perpe­
tuated regional and state elites by systematically excluding 
ail opposition to the dominant political party of the area 
through fraud and violence.
Santana was no exception in this scheme. Through 
the use of kinship and patronage, the Santana elite not 
only controlled the neighborhood and regularly returned
*^The best analysis of the intricate connections 
maintained by local coroneis and their clients with national 
and regional power structures is to be found in Della 
Cava (1968, 1970).
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electoral majorities to the dominant Partido Republicano 
Paulista. but it controlled as well the most important 
economic resources of the area. Through consanguinity 
and marriage, the families were able to consolidate their 
control over land and local commerce. Of the thirteen 
families in my sample which descended from the elite in 
question, for example, eight were already established 
in Santana by 1900. Of these eight, five shared a common 
ancestor and in addition were bound by numerous affinal 
ties. Figure 18 is adapted from geneaologies of these 
five families, some members of which married later arrivals. 
By indicating family involvement in landownership, commerce, 
politics and the liberal professions, it illustrates the 
extent to which kinship and marriage facilitated the concen­
tration of resources and political power.
Thus, for example, during the 1920's, Santana's 
politics were controlled by a coronal from Juquerx^® the 
municipality to the north of Santana. His daughter was 
linked affinally to an important landowning family in 
Santana by her husband's brother's marriage. The local
1^Informants were vague about who controlled 
Santana before the coronal from Juquer£. It was possib­
ly  a coronal (who was a captain) from Guarulhos, to the 
west. In any event, no central city politician was 
important in Santana until the advent of Adhemar de 
Barros after the end of the First Republic.





Figure 18. Santana's Elite, 1900-1930
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political boss who represented the coronel. was one 
Eugenio Braga, who according to informants, was also 
a tax assessor and head of the municipal department in 
charge of Sao Paulo's rivers and marshes. Braga and his 
brother married into a prominent landowning family 
indicated in Figure 18 and thus became landowners in 
their own right. Braga's ward heeler (cabo eleitoral)T 
Jose Goya, was tax inspector and a Justice of the 
Peace. His brother was an officer of the Forya Publica: 
his daughter married into a family with heavy commercial 
as well as real estate interests--which was itself rela­
ted to Braga's wife's family. Among these families alone, 
then, various local interests were tied into the affairs 
and benefits of municipal government, and we have sugges­
ted above that Brazilian liberal professionals of rural 
origins provided additional important links to the higher 
levels of the Partido Republicano Paulista.
The key to political domination in Santana was, 
as elsewhere in Brazil, control of the electorate, and 
a kinship idiom, if not kinship, worked here too.
Borrowing Weffort's phrase, the political relationships 
of coronelismo were only "quasi-political, a single 
dimension of the general social dependence of the voter" 
(1965:176), which was both masked and reinforced by the 
extension of fictive kinship. Compadrio (co-parenthood) 
bound the elite, but it could also be used, especially
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in Santana's rural areas to the north, to control the
electorate. Thus, we may presume that the corone1 from
Juqueri's fame for humility and liberalism with the lower
classes was politically useful.
0 coronel era muito simples, muito humilde, muito 
liberal. Era tudo na mesa, branco e prSto junto.
A nossa casa era refugio do Dr. Washington Luis. Um 
dia estava ai um caboclo compadre--um dos mil-- 
e chegou o Dr. Washington, tambem compadre. E coi- 
tado do cabSclo, ficou todo atrapalhad^o, que nao 
sabia usar garfo. 0 coronel falou, "0 me^e,^ nao se 
avexe nao, coma can colher, que o compadre e gente 
mesmo."
The coronel was very simple, very humble, very liberal. 
Everyone sat at the table, blacks and whites together. 
Our house was the refuge of Dr. Washington Luis. One 
day a peasant compadre was there--one of the millions-- 
and Dr. Washington, who was also a compadre. arrived. 
And the poor peasant got all embarrassed because he 
didn't know how to use a fork. The corone1 said,
"Don't worry, eat with a spoon, because the compadre 
is real people."
But the coronel did not depend solely on his own clientele
forged in this way through paternalism and god-parenthood;
his political boss and ward heeler in Santana regularly
returned majorities to the PRP. Precisely how Braga and
Goya controlled the votes is not known. There were no
reports of the electoral fraud and violence which typifies
coronelismo and the First Republic. But then, we need not
assume the grossest characteristics by which coronelismo
operated. In view of the contacts with municipal govern-
19Leeds (personal communication) argues that the 
more common usage is "rico e pobre" (rich and poor) rather 
than "branco e preto" (black and white.).
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ment controlled by the political boss and the ward 
heeler, and the informal social and political capital of 
other elite families in Santana, there is no reason to 
suppose that extra legal rather than illegal methods 
might not have been used to recruit the electorate. Thus, 
a close relative of the ward heeler!s spoke of him as 
follows:
Ele ganhava eleipao por fazer^favores pros 
outros. Por isso morreu pobre, nao guardou nada 
para ele. Nas enchoites retirava as families la de 
baixo das aguas; quando andava de bonde, pagava pra 
todos, e depois, em *46 pagava as fotografias pros 
pobres. Goya quando pedia o favor, £a la com a 
pessoa mesmo pro "sim" ou "nao" na hora. Dizia que 
carta era muito^facil esquecer.
Tudo mundo ia perguntar na casa dele, e naquele 
tempo a gente era leal, e o politico era honesto.
Ele foi Juiz de Paz por dez anos. Ele era bom . . . 
nas eleicoes levava sacola de lanche pra dar pro 
pessoal la na fila.
He won elections by doing favors for people.
That's why he died poor, he didn't keep anything for 
himself. In the floods he would rescue the families 
down below from the water; when he rode the trolley 
car he would pay for everybody, and later, in '46, 
he paid for the photographs for the poor. Goya, when 
he asked someone for a favor [tor someone elsq7» he 
went there with the person for a "yes" or "no" on the 
spot. He said letters were too easy to forget.
Everyone went to ask /who they should vote torj 
at his house, and in those days people were loyal, and 
the politician was honest. He was Justice of the Peace 
for ten years. He was good . . . during elections, he 
would take bags of food to give to the people standing 
there in line.
But, in another context, the same informant added:
Naquela epoca, ate'’ os mortos votavam.
In those days, even the dead voted.
The importance of Santana to the dominant PRP in the
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1920*s is suggested by its extraordinary population growth. 
As I noted earlier; its population had grown from 7,000 
in 1900 to 43,588 in 1934, an increase of over five hundred 
percent in thirty years. The large number of students 
alone in the mid 1920*s suggest that a goodly number of 
the population was literate and eligible for legitimate 
recruitment into electoral politics by the local political 
machine.
Although Santana was a semi-rural suburb, controlled 
by a rural coronel to the north, it also formed part of the 
urban vote. It will be recalled that in the 1920's, Sao 
Paulo's PRP was faced with the vocal opposition of the 
newly formed Democratic Party (Partido DemocratIc q--PD).
This was especially so because of the publicity surrounding 
elections, which would have been absent in small towns of
the interior. As the urban electorate grew more critical,
political competition against the PD led to electoral 
recruitment among the city's foreign working class popula­
tion by the PRP. According to Fausto,
The PRP . . . attempted to include /non naturaiiasedj
foreigners in its domain, frequently making use of 
their "votes" to falsify elections: the PD tried to 
appear as the legitimate heir to the best Paulista 
traditions. The manifesto announcing Julio Prestes's 
candidacy [tor the PRP presidential nomination of 
19307, for example, was published in Arabic and 
other foreign languages, causing great scandal among 
the democrats, who did not spare Julio Prestes for 
becoming a great man, "even in Turkish" (1972:36).
In accordance with this PRP tactic, Santana's 
elite participated in specifically urban ways of mobili-
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zing votes. In the 1920's the head of the Santana PRP 
(who had the labor accidents registry in the center of 
the city) travelled to the legislature in Rio de Janeiro 
to fight for working class legislation to protect factory 
workers from the "extra-judicial arrangements of industrial­
ists in Rio and Sao Paulo" (A Gazeta /Sao Paulo_7,1950, 1/5: 
12). Even the women of the Santana elite participated in 
church activities which aimed at educating and mobilizing 
the working class of the city. One informant, who seemed 
aware of the political and paternalist nature of such 
organizations, described her activities:
Eu trabalhava na Irmandade dos Anjos, fazendo 
teatrinhos pras mocinhas com Dona Albertina. Depois 
trabalhei na Juventude Operaria Catolica /JOQ/ com as 
operarias, pregando pros direitos operirios. Fazia 
reunioes, e dava^ aula de religiao, corte e costura, 
aulas de forma^ao moral pras mopas . . . Fazia 
festinha de Pascoa e Natal. Era tudo coisa de 
igreja, mais tinha gente que depois se tornou politica. 
Na JOC eu estava fazendo uma protecab, tava fazendo 
uma caridade, sendo boa pras operarias.
I used to work in the Sisterhood of the Angels, 
putting on little plays for the girls with Dona 
Albertina. Later 1 worked in the Catholic Workers 
Youth movement, with working class girls, preaching 
for the rights of the workers. I would organize meetf 
ings, give classes in religion, sewing classes, classes 
in moral development to the young women. I had little 
parties at Easter and Christmas* It was all church 
business, but there were people who later became politi­
cal. At JOC I was doing protection, charity, I was 
being good to the workers.
In the context of heated electoral contests, the 
value of an urban neighborhood machine which regularly and 
quietly returned large majorities to the dominant party 
appears unquestionable. Santana (and probably other neigh­
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borhoods in Sao Paulo) appears to have developed an urban 
variant of First Republic coronelismo which was important 
to the Sao Paulo Republican Party and which linked its 
local elite to the power structure of the city and state.
No other hypothesis seems to account for the rapidity of 
the Santana elite's political decline after 1930, when 
such machines were no longer necessary to the oligarchy.
In the 1920's however, the Santana elite did 
not foresee the possibility of a political shakeup which 
could affect their position. They were supremely confident 
and secure in their superior position in the neighborhood. 
The electoral arena was probably the only one in which, 
on occasion, the distinction between as familias and a 
italianada la de baixo or a. g a ^ i y ^ a  was permitted to 
lapse.
However, the closeness of the families at the 
top of the hill and the dominance of the PRP in Santana 
is not meant to imply that there were no political 
disputes, or that there was no representation of the 
opposition PD in Santana. Disputes existed, but the 
families were not split by the reformism and dissent 
being voiced in the city's main newspapers. The factions 
in the municipal government of Sao Paulo had been com­
pared to "two little carts which transported the money 
out of the treasury . . . /witti7 terrible emulations over 
which would carry away the most money" (Horse, 1972:316)
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
159
Thus, in Santana, splits occurred over the distribution of
spoils, but always within a context of familism and class.
For example, one dispute which was biou^it to my attention
was over the control of judgeships within the PRP.
Meu cunhado organizou um partido, tambem do PRP, mas 
em oposicao ao eleitorado do Braga nas elei^oes pra 
Juiz de £az de Santana. Eram eleitos pelos habitan- 
tes do bairro. 0 Braga controlava os operarios, os 
comerciantes, o pessoal la de baixo. Os pro&sseres 
estavam todos do lado do cunhado, mais apenas fizeram 
oposicao na eleicao, que era pra tres juizes e tres 
suplentes. So ganharam um juiz e dois suplentes.
My brother-in-law organized a party, part of the PRP, 
but in opposition to Braga*s voters, in the elections 
for Justice of the Peace of Santana. They were elec­
ted by the residents of the neighborhood. Braga 
controlled the workers, the merchants and the people 
down below. The teachers were all on the side of 
the brother-in-law, but they only formed an opposi­
tion in the election which was for three judgeships 
and three replacements. They only got one judge and 
two replacements.
Similarly, the Partido Democratico was represented 
in Santana, and indeed, it was organized in much the 
same way as the local PRP, except for the absence of a 
coronel. whose counterpart was to be found in the upper 
ranks of the PD organization in the city. Thus, the head 
of the party organization was a Brazilian liberal profes­
sional, a dentist and a pharmacist, who had come to 
Santana from the interior of the state in 1923. When the 
PD was formed in 1927, he became the head of the party 
organization, but the PD*s political boss was a local 
man, just as the PRP*s political boss was. The PD 
political boss was an important figure in commerce and
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout permission.
160
real estate, whose family had been in Santana since before
1900. This individual frequently argued over political
matters with the boss of the PRP--who was his brother-in-
law. According to informants, if arguments became too
heated, one of the two would present the other with a
suckling pig to restore amicable relations. I heard of
no political disputes in Santana at that time which split
the elite, or which did not occur within such a shared
sense of familism and class.
A sense of "being above" political dispute permeates
the accounts of the 1924 Tenente revolt in Sao Paulo. In
1924 the dissident General Is idoro Dias marched from the
Santana military barracks to the fforjpa Publica headquarters
in the city. Much of the city cheered the rebels on,
providing the kind of diffuse support which made the
Tenentes appear much more powerful than they actually 
20were. The Santana families did not participate in this
"When they entered Sao Paulo during the 1924 
revolt, the revolutionaries were received with cheers; 
during the course of the fight, the soldiers in the open 
trenches on the streets . . . received cheers from the 
neighboring residences. A Legalist lieutenant . . . spoke 
of his men's resentment before the hostility manifested b£ 
the people of^Sao Paulo. Young ladies from Cagapava, Mogi 
das Cruzes, Sab Jose dos Campos, Taubat^, came to meet the 
trains bringing government troops and would incite the 
soldiers to join the rebels. 'The humble and ignorant 
vegetable saleswoman of the neighborhood would close her 
complaints on business with the picturesque invective,
"It doesn't matter, Isidoro is coming!" This was also the 
psychology and language of the laborer, the unemployed 
cook and it may be supposed, even of the beggar, who was
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euphoria; most simply ran away during moments of political 
turbulence:
Em '24 Santana estava ilhado# e a Ponte Grande ja 
era trincheira. As families fugiram. Eu vim de 
earropa de padeiro pra ver a minha noiva. Consegui 
passar porque conhecia muitos dos oficiais da Forpa 
Publica e do Sxercito. Escapamos pra fazenda do 
Bispo em Tremembe.
In '24 Santana was surrounded and the Ponte Grande 
was a trench /a battle ground/. The families ran 
away. I came in a baker's carriage to see my fiancee.
I managed to pass because I knew many of the officers 
of the Forca Publica and the Army. We escaped to 
the fazendk of the Bishop in Tremembe.
The Santana elite's sense of being above political dispute
and in local control is nowhere more apparent than in the
May 24, 1930 issue of the local newspaper, Sant'Anna-Jornal.
The dominance of the PRP appears to have been unquestioned
and not even worthy of note. The first page announced a
local PRP meeting. The second page was given to poems,
notes on hygiene, an article on the evils of gossip,
gambling and usury, and another on social events. In the
lower right hand corner of the second page was a column,
"Noticiario," whose third item down announced the Prestes
victory over Vargas in the national presidential election.
also affected by the crisis,'" (Fausto, 1972:62).
Speaking of the^l930 coup, another informant 
said, "Tivemos bastante medo em '30. Pulamos o muro pro 
vizinho e fumos pro sxtio do Braga. Eles ate que vieram 
nos buscar" (We were very frightened in 1930. We jumped 
over the wall to the neighbor's and went to Braga's sitio. 
They even came to get us).
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Under the current regime it was a foregone conclusion, 
not worthy of any more note than the announcements of 
regional festivities, public park plantings and unsolved 
crimes.
The 1930 coup, however, took the leading families 
by surprise. Unlike other occasions, when they had 
returned from running away and found their control of the 
neighborhood intact once order was restored, this time 
the Sao Paulo oligarchy was undergoing a redefinition of 
its political position within the Vargas regime. Elections, 
upon which the power of local families so heavily depen­
ded, were repeatedly postponed, and the Santana families 
participated in the growing Constitutionalist fervor 
which developed in Sao Paulo over the next two years.
When the Constitutionalist Revolt broke out in 
1932, Santana's leading families joined in the general 
euphoria.22 As many explained, "Precisavamos nos libertar
22Morse (1972:326-28) provides a description of 
this state: "Hen, women and children, including doctors, 
technicians and professionals rushed in crowds to the head­
quarters of the movement asking to be sent to the front, or 
to offer their services . . . units of volunteers were 
formed to fight by the side of the Forqa Publica. 50,000 
were finally sent to the front . . . Honey contributions 
were abundant. The Gold Campaign received offers of gold 
objects to a value of more than 3,000 contos from the 
interior, and more than 6,000 from the capital. A public 
subscription to help the families of the soldiers collected 
1,000 contos in three days. The women who organized the 
Egg Campaign received millions of dozens of eggs for the 
trenches and the hospitals. A group of Syrian women began 
another campaign to obtain waterproof raincoats. Indus-
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
163
das ataduras da ditadura" (We had to liberate ourselves 
from the bonds of dictatorship). The men old enough to 
enlist did so. Young men who stayed behind were mocked on 
the streets. Many of those too old to enlist organized 
civilian battalions to maintain public order in the city, 
while the Forca Publica were fighting the Federal troops.
The wives and daughters of the families at the top of the
^  -v. 23hill joined Sao Paulo*s "auatrocentao" women in organi­
zing the Gold Campaign, sewing bees, mess hall and troop 
morale festivities. They became "godmothers" for the 
battalions leaving from Santana’s barracks, which had been 
taken over by Constitutionalist forces, and formed wel­
coming committees for the returning soldiers.
Nunca mais vai haver uma coisa parecida, tao linda. 
Trabalhamos na penitenciaria fazendo colchbes, 
trabalhamos no salao do conservatorio da Liga das 
Senhoras Catolicas com as mogas de alta sociedade 
que famla. Era honra escolher feijao e fazer 
comida. Trabalhamos em grupos caseiros, costurando 
ou cosinhando. Todos foram. Era tudo mundo a 
trabalhar juntos . . .  esperando noticias.
trial, commercial and wholesale associations joined the 
movement. Foreign residents, who were accused of absen­
teeism in 1924, also joined the movement. The policing 
of the cities was left in charge of civilians; in spite 
of this there was no vandalism and crimes of violence 
decreased . . . The troops received chocolates, canned 
goods, wine and toothpaste in great quantities, but in 
spite of the valorous industrial effort, not enough war 
materiel,"
23The term "ouatrocentao" originated at this time. 
It refers to families who have lived in Sao Paulo for four hundred years, and in a more general way to Sao 
Paulo's "upper crust,"
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There will never again be anything like that, so 
wonderful. We worked at the penitentiary making 
matlresses, we worked in the music room of the 
League of Catholic Ladies, with the women of high 
society who went there. It was an honor to pick 
over beans or to cook. We worked in groups at 
home, sewing or cooking. Everyone participated.
It was everyone working together . . .  waiting for 
the news.
And, when it was all over, they returned home, 
as shocked and bitter as the rest of the population, 
crying "betrayal."
People accused the Forjpa Publica of betrayal 
because it surrendered, even though it was in a militarily 
untenable position (Silva, 1932:415-20). The real problem 
lay with Sao Paulo's political leaders, who had through 
rhetoric and through the media, manipulated the public 
and aroused entirely unreal expectations (Silva, 1932: 
127-29). For Santana's families the betrayal ultimately 
destroyed them as a group. Whereas the city's elite, 
composed of coffee planters and industrialists, were able 
to adjust and accomodate to the new order, the Santana 
families were ultimately destroyed as a local politically 
influential group because they lost their most important 
resource, the electoral control of the neighborhood.
We have seen that Santana's elite had been 
intermediaries in the city's larger political structure, 
and I have suggested that their importance arose not 
from the material resources they controlled, but from 
the number of urban votes they could contribute to the
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PRP. As long as they were important electoral inter­
mediaries, they controlled the neighborhood, maintained 
their cohesiveness and maintained their links to more 
important politicians. In the absence of elections, 
under Vargas, their connections with the city's oligar­
chy decreased, and the politics they represented became 
obsolete.
The process of their marginalization, however, 
was not immediate and absolute, except in the case of the 
coronel. In 1932 the Santana political machine was attacked, 
a task which was relatively easy to accomplish in the 
absence of elections. The machine was run by two indivi­
duals, the coronel from Juqueri and the cabo eleitoral. 
Under the new regime, legal proceedings were instituted 
on a number of charges against the coronel and the ward 
heeler's office was set on fire by persons unknown. In the 
words of their children,
Quando perdemos a revolupao de '32, abriram processo 
contra meu pai, dizendo que era aproveitador, que a 
fazenda era de politica— sem ver os documentos. Foi 
um processo por caltLnia e infamia, e ele ganhou.
Aquele que acusou foi condenado a despesas e quarenta 
dias de prisao, e o gai teve a satisfapao de ganhar 
num regime de oposipao. ^Provou que era heranca 
materna, que os filhos riao eram empregados publicos, 
e,se fosse pratico, nossa situapao seria outra, e 
da£, foi homenageado publicaments pelo povo de Santana.
When we lost the revolution of '32, they brought a 
suit against my father, saying that he had taken advan­
tage, that his fazenda derived from politics--without 
looking at the documents. It was a suit of calumny and 
infamy and we won. The man who accused him was con­
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demned to pay the expenses and to spend forty days 
in jail, and father had the satisfaction of winning 
under an opposition regime. He proved that /the land/ 
was a maternal inheritance, that his children were 
not public employees— if he'd been practical our 
situation would be different— and then he received 
public homage from the people of Santana.
Getulio entrou, e puseram fogo na reparticao dele 
na Ponte JSrande. Dax vieram fazer vistoria na 
reparticao dele, e ele foi citado como modSlo.
Getulio came in, and they set his office by the Ponte
Grande on fire. Then they came to inspect his section,
and it was cited as a model.
While both were eventually found innocent of any 
wrong doing, their political careers and the careers and 
social prominence of the local elite associated with them 
began to decline. When the coronel died on his fazenda 
he was a forgotten figure. The cabo's decline took a bit 
longer.
After Sao Paulo's defeat in the Constitutionalist 
Revolt, what was left of the Santana political machine was 
taken over by Adhemar de Barros, a young city-side politi­
cian of the PRP, in a process that suggests the shifting 
nature of the coalitions between actors in the larger 
political system and the individuals who act as inter­
mediaries on the local level. Adhemar de Barros is best 
known as a Sao Paulo politician of the populist era. 
However, as a young congressman in 1933, he had wished to 
organize a working class wing of the PRP (Cabral, 1962:29), 
and it is during this time, according to informants, that 
he first made contact in Santana. When the 1934 Consti­
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tution reintroduced elections, he took Goya on as his
cabo eleitoral. Clearly then, upward connections could
still be made during the Vargas years by a good ward
heeler, but they depended on the stability of the electoral
process, which was again abolished by the declaration of
the Estado Novo in 1937. When elections were reintroduced
after the Second World War, Adhemar de Barros formed in
Sao Paulo what was probably the most powerful electoral
machine in the country (Skidmore, 1967:67-68), but Goya
was passed over. According to one of his descendants,
Em *46 Goya quis continuar na politica do mesmo 
jeito. 0 eleitor jque pedia o candidato. Ele 
nunca impunha. Nao tinha interesse pessoal^ Ele 
eonheceu Adhemar la na sede. Adhemar era medico, 
e queria tratar da filha dele por que era cabo 
eleitoral. Ele foi lancado em Santana pelo Goya 
em '33 ou '34. Ate que usaram a garagem pra 
contar cedulas. Dai, depois da elei^ao de '46,
Adhemar nao precisou mais, e demitiu os cabos.
Nao foi o Goya que abandonou, nao.
In *46 Goya wanted to continue in politics in the
same way. The voter would ask which candidate he 
should vote for, he never imposed one. He had no 
personal interest. He met Adhemar at party head­
quarters. Adhemar was a doctor and wanted to care 
for his daughter because he was a ward heeler.
Adhemar was introduced in Santana by Goya in '33 or 
*34. They even used his garage to count the ballots. 
Then, after the election of '46, Adhemar didn't 
need him anymore, and he dismissed his ward heelers.
It wasn't Goya who abandoned him at all.
Goya's betrayal by the supreme politician of a 
later era provides a symbol of the political decline under­
gone by the whole Santana elite as a result of the passing
of the First Republic. Ultimately many of the families
also lost wealth, although their economic decline was
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generally less meteoric.
It is tempting to ask about the relationship bet­
ween political marginalization and economic decline. The 
analysis is complicated, however, because Santana's 
economy was also changing. In particular, dairy farming 
became unprofitable in the early 1920's when the city re­
quired that milk be pasteurised, thus raising the cost of 
production. The sale of animals to the city services 
collapsed with the advent of the automobile, and the grow­
ing real estate value of the land undercut what was left
of the grazing economy. Animal traders who did not have
a land base on which to graze their mules and horses were 
increasingly at a disadvantage. An informant speaks of
her husband's career:
#-Foi duro. 0 negocio de animais caiu de uma vez. 0
municipio de Sao Paulo usava os animais pra agua,
lixo e pra Forca Publica. 0 automove1 substituiu.
Foi um momento dificil . As filhas ja grandes, na 
escola, e as viagens eram tudo prejuizo. E' que tinha 
de vender logo por falta de pasto, e depois era 
dificil vender. Aqui nao tinhamos pasto. Antes 
alugavamos, mais foram vendendo pra loteamento. Foi 
uma fase muito ruim.
It was hard. The bottom fell out^ of the animal 
business. The municipality of Sao Paulo used the 
animals for water, garbage and the For^a Publica. 
Automobiles replaced them. It was a difficult moment. 
The girls were growing up, they were in school, and 
every trip lost money. We had to sell them fast 
because we had no pasture and later it became hard to 
sell them. We didn't have pasture here. Earlier we 
had rented the land, but it got sold for real estate 
development. It was a very bad phase.
There were three general avenues followed by 
Santana's elite families after the 1930's. Urban real
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estate development increased in importance, as did careers 
in the professions and salaried employment. Each 
possibility, moreover, could involve outmigration from 
Santana and brutal downward economic mobility.
Real estate had provided a source of profits as
early as 1915. If an entrepreneur was not already a local
landowner, commerce had provided a financial springboard
to amass real estate holdings, during the 1920's. The
careers of a number of individuals were similar to that of
this informant's father, who was a leading member of the
Santana elite.
Meu pai foi um dos primeiros a construir aqui em 
Santana. Ele chamava de "galinheiro pros pobre" 
aquelas casinhas la em baixo. Ele que era o antigo 
BNH. A rua ate que ta com o nome dele. Ele tinha 
loja de secos e molhados, depois herdou os terrenos, 
e viveu fazendo as casinhas. Ele era um bonachao 
. . . quando tava velho sentava la no terrapo com 
o bolso cheio de balas que dava pras crian9as que 
chamavam ele de vovo. Tava sempre com charuto.
Ate o pao que ele dava tinha cheiro de charuto.
E^ as mulheres vinham pagar o aluguel, e as criangas 
recebiam balas. E^ muito dessas casas ainda sao 
nossas, viu.
My father was one of the first to build here in 
Santana. He called those little houses down below 
"chicken coops for the poor." was the old BNH . ^
The street even has his name. He had a dry goods store, 
and then he inherited the land and spent the rest of 
his life making the little houses. He was a sweetheart. 
When he was old he would sit out on the terrace with 
his pockets full of candies which he would give to the 
children, who called him grandfather. He always had a 
cigar. Even the bread he gave smelLed of cigars. Yes, 
the women would come and pay the rents, and the chil­
dren received candies. Many of those houses are still
^BNH, National Housing Bank.
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ours, see.
Alternatively, real estate holdings which had been 
split by inheritance could be reconsolidated by marriage, 
or purchase from disadvantaged relatives. Thus, Gilberto, 
a prominent merchant and animal trader married a land 
heiress, and, as her relatives died, bought their shares 
back from their widows or children. However, with the 
decline of the animal trade, the commerce which serviced 
it became an increasingly rare source of base capital.
It became a rare occupation after 1930. Very few male
descendants of commercial families continued on in commerce 
or continued to amass capital. Many began to live off 
unearned income from their lands, and generated little or 
no earned income of their own.
-Esse foi dolce far niente . . .̂ um capitalista.
-Vivia de renda, tinha tuna porpao de casas.
-Tinha um armazem, mais vivia de renda, era proprie­
tor io.
-Nao fazia nada, vivia de renda, mais naquele tempo 
nao precisava tanto dinheiro. ^
-Era proprietario, dolce far niente. Ia gastando e 
vendendo.
-Eram simples, todos proprietaries eram simples, 
mais tinham fama de rico . . . bruta fama de rico.
-That one was dolce far niente . . .  a capitalist.
-He lived on income, he had a bunch of houses.
-He had a store, but lived on income. He was a pro­
prietor.
-He did nothing, he lived on income, but in those days 
one didn't need so much money.
-He was a proprietor, dolce far niente. he would spend 
and sell.
-He was simple, all proprietors were simple, but they 
had the reputation for being rich . . • damned repu­
tation for being rich.
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Real estate development was not, however, a 
lasting source of income for Santana's elite families. 
Paradoxically, it was only a successful way of maintaining 
wealth as long as it wasn't sold. Bolaffi has shown that 
low municipal land taxes together with municipal invest­
ments and improvements sent urban land values soaring (1975: 
82). Thus, while many la downers developed their land 
and built rental houses, profits from this source were 
dampened by a rent control law introduced in 1930 (Bo­
laffi, 1975:79) and the highest profits were ultimately
25for those who kept their lands intact. Some of Santana's 
elite families were able to keep their land and maintain 
themselves secure in their sense of familism and class, 
but many others were brutally downwardly mobile. A number 
of individuals took lowly positions in the bureaucracies, 
became doorkeepers or janitors in the public schools or 
street salesmen. Thus, an informant speaks of her sibling's 
children:
Nao tenho muito contato com esses . . . sabe, os 
pais morreram, os filhos foram criados na casa de um
25 In 1949, an informant's father, who had been part 
of the old elite, gave an interview on the progress of the 
neighborhood to O Jornal das Noticias. At that time, 
two twin houses on a main street in Santana rented for 
Cr.300.00 and Cr.2,500.00, respectively. The difference 
reflects the landlord's inability to raise the rent except 
for a new tenant. According to the same interview, a large 
house on Av. Voluntarios da Patria, Santana's main street, 
cost Cr. 100,000.00 in 1925. In 1949 just one square meter
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parente. Estudaram pouco e comeparam a trabalhar. 
Tiveram algum terreninho pra ajudar, casas de 
heranca que deu pra comprar ̂ outras casas se quise- 
rem. As mulheres casaram so mais ou menos, £e ve, 
sao trabalhadores, mais nada de riqueza nao. Sao 
remediados. Outros ficaram pobres, pobres, pinta- 
dor de parade, porteiro de grupo. A renda acabou, je 
renda tern de fazer renda. Vendiam e comiam. §e ve 
como e o Destino.
I don't have much contact with those . . . you know, 
their parents died, the children were raised in a 
relative's house. They studied little and began to 
work. They had a little land to help, houses they 
inherited which they could have sold to buy others 
if they wanted. The women only married more or less 
well; you understand, they are hard working, but 
there is no wealth there. They get by. Others 
became poor, poor, wall painters, doormen for public 
schools. Their income finished, and incane has to 
generate income. They sold to eat. You see how 
Destiny is.
Of those who sold land, many sold unwisely or too
rapidly. Some did not realize the value of their lands
until too late. Thus another informant speaks of her
family's fortunes;
Meu avo tinha uns 900 hectares no alto de Santana, 
Tucuruvi e Mandaqui. Nao ligou muito com os terrenos 
porque tambem tinha fazenda grande com fabrica de 
tijolo, carpintaria, gado e plantio. Dividiu a 
fazenda entre os oito filhos^ mais porque nab cuidou, 
muito ficou grilado. Dai, la pro fim da vida, vendeu 
um terreno prum portugues, a parcela. 0 portugues 
vendeu pruma compania de loteamento, fez fortuna e foi 
embora sem fazer o resto do pagamento, Fizeram lotea­
mento, con casas operarias, e da do, coitados. Agora 
tao querendo as escrituras, e nao pode, por que a 
terra & nossa. Ele nao pagou, ne. Legalmente a 
terra e nossa, mais a gente tern de pagar os melhora- 
mentos, o que e claro nao podemos^fazer. Imagine 
pagar todas essas casirihas. Entao os advogados
of frontage cost that much, excluding the cost of the 
building (0 Jornal das Noticias. 1949, 12/14:5)
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falaram pros operarios pagar a divida do portugues, 
so que muitos nao querem, com razao. E o dinheiro 
que resta, vai tudo pros advogados, ne.
My grandfather had 900 hectares in the heights of 
Santana, Tucuruvi and Mandaqui. He didn't worry 
too much about that land because he also had a large 
fazenda with a brick factory and a carpentry shop, 
cattle and agriculture. He divided the fazenda and 
the land among the eight children, but because he 
hadn't taken care of the land, much was lost to 
squatters. Then, towards the end of his life, he 
sold some land to a Portuguese on time. The Portu­
guese sold to a real estate development company, 
made a fortune, and went away without making the 
rest of the payments. The land was developed with 
working class houses, and itte a shame, poor things.
Now they want title to the land, and it can't be, 
because the land is ours. He didn't pay, right.
Legally the land is ours, but we would have to pay 
for the improvements, and its clear we can't do that. 
Imagine paying for all those little houses. So then 
the lawyers asked the workers /who lived in then?/ to 
pay the Portuguese's debt, but many of them, quite 
rightly don't want to. And the money that's left, 
it all goes to the lawyers.
Many sold land to underwrite a life style, to pay for their
children's educations or dowries: others faced competition
from larger or unscrupulous developers. All in all, a lot
of land was dissipated and was not a basis for maintaining
wealth. Only a few families still had land after two
generations. For most, their situations were like these
informants's:
Nossa chacara agora tern dezesseis casas. 0 pai lo- 
teou tudo, mais gastou dinheiro, tava muito hipotecado, 
e o Banco ficou com tudo.
Our land now has sixteen houses on it. My father 
developed it all, but he spent money, it was heavily 
mortgaged, and the Bank got it all.
Nossa familia herdou bastante, inclusive aquele 
predio na Avenida Sao Joao . . . aquele nos bebemos
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
174
andar por andar. A geracao nao soube manter. Alguns 
vao equilibrando, mais nao e mais aquela fortuna.
Our family inherited a lot, including that building 
on Avenida Sao Joao /important city-side avenue, 
lined with skyscrapers^ . . .  That one we drank, 
floor by floor. The generation didn't know how to 
maintain its wealth. A few of us have managed to 
balance /our budgets^, but its no longer that fortune.
Increased education and careers in the professions 
was not a panacea either. Among the more successful elite 
families there was a clear movement away from the rela­
tively independent positions of control over land, commerce 
and real estate to a dependence on salaries. Thus, among 
the children of Santana's elite, commerce was replaced by 
the liberal profesaons: doctors, lawyers, dentists, accoun­
tants and school teachers. Similarly, the women married 
liberal professionals. To the extent that one can judge 
from the genealogies of the more successful elite families, 
the trend towards liberal professionalism continues among 
their children and grand-children, although increasingly 
as dependents on salaries from large firms, and where it 
exists at alL, on a vastly reduced land base to generate 
unearned income. There does seem to have been enough 
among a few families to provide a cushion for at Least 
two generations, if it was carefully managed. Thus, 
within the family which drank its inheritance “floor by 
floor," a more successful member finishes her tale of 
loss of family fortunes with the following caveat:
S preciso muito equilrbrio, muito controle, se nao, 
nao da mesmo. Eu, o, eu seguro as arreias.
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One needs much equilibrium, very much control, 
otherwise it is not possible. I, I really hold 
on to the reins.
For some of the older liberal professionals, such 
control seems to have been necessary, because they did not 
earn that much. Although we may speculate over what might 
have been the case had these families been able to main­
tain their political capital, many of Santana's professio­
nals appear to have had a limited clientele. A prominent 
but elderly dentist explaining his present difficulties 
suggests the social and political isolation possible for 
even a relatively successful descendant of Santana's 
elite:
No meu tempo tinha tudo, medico, advogado, economista, 
eu tinha conhecimentos de todas as classes. Muitos 
foram politicos. Mas agora, nesse bairro--com consul- 
torio no bairro— nao se ganha mesmo. Esse bairro 
esta ficando ruim pra tudo. Cheio do pessoal antigo, 
conservador, pad duro--e dificil. Agora Santana 
ficou um bairro de passagem. Os velhos nao^pagam, 
os mais novos vieram de outros bairros, e ja tern os _ 
seus dentistas. E os bairros populares tern um montao 
de dentistas de terceira categoria.
In my day, I had everything, doctors, lawyers, econo­
mists /as patients7. I knew all the classes. Many 
were political. But now, in this neighborhood--with 
an office in this neighborhood--you really don't 
make money. This neighborhood is getting bad for 
everything. Full of old, conservative and stingy 
people. Now Santana has become a neighborhood of 
transients. The old ones don't pay, and the younger 
ones come from other neighborhoods and already have 
their dentists. And the popular neighborhoods have 
millions of third rate dentists.
Among the families who did not become poor, 
especially those of the Brazilian liberal professionals 
who had less invested in the neighborhood, the area
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
176
became increasingly defined as a changing neighborhood, 
a place to leave, a place for poor soldiers and immigrant 
working classes. Many such families left the area. They 
sold their houses and moved away to other parts of the 
city, and their descendants explain the move as a conse­
quence of the neighborhood's turn for the worse.
Pai era medico e dentista. Tinha duas farmacias, 
dois carros e um casarao. Rico mesmo nab era, mas 
com nove filhos, todos estudando, se formando, as 
meninas tomando^aulas de piano . . . ele estava bem. 
Nos saimos de la por que Santana foi considerado 
bairro operario, com a policia, que eram pobres. 
Soldado de policia nao era considerado de sociedade. 
Nos tinhamos parentes em outros bairros, em Sta. 
Cecilia, em Perdizes. Quando eu era menina, tinha 
muito italiano, turco . . . vendiam carvao, miudos, 
as verdureiras com burrinho e dois cestos do lado.
Os turcos que eram engra^ados--mordiam o dinheiro.
Eram considerados de classe baixa, mas , subiram mais 
do que a classe media. Fizeram um montao de dinheiro.
Father was a doctor and a dentist, he had two phar­
macies, two cars and a huge house. Really rich he 
wasn't, but with nine children all studying and gra­
duating [in the professions/ and the girls taking 
piano lessons, he was well off. We left that place 
because Santana was considered a working class neigh­
borhood, with the police, who were poor. Soldiers of 
the police were not considered to be part of society. 
We had relatives in other neighborhoods, in Sta. 
Cecilia, in Perdizes. When I was a girl, there were 
lots of Italians and Turks in Santana. They sold 
charcoal, innards, women sold vegetables from donkeys 
with baskets on either side of them. The Turks were 
funny--they bit the money. They were considered 
lower class, but they rose higher than the middle 
class. They made a mountain of money.
In a few cases, Santana women married into immi­
grant commercial families and moved away. While these 
marriages appear to have been financially sound, since the 
resulting families at present live in the wealthier
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neighborhoods of Sao Paulo, and are said to be socially,
politically and economically well connected, they were
against the racist ethic of elite Santana in the 1920's
and 1930's. As one informant told me,
Na minha epoca casavamos com medico, advogado . . . 
Quando Eugenia casou com um Italiano, estranhamos.
Ele nao era bopal, mas ja dava pra estranhar.
Diziam que o que vale e o dinheiro, mais que choca, 
choca muito, v£u.
In my day we married doctors and lawyers . . •
When Eugenia married an Italian, we thought it 
strange. He wasn't gross, but it was strange.
They said it was the money that counts, but 
it was shocking.
It is unclear, however, what the circumstances were 
for most of the outmigration, since contacts were subse­
quently broken. Many became extremely poor, in low 
status jobs. The overall picture is one of decline and 
disintegration.
The themes of decline and disintegration are 
suggested in Figure 19, which expands the genealogy 
given in Figure 18. It was drawn from four informants, 
two in the second generation and two in the third. While 
these informants could not give the collateral line, 
descended from the cousins of the first generation ("Adults 
by 1900"), and became increasingly vague about family 
members whose careers began between 1950 and 1972, the 
genealogy nonetheless reveals the range of trajectories 
possible for the descendants of one of the major landowners 
of Santana. Downward economic mobility was possible for
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members of such families even as the elite was forming: 
thus, in the first generation, two out of ten individuals 
and their nuclear families were impoverished because of 
unwise land sales between 1910 and 1920, and their descen­
dants lost contact with the rest of the families.
In the second generation, more than half were 
lost to the family. Among forty-two cousins (excluding 
affinals) twenty-two individuals became poor and family 
contact was broken. £our did not become poor, but infor­
mants were not sure where they lived. Those who were 
successful in the second generation and formed the core 
of the Santana elite, did so, as we have seen, on the 
basis of commerce and real estate. Many, however, were 
already living on income. Just under half (thirty out 
of sixty-three individuals) became poor in the third 
generation. Seven did not become poor, but contact was 
broken. Again, over half of the generation's members 
were lost to the group (thirty seven out of sixty-three). 
Because so many of the descendants of the poor second 
generation members are lost to genealogical isckoning in 
the third generation, this is almost certainly an under 
estimation.
The families who lost their land base in the first 
or second generations do not seem to have been able to re­
coup their losses: by the third generation, many are in 
lowly employment: policemen, bus drivers, wall painters, 
and one of the women had become a domestic servant. In
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Figure 19, for example, only one male descendant of one
of the impoverished branches was able to improve his
economic position. His father had been a municipal
bureaucrat of low to middle level ("Ganhava douco. e
nao tinha jufzo" — He earned little and had no sense), and
his siblings continued in lowly bureaucratic or salaried
positions. He on the other hand, began his career as a
laborer in a sweets factory:
Trabalhava como oper^rio numa fabrica de doces, 
fazendo goiabada. Come^ou por baixo mexendo tacho 
de doce. Esseje fez. Tern pequena industria, nao 
sei de que. Nao e nada de riqueza, mas ta bem.
He worked as a leborer in a sweets factory, making 
guava paste. He started at the bottom, stirring the 
pots of syrup. This one made himself. He now has 
a small industry, I don't know what of. He's not 
rich, but he's all right.
The difficulty in making a successful economic career
without private resources was recognized by some informants,
who felt that
E preciso nacer de classe media: E difficil a pessoa 
ganhar dinheiro sem uma ajuda por traz.
One must be born middle class: it is difficult for a 
person to make money without some financial backing.
The genealogy in Figure 19 suggests that in order 
for some descendants to keep their wealth, others must 
systematically loose it. In this respect, the cross­
cousin marriage between members of the second generation 
is suggestive of the process. The woman and her siblings 
were landed. She married a cousin with extensive commer-
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cial interests, who subsequently acquired land from her 
siblings, who together with their descendants became poor. 
The issue from the cross cousin marriage, however, main­
tained a degree of wealth through the third and fourth 
generations.
In addition to economic decline undergone by many 
of the descendants of Santana's elite, there is dispersal 
and the end of social cohesion. Marriages within the 
group decrease and the social activities which had identi­
fied and united the Santana elite in the 1920's ceased. 
People who left the neighborhood were largely forgotten. 
Indeed, photograph albums filled exclusively with gradua­
tion pictures are revealing in this instance. They attest 
to the status importance of higher education in the li­
beral professions in the 1930's and 1940*s. It is ironic 
and symbolic, however, that the photos in the albums I 
saw were simply annotated with the profession and the 
date of graduation, and not the individuals' names. When 
these had moved out of Santana, they were forgotten and 
their families lost track of. They are now anonymously 
part of Sao Paulo's middle sectors, dispersed through the 
city. 1 was able to interview a few such individuals, and 
while they remember their lives in Santana clearly, they 
have formed other social circles and have only sporadic 
contacts with families remaining in Santana, if any, Ii general,
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neither those who stayed nor those who left attempted 
to maintain contact.
Thus, over time, the Santana elite, which had been 
closely knit in its control of the political and economic 
resources of the area during the First Republic, has 
gradually disintegrated. People blamed themselves when 
they referred to "the generation's inability to maintain 
its wealth," or to various relatives' "lack of sense," or 
inability to "marry well," but the forces which had led 
to social cohesion in the 1920's disappeared in the 
following decades. Socially the group has disbanded. The 
sense of familism and class which united them as against 
other people during the First Republic--the sense that the 
world was defined as consisting of "as famxlias" and "os 
pobres la de baixo"--exists only in the memories of infor­
mants. Politically, these families and their descendants 
lost positions of local prominence and political status 
and never regained them. Economically, many have become 
brutally poor and others control no resources beyond their 
ability to work and bring in a salary. Among the families 
interviewed the salaries have not generated capital. They 
are spent in a controlled way on consumer goods.
Santana's elite only formed a group with shared 
access to political power and property for a short period 
of time: the polity of the First Republic included Santana's
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elite in its mechanisms of domination and permitted and 
encouraged its development as a group. Although we have 
revealed no direct relationship between their marginali­
zation from political power and their subsequent economic 
decline and dispersal, it is interesting that a similar 
sequence, albeit on a lesser scal^ appears to characterize 
the careers of the immigrants and bureaucrats who will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
SANTANA, FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE HILL, 1930-1972
Unlike the families at the top of the hill, the 
families with which I am concerned in this chapter never 
formed a single identifiable group. This chapter deals 
with people whom the elite at the top of the hill had 
dismissed as a italianada la de baixo. os pobres la de 
baixo (the Italians at the bottom, the poor down below). 
In fact, during the 1920's and 1930's, these people did 
live at the bottom of the hill, but they were generally 
not working class people. They belonged to what we have 
broadly defined as middle income sectors. One group, 
the immigrants, included families with modest truck farms 
before the 1930's and with moderately successful commer­
cial and real estate enterprises after. The other group, 
the bureaucrats, were not as well off initially. Most 
came from impoverished landowning families who migrated 
from declining rural areas of the interior. Once in the 
city, however, these families benefited from the fact 
that they were literate (See Chapter II, pp. 76-77).
Only a small percentage of the Brazilian population fell 
into this category. They were absorbed by the expanding 
bureaucracies of the Vargas and populist years and
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achieved middle level incomes despite their initial po­
verty.
During the Vargas years and especially under 
populism, the immigrants and bureaucrats formed friend­
ships and interlocking networks (sometimes lasting for 
two generations) which enhanced the political and eco­
nomic status of both groups. The key to most of these 
relationships appears to have been the accessibility of 
government resources which increased dramatically from 
1930 to 1964, and which are now in a process of sharp 
contraction. Following the military coup of 1964 and 
especially since 1968, both groups have lost influence 
with government. In other words, they have undergone a 
process of marginalization which parallels that described 
for the old elite of Santana in the previous chapter.
This chapter assesses the current situation of bureaucrats 
and immigrants in the light of this parallel,
Santana changed in the 1930's. From a distant 
underdeveloped area, where the rich of the state might 
send their daughters to boarding school, and the rich 
of the city might drive out for a day's recreation in 
the countryside, it became over the course of three 
decades a commercial entrepot between Sao Paulo and the 
interior. By mid century it would lose most of its 
rural aspect, and in the next twenty-five years it
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would lose all the visible reminders of its distinctive 
past.*' The "tone" of the neighborhood changed most 
dramatically after 1930, however. The quality of the 
neighborhood's leisure was no longer dominated by the 
good ladies from the top of the hill. It is said that 
Santana became known not for the church bazaars, or the 
cabaret on the top of the hill which had been popular 
with the local elite in the 1920's, but for the quality 
of its Italian restaurants, movies, circuses, football 
and boxing clubs. In the 1930's, the Tatu Club, which 
had been a center for Republican Party politicians in the 
previous decade, became a soccer club frequented by the 
sons of foreign immigrants and rural Brazilian migrants.
Changes in the quality of the neighborhood's 
retail commerce were more important. According to 
informants, commerce soared in the 1930's and was increas­
ingly dominated by foreign immigrants or their descen-
Some of the roads remained unpaved, but by 1950 
truck farming had virtually disappeared. The neighborhood 
was increasingly connected to the center of town as flood 
control measures on the Tiete improved and a new bridge 
was built over it in 1942. In 1948, the last of the 
elite chacaras (estates) was sold, and the land developed 
into residential villas. The main house became a private 
maternity hospital and a smaller outbuilding became a 
children's library. In 1964 the Cantareira train was 
removed to make way for a new avenue in Santana which 
would extend the city's north-south artery into the neigh­
borhood. By 1974 the massive structure of the Colegio 
Santana would be destroyed to make way for residential 
highrises.
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout permission.
187
dants. By the time immigration was cut off in 1930, 
small industry in the form of textile, furniture, soft 
drink, printing, glue, food processing and carpentry 
establishments were interspersed among the older supply 
houses and dry goods stores of the main streets of 
Santana.
The development of Santana's local economy was 
clearly stimulated by the increase in Sao Paulo's popu­
lation. After 1930, when foreign immigration decreased 
sharply because of changed immigration policies (See 
Chapter II, p. 85, fn. 27), such growth was primarily 
due to internal migrations by rural Brazilians who came 
to the city from regions in agricultural decline. Be­
tween 1934 and 1939 the city's population increased by 
over 300,000 people at an average of over 50,000 indi­
viduals a year (Cavalcanti, 1972). Santana's popula­
tion had increased most dramatically in the first three 
decades of the century, so that by 1934, it was already
the most populous district in the Northern 2one of the 
2city. After 1934, its growth rate was outstripped by
2We have seen the local elite comment on Santana's 
change from a neighborhood of '‘good families1' to a neigh­
borhood inhabited by the poor and working class. In the 
1940's social scientists studying Sao Paulo's growth 
defined it as a working class satellite to the city (See 
Hermann, 1944:36; Araujo, 1941:71).
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the working class neighborhoods which surrounded it 
(See Figure 20). Nonetheless, its population continued to 
grow at a respectable rate.
Figure 20. Population growth of the Northern 
Zone of Sao Paulo, 1934-1950.
Subdistricts 1934 1940 % 1950 %
Santana 43,588 55,081 26.3 90,198 63.7
Tucuruvi 24,632 33,761 37.5 88,720 162.8
Casa Verde 13,542 22,120 64.4 58,571 164.7
V. Naria , 5,722 15,281 167.0 54,373 255.8
N. Sra. do 0 7,866 13,436 70.8 51,012 279.6
SOURCE: Mendes Torres (1970:111)
In addition to the general population growth 
of the whole area, many of Santana's immigrant families 
were able to develop commercial interests in the area 
because of changes in the structure of the commerce 
which had been controlled by the elite. We have seen 
that the elite's commerce developed primarily to ser­
vice the animal trade. The retail commerce which they 
controlled was linked to the animal trade in that much 
of their merchandise was sold in the interior, along 
the animal trade routes. Local retail commerce had
always been shared with travelling salesmen, mascates.
3who where most frequently of immigrant origins. With
^See the informant cited above, Chapter III, p. 
40: "The storekeepers sold to the people down below, to 
the hillbillies from Juquox, Atibaia, Bragan^a . . .
The others would buy from the travelling salesmen."
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the decline of the animal trade, we have seen that the 
occupations of the old elite changed from commerce to the 
liberal professions and real estate development thus 
providing an opening for the expansion of immigrant 
commercial concerns.
It was thus on the basis of rural migration from 
the interior and the decline of commerce linked to the 
animal trade that Santana's immigrant families were 
able to develop a local, relatively strong and far more 
varied commercial center along the main streets of the 
neighborhood than had been the case when the elite fami­
lies from the top of the hill controlled commerce. Real 
estate developments proliferated and the area became 
studded with stylistically undefined two story houses 
(sobrados) and villas (houses on a private road with a 
turn around at the end). Many individuals, besides 
members of the elite, were able to participate in the 
real estate boom of the epoch and a few of the truck 
farms belonging to immigrants were subdivided for housing 
plots and villas, which if unoccupied at first, were 
soon rapidly filled.
Immigrants had been in Santana since the turn of 
the century, with the establishment of the Italian colony. 
Santana's immigrants do not seem to have been representa­
tive of the bulk of Sab Paulo's foreign population: most
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of the city-side immigrants were impoverished Italian 
peasants who were brought to Brazil to work in the coffee 
plantations or to man the factories in the city at the 
turn of the century. In 1934 twenty percent of San­
tana's population was foreign born, although many more 
must have been of foreign extraction. Only 3.5 percent 
were Italian born; 8.09 percent were Portuguese born. 
Santana and the neighboring districts of Casa Verde and 
Tucuruvi had over twenty percent of the Portuguese 
population in Sao Paulo, and in general, immigrants from 
Portugal were not working class, but landowning truck- 
farmers (Araujo, 1941:73-83). These factors suggest 
that foreign immigration to Santana may have been of 
a generally higher economic level than that to the rest 
of the city. While the immigrant families interviewed 
in Santana were far from bourgeois, they were not of 
working class origins either. We do not know how repre­
sentative these families were of Santana's foreign popu­
lation, but it is certain that they had more resources—  
land, capital, training--to take advantage of the commer­
cial opportunities offered by Sao Paulo's growth than the 
mass of foreign factory workers, or indeed, as we shall 
see later on, than the Brazilian rural migrants who 
came to Sao Paulo at that time. Some of the foreign 
families arriving in Santana were able to afford several 
return trips with their families to visit Italy or
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Portugal, and all but one immigrant interviewed (or dis­
cussed with their descendants) were literate on arrival.
By the 1930's many owned land or their own commercial en­
terprises and were actively participating in Santana's 
growth. In general, this applies equally to the foreign 
born immigrants who arrived in Santana before 1930 and to 
the second generation immigrants (Brazilian born of foreign 
extraction) arriving in Santana after 1930 (See Figures 
21, 22, 23).
The careers of families arriving in Santana before 
1930 do not in any way support Willems's (1975:197) hypo­
thesis of dramatic social mobility among immigrants. They 
support, rather, Dean's suggestion (1969:50-51), discussed 
in Chapter I, that foreign immigration reduplicated the 
structure of the immigrants' countries of origin. We may 
surmise, then, that the Santana immigrants discussed here 
were not alone, and that in addition to the laboring masses 
and the few entrepreneurs, individuals and families of 
middle economic status also arrived in Sao Paulo. Thus, 
while the elite at the top of the hill had referred to the 
population at the bottom of the hill as os pobres or §. 
italianada la de baixo, many of these were neither poor nor 
Italian, but Portuguese, Syrians or Germans of middle income.
Moreover, while many informants of foreign 
descent felt that the careers of their kinsmen consti­
tuted modest tales of independent achievement in the
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Figure 21. Professions of First Generation Immigrants to Santana, 1900-1930
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Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout permission.
193
F ig u re  22. P ro fe s s io n s  o f Second G e n e ra tio n  Im m igrants to  S a n ta n a ,1900-1970
Occupations 1900-1930 1930-1950 1950-1970 Totals
Salaries
Low
soldier 2 factory workers construc­tion worker driver (5)





2 tombstone sculptors accountant head car­penter
(4)
2 book­keepers 6 sales­menindustrialmanager(9)
TV publi­city man industrial manager 4 accoun­tants (6) (19)
Independents
Truckfarms (5) (0) (0) ( 5)
Transportation 3 animal based (3)
taxifleet
(1) (0) ( 4)
Commerce
(0)
real estate 3 stores barber tailor salesman baker (turned stockbro­ker)(10)
gas station owner
(1) (li>
Industry 2 carpen­try shops
(2)
2 carpen­try shops wire fac­tory valve factory textile factory bakery (6)
5 workers in family owned car­pentry shops automobile repair shop lamination factory (7) (15)
Totals (19) (31) (15) (6 5 )
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new world, there is an interesting shift between the first 
and second generations as regards careers that suggests 
a measure of downward mobility, or at least a loss of 
control over land and capital. Among first generation 
immigrants arriving in Santana before 1930, 19.44 percent 
earned salaries and 80.55 percent owned their own busi­
nesses: truck farms, transportation companies, commer­
cial or industrial ventures. The proportion of indepen­
dent businessmen declined radically among the second 
generation to 52.63 percent among those beginning 
careers between 1900 and 1930 and to 54.83 percent 
among those beginning careers after 1930 (See Figure 23 )•
Figure 23* Career comparisons between genera­
tions of immigrants in Santana, 1900-1950.
First Second Second
Generation Generation Generation 
1900-1930 1900-1930 1930-1950I % N % I %
Salaries 7 19.44 9 47.36 y± 45.16Low 5 13.89 5 26.31 5 16.13
Med ium 2 5.55 4 21.05 9 29.03
IndeDendents 29 80.55 10 52*63 17 54.83
Truckfarms 11 30.55 5 26.31 - -
Transportation 4 11.11 3 15.79 1 3.22
Commerce 5 13.89 - - - - 10 32.26
Industry 9 25.00 2 10.53 6 19.35
Totals 36 99.99 12 99.99 31 99.99
In addition, there are suggestive differences 
in the distribution of careers among the second genera­
tion beginning careers between 1900 and 1930 and that 
beginning careers after 1930. While the proportion of
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salaries to independent enterprises remains more or
less constant, the proportion of low salaries decreases
among the second generation beginning careers after 1930.
Among the independents, there is a dramatic increase in
industrial and commercial enterprises in the second
4generation beginning careers after 1930.
These data generally confirm informants' reports 
of Santana's commercial growth after 1930, but they 
suggest a number of other things as well. First of all, 
while the first generation immigrants had enough capital 
to be relatively independent as truck farmers or owners 
of animal based transport companies, they may have lost 
land and capital because of difficulties with the 
language and lack of understanding of Brazilian laws.
In some cases, the land appears to have been sold too 
rapidly and at low prices to real estate speculators. 
However, we do well to recall that during the early 
part of the century the status of private property was 
in the process of being defined in Santana. According 
to informants' memories and impressions, the Italian 
colonists, for example, sometimes lost land because they
^Chi square tests were performed on all of these 
comparisons; the only one which yielded unequivocal 
results was that between the first and second generations. 
However, because of the smallness and non randomness of 
the sample, the results should be considered as sugges­
tive rather than definitive.
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did not speak fluent Portuguese and did not understand 
the tax laws. Other immigrants or unscrupulous city offi­
cials quietly paid the taxes and got access to title. In 
other instances, official surveys which could have proved 
immigrant's boundary claims mysteriously disappeared from 
municipal files (See Appendix IV-A).^ Such difficulties 
do not find expression in informants' descriptions of 
their first generation ancestors' professions as "landown­
ing truck farmer,” but they are reflected in the increase 
of salaried positions in the second generation. Thus, the 
difficulties which we would expect the first generation to 
face affected the careers of the second generation.
Moreover, the fact that among the second generation 
success--that is, higher salaries or increased commercial 
opportunities^--seems to be related to whether a career 
began before or after 1930 suggests two things. First, 
the less successful second generation careers may 
have been affected not only by a general " (shakeout” 
among the first generation families, but also by the
^Citations from informants which are too bulky 
to be included here are found in Appendix IV.
^A chi square test on the significance of increas­
ed high salaries after 1930 was only at .30. However, 
the test on the significance of increased commerce after 
1930 was greater than .10, suggesting that the variation 
may not be due to chance. However, as stated above in 
Fn. 4, in view of the size and non-randomness of the sample, 
these results are only suggestive and should be regarded 
with caution.
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general labor glut of Sao Paulo's market during the 
First Republic, which was specifically created by immi­
gration policies favoring the coffee oligarchy (See 
Chapter II, pp. 64-65 ). Second, the more successful 
second generation careers in commmerce beginning after 
1930 suggest that improved commercial opportunities 
resulted not only from the vacuum left by the elite 
families as their descendants abandoned commerce, but 
also from the population growth which characterised the 
whole Northern Zone of the city. To a degree, immigra­
tion itself created markets for immigrant concerns. But 
by the 1930's, the height of the immigration period 
was over. We may then surmise that the improved commer­
cial opportunities in Santana arose from a particular 
kind of population growth which could support the 
increasing variety of Santana's commerce: namely the 
newly arrived bureaucrats.
The bureaucrats, who arrived in the late 1920's 
and 1930's were able to pay for the goods and services 
offered by Santana's commerce, but not for the more 
expensive commodities handled by the commerce in the 
center of Sao Paulo. If the foregoing hypothesis is 
correct, the result of the Vargas years was not only 
to stabilize the downwardly mobile rural elites who 
came to Santana as bureaucrats, but to contribute as
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well, through their creation, to the stability and 
prosperity of Santana's commerce and the immigrants who 
controlled it.
Most of the bureaucratic families who came to 
Santana in the late 1920's and 1930's were from reasonably 
wealthy, landed backgrounds in their fathers' or grand­
fathers' generations, but had witnessed the precipitous 
decline of family fortunes. They had seen the value of 
their production decline and the size of their landhold­
ings decrease through inheritance to the point where a 
large nuclear family would have difficulty supporting 
itself. In spite of this downward mobility in the 
economic sphere, these families were relatively privileged. 
They were literate, and in their towns in the interior, 
they or their relatives had had the political and social 
status of landowners, coroneis or cabos eleitorais. Such 
individuals were used to prestige and to political 
influence at least on a local level even though, as one 
informant put it, "Os poderosos foram de tempo passado.
Nos ouase aue nao vimos esse poder" (^he powerful ones 
were of bygone days. We hardly saw that power).
Once in the city though, their literacy entitled 
them to little in the 1930's, and their sense of social 
status was incommensurate with the realities of their 
new situation, as there was no one to validate it:
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Viemos pra Sab Paulo porque meu irmao, que tava na 
Forca mandou vir. Estava diflcil la no sxtio. Fomos 
pro lado de Vila Formosa onde era tudo rua de terra, 
casinhas . . . nao sei, estranhamos. No interior 
eramos familia de certa classe. Aqui era carrocei- 
ro . . .  era diferente. Mamae arrazada. Eu riao 
tinha com quern conversar, saia quarenta e cinco 
minutos a pe pra cidade pra passear. Eu queria 
trabalhar. Tinha trabalhado na fazenda da minha 
irma, mais nao gostava. Aqui queria trabalhar na 
fabrica, e marquei com a noiva do meu irmao pra 
me arrumar um emprego. De noite, quando falei pro 
meu irmao, ele nao deixou, explicou, me mostrou a 
diferenga de trabalhar em fabrica, que na nossa 
situa^ao nao podia, que era melhor trabalhar numa 
lojâ . No dia seguinte falei pra mojia que^ meu 
irmao tinha falado que a nossa posipao nao permitia 
que eu fosse trabalhar em fabrica. liiiihl Deu um 
boro! Eu so fiquei inteligente depois de velha. 
Fiquei envergonhada, brigou comigo, brigou com ela, 
me mandaram de volta pra fazenda da minha irma, 
onde me davam todo trabalho pesado . . .
We came to Sao Paulo because my brother, who was in 
the Forqa Publica sent for us. It was difficult on 
the sitio /subsistence farm7. We went to Vila 
Formosa /working class neighborhood of Sao Paulo/ 
where everything was dirt roads, little houses . . .
I don't know, it was different. In the interior we 
were a family of a certain position. Here there 
were cart drivers . . .  it was different. Mother 
was exhausted. I didn't have anyone to talk to,
I would walk forty-five minutes to go look at the 
city. I wanted to work. I had worked at my sister's 
fazenda but I didn't like it. Here I wanted to work 
in a factory, and I arranged with my brother's girl 
friend that she should find me a job. At night when 
I told my brother, he wouldn't let me, he explained 
and showed me the difference between working in a 
factory, that in our position I couldn't, that it 
was better to work in a store. The next day I told 
the girl that my brother had said that our position 
would not permit me to work in a factory. Iiiih! 
There was trouble! I only got smart after I got old! 
I was embarrassed, they fought with me, with her, he 
sent me back to my sister's fazenda, where they gave
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me all the heavy work . . J
The decline of familistic support for many of
these families is an added indication of their initial
downward mobility. If there were wealthier branches
of their families in the city, they were often less
than helpful. A few families did have such relatives in
Sao Paulo when they migrated, but most informants laughed
at the suggestion that such relatives might have helped.
Only one of my informants ever asked for help and was
disappointed.
Fui no Instituto Fontoura por indicagao de um / 
parente que estava melhor de vida, e trabalhava la.
Su era auxiliar de qurmico, mais a£ tambem nao tinha 
futuro. E, o comego nao foi muito fiicil, riao.
Aquele parente poderia ter ajudado bemjnais. Pensei 
que 1a trabalhar no escritdrio, mais nao, fui pro 
setor dos operarios, puxando carrinho, engarrafando
0 produto. Fiquei muito chocado com o trabalho 
bragal. Ademais, tava com um furunculo enorme 
debaixo do brago, e sofn aquelas^ dores. Foi tudo
a mesma coisa. Naquele tempo, Sao Paulo era pequeno, 
e nao oferecia as oportunidades de hoje. E^os 
parentes ajudavam, mais aqueles que podiam nao aju- 
davam tanto nao.
1 went to the Instituto Fontoura /a drug factoryj 
through the advice of a relative who was better off, 
and worked there. I was a chemist's assistant, but 
there wasn't much future there either. Yes, in the 
beginning it wasn't very easy. That relative could 
have helped a lot more. I thought I was going to 
work in an office, but no, I was sent to the workers' 
sections, to push carts and bottle the product. I 
was very shocked with physical labor. Moreover,
^See Appendix IV=B.
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I had an enormous abscess under my arm, and was 
in tremendous pain. It was always the same thing.
In those days Sao Paulo was small and didn*t offer 
the opportunities of today. Sure, relatives helped, 
but those who could didn't help that much.
Unrealistic expectations of this sort underscore 
the vulnerability of such families. For the untrained 
in a difficult job market, the opportunities provided by 
the growth and stability of the bureaucracy during the 
Vargas years stopped a process of vertiginous downward 
social mobility.8 Literate Brazilians, eligible for 
government employ, were provided with secure employment, 
a modest but sure source of income, retirement benefits, 
and access to government loans. Most importantly, they 
were reintegrated into a new scheme of government. For 
Santana families of such backgrounds, the last was of 
special importance, for it was on the basis of their 
new government connections that they were able to estab­
lish new grounds for prestige and influence in Santana.
Of the twenty Brazilians ia my sample, who came to 
Santana frcm about 1928 to 1950, all but three joined bu­
reaucracies. In contrasty none of the eleven second generation 
foreign immigrants who arrived after 1930 did, although
8There is a parallel here between the careers of 
the second generation immigrants beginning their careers 
during the First Republic. We have hypothesized that 
these, too, were affected by the labor glut caused by 
First Republic immigration policies.
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one was connected to the For^a Publica as a tailor (See 
Figure 24)* A few of the bureaucrats had lived briefly 
in other areas of the city before moving to Santana.
They came to Santana because housing was cheap and it 
was close to the center of the city, where many held jobs 
in the State Office of the Treasury, the Department of 
Public Health, the Ministry of Education, the Department 
of Water and Sewage, and in the For<pa Publica (See 
Figures 24 and 25 ) •
The For<pa Publica provided almost half of the 
bureaucratic employment among Brazilian migrants inter­
viewed. A degree of mobility through the ranks had 
been possible in the For^a Publica since 1915. In 1924 
mobility was limited to the literate: earlier basic 
education courses had made mobility through the ranks 
possible even for illiterate, volunteers, but in 1924, 
these were abolished and officer training programs which 
only accepted literate individuals were instituted (Fer­
nandez, 1972:233). The age of grandeur of the Forca 
Publica had terminated in 1932: with the defeat of the 
Constitutionalist Revolt, it fell under Federal control.
Yet, despite the personal humiliation of being associa-
9ted with a defeated institution, careers were made
^An informant who participated in the 1932 revolt 
as an officer in the Forca Publica explained: f
"0 que houve mesmo em '32, o que se nota, e. a ambi-
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Figure 24. Professions of Brazilian Rural Migrants and 
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there. In the 1930's it became possible to get univer­
sity training through this institution, which otherwise 
would not have been available to the volunteers. In 
fact, volunteers to the For^a Publica had a far lower 
level of preparation than did individuals who joined the 
public health services, the teaching bureaucracy or 
various ministries in desk jobs. Perhaps it is because 
the requirements were lower than in other bureaucracies 
that familistic networks in the Forga Publica appeared 
much stronger than in other bureaucracies.(See Figure 25)• 
While relatively few individuals interviewed did so, 
those who were able to take advantage of the university 
training offered by the Forca Publica could, after 
retirement, start private businesses as civil engineers, 
veterinarians and doctors.
3ureaucratic employment provided stability and 
new opportunities to families which were in tight 
straits. This was recognized by many women of rural
£ao desmedida dos politicos que queriam recuperar 
os cargos perdidos com a revolucao de *30. Insufla- 
ram o povo contra a Forcpa. Chamavam de traidor, de 
judas, desciam dos bondes. Chamavam as meninas na 
escola de filha e irma de traidor."
"What happened in '32, what one notes is the unmea­
sured ambition of the politicians who wanted to 
recuperate the positions lost with the revolution of 
'30. They encouraged the people against the Forga. 
Called us traitors, judases, got off trolleys. They 
called the girls at school daughters and sisters of 
traitors."
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migrant background who married bureaucrats:
Na^ minha epoca casavamos com funcionario, o que 
nao pode chegar a fortuna por muito esforpado 
que seja. 0 trabalho pro estado da menos dinheiro 
mas mais garantia.
In my day we mariied public servants, who can't 
make fortunes no matter how hard they try. Working 
for the state yields less money but more security.
Of all the bureaucrats interviewed, those who 
joined the For<pa Publica were most explicit in their 
recognition of the possibilities for upward mobility 
inherent in the new structure of opportunities offered 
them. The following citation is from a volunteer's 
graduation speech:
Ha dezessete anos batia eu as portas deste 
Batalhao, onde hoje vos reunis para, por meu 
intermedio, homenagear a tradicional hospitalidade 
desta terra de Sao Paulo . . . Quando rememoro o 
passado, e comparo o pouco que sou ao nada que 
era, sinto um orgulho infinito e creio nos des- 
tions gloriosos do Brasil . . . Uma terra onde o 
pobre, com o esforco proprio pode estudar e pro- 
gredir, tendo apentis como limite o limite de suas 
proprias forpas, nao pode deixar de ser forte.
A historia de minha vida e a historia anonima de 
muitos. E'a de uma infancia pobre, de uma adoles-  ̂
cencia perigosa sujeita a tentapao do vicio, atraves 
de uma camaradagem nociva . . . Aos oito anos perdia 
o meu pai. Aos nove ja me encontrava vendendo o 
suor do meu rosto pelo pao de cada dia. . . com o 
espirito aventureiro cheguei eu a Capital Federal.
No Rio conheci de tudo. Convivi com a escoria de  ̂
sua sociedade, e realmente sofri . . . dias de mise- 
ria e de desanimo.
Ha/ momento na vida de cada um de nos que repre- 
sentam se'culos de intenso viver. Esses momentos eu 
os vivi^entao. Era Julho de 1924. Rebentara a 
revolucao. Sem objetivos fixos alistei me a um 
batalhao de voluntarios que nao chegou a vir a Sao
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Faulo. Sozinho, sem recursos, descrente dos que, 
como serralheiro com a minha falta de sorte poderia 
adquirir; bastante orgulhoso e independente para 
pedi-los, decidi alistar-me na For^a Publica de 
Sao Paulo.
Bendita a hora feliz de minha inspira^ao.
Aqui encontrei, na disciplina e no trabalho, a 
orienta^ao segura que minha inexperiencia exigia.
Aqui, no exemplo dos meus chefes, completei minha 
forma<pao moral.
Aqui estudei. Casei-me. Tive filhos, que em 
Deus esperc^ terao melhores dias que os meus.
Aqui consegur chegar a capitao e obter o tltulo 
de medico.
Seventeen years ago, I was knocking at the doors 
of this battalion, where today we are united to 
celebrate, throughjne, the traditional hospitality 
of this land of Sao Paulo . . . When I recall the 
past, and compare the little I am to the nothing 
that I was, I feel infinite pride and belief in 
the glorious destinies of Brazil . . .  A land in 
which a poor man, can through his own efforts 
study and progress, having as a limit only the limits 
of his own strergth cannot be other than strong.
The story of my life is the anonymous history 
of many. It is the tale of an impoverished child­
hood and a dangerous adolescence subject to tempta­
tions to vice through unwholesome aquaintances . . . 
When I was eight, I lost my father. By the time I 
was nine, I was selling the sweat of my brow for 
my daily bread . . . with an adventurous spirit I 
arrived in the Federal Capital. In Rio I knew 
everything. I lived with the dregs of its society 
and I truly suffered . . . days of misery and 
depression.
There are moments in the lives of each of us 
which represent centuries of intense living. Those 
moments I lived then. It was July 1924 and the 
revolution broke out. Without any fixed objectives 
I enlisted in a battalion of volunteers that never 
reached Sao Paulo. Alone and without resources; 
with a lack of faith in the resources that a metal-
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worker with my lack of luck could acquire; too 
proud and independentfto beg for jrhem, I decided to 
enlist in the ffqrca Publica of Sao Paulo.
Blessed the happy hour of my inspiration.
Here I found, in discipline and work, the secure 
path which my inexperience required.
Here, with the example of my superiors, I com­
pleted my moral development.
Here I studied. I married. I had children, 
who God willing will have better days than mine.
Here I have managed to become a captain and to 
obtain the title of doctor.^
It is clear from these and other statements by 
the Brazilian rural migrants interviewed that they felt 
that they were starting their lives at the bottom, saved 
from absolute proletarianization only by the security 
of the jobs in the bureaucracies which became available 
at that time. They came to Santana because the neighbor­
hood was relatively cheap and they were poor. None of 
these families was able to buy land, or a house when 
they moved to Santana. Although they now all own their 
own dwellings, when they moved to Santana they rented 
the "chicken coops for the poor" being built by the 
families at the top of the hill, or more usually, houses 
built by immigrants or their descendants.
The beginning of a symbiotic relationship
103ee Appendix IV-C.
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developed between many bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic 
families: at first it was a relation between ethnic 
groups. Foreigners, especially Italians, were discrimi­
nated against by the Law of Two Thirds (See Chapter II, 
p. 85-6) and the limitation of bureaucratic employment 
to the Brazilian born. Social prejudice was expressed 
by foreigners and Brazilians alike. Older Brazilian 
informants comment on "unfortunate" marriages between 
Italians or Syrians and Brazilians, but in fact such 
marriages appear to have been rare during the 1930's. 
According to a 1941 survey of the population of Sao 
Paulo, foreigners generally married each other because 
the Brazilians they were exposed to were most often of 
either a lower or a far higher economic status (Araujo, 
1941:72). Because of this legal and social discrimination 
immigrants in Santana could only gain access to govern­
ment resources through bureaucratic personnel who acted 
as intermediaries for them. They became slightly more 
integrated into the existing political scheme than 
might otherwise have been the case, in the absence of 
even nominal participation in electoral politics.'*'*' 
However, as the Brazilian born replace the foreign born
*^Among the families interviewed only two in­
formants admitted to having relatives who joined or 
participated in the Integralist or Communist movements 
of the 1930's.
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of whatever extraction, the families became defined by 
their direct or indirect access to government.
The relationship was recognized. The bureaucrats 
provided a market fcr land, commerce and industry which 
were in immigrant hands, and in return for the relatively 
cheap rents given them, gave access to ieito. Jeito 
(literally, "manner," a way to fix or arrange things) is 
the ubiquitous Brazilian word meaning the ability to 
get by, to manage, generally by the successful manipula­
tion of one's personal connections. It has to do with 
the creation of clientelistic networks and is usually 
applied when there is the expectation of mutual aid. 
Through their friendships with the bureaucrats, the non­
bureaucrats got access to informal channels of informa­
tion and assistance. The "municipal benevolence," 
which da Silva Mendes (1958:222) holds responsible for 
the mushrooming of housing developments in Santana 
during these years, probably had its roots in many such 
relationships. Besides the acquisition of building 
permits, informants mentioned tax exemptions, housing 
loans from the Gaixa Economica (State Savings Bank), 
special consideration for their children's application 
to State schools, legal advice, a few bureaucratic 
positions for the Brazilian born and even the use of the 
rare telephones in Sao Paulo, which even now are only
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available at exorbitant prices or to people with 
connections.
Friendships between the bureaucrats and non­
bureaucrats were hardly ever formalized during the Vargas 
years. Among the families studied only one marriage 
occurred’between a bureaucrat--a Forga Publica officer—  
and a landed woman of Italian descent. IVhile this 
marriage expressed a union of material and social capi­
tal and can be considered as expressive of the bureau­
crat-immigrant relationship discussed here, I do not 
know how frequent such marriages may have been in Santana 
in the 1930's. Most of the bureaucrats interviewed who 
came to Santana in the late 1920's and early 1930's were 
already married and starting families. Among the For<pa 
Publica officers interviewed who married foreign women, 
the women were most often working class women whom they 
had met in the center city industrial neighborhoods 
surrounding the Forga Publica headquarters.
During these early years in Santana, the immi­
grants appear to have gotten the better part of the deal: 
they had capital and the bureaucrats did not. The 
bureaucrats provided them with opportunities to utilize 
their capital assets. The bureaucrats, however, gained 
prestige, which would later be formalized through god­
parenthood, marriages--in the next generation--and occa­
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sionally in joint business ventures. For example, one 
voung Forca Publica officer, after having graduated from 
engineering school,formed his first business partnership 
with his old immigrant landlord. According to the land­
lord's daughter,
Nos conhecemos o Cel. Thomas faz tempo. Ele era 
vizinho nosso quando veio pra Santana. Alugava a 
casa do papai. Ele era carpinteiro fino, trabalha- 
va em construpoes, fez todo o trabalho de madeira 
pra igreja Sao Bento, Fapai era dTtimo construtor, 
so que nao tinha forma^ao. Era arquiteto autodidata. 
Ele se deu bem com o Coronel, que nao tinha expe- 
riencia. Entao ficaram socios, e trabalharam juntos, 
fizeram uma por^ao de casas quando papai loteou o 
terreno. Quando papai se aposentou, o Cel. Thomas 
fez a minha casa. Continuamos muito amigos.
We have known Colonel Thomas for a long time. He 
was our neighbor when he came to Santana. He rented 
father's house. Father was a fine carpenter, he 
worked in constructions, he did all the wood work 
for the church of Sab Bento, He was an excellent 
builder, although he had no formal training. He 
was a self taught architect. He got along well 
with the Colonel, who /had a degree but_7 had no 
experience. So they became partners and they 
worked together. They built a lot of houses when 
my father developed his land. When my father 
retired, it was the Colonel who built my house.
We continue very friendly.
Naturally the opportunities were greater for 
the bureaucrats who had been able to acquire sufficient 
training in their bureaucracies to be able to set up 
independent enterprises. The friendship and patronage 
extended to the immigrants could then lead to economic 
gain through the acquisition of commercial clients.
Thus, the Cel. Thomas, mentioned above, received a few 
prestigious city side contracts, through connections
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made in the For^pa Publica. but the bulk of his business 
was in Santana among immigrant and other non-bureaucra­
tic families. While Cel. Thomas's career was exception­
ally successful, eventually all of the bureaucrats bene- 
fitted from the friendships formed with immigrants and 
their families during the Vargas years.
The relationship begun between bureaucratic 
families and non-hureaucratic families became completely 
symbiotic during the populist years following the reintro­
duction of elections, because then immigrant friends and 
business clients became the bureaucrat^ political clients.
The 1950's were prosperous years. Santana's 
commerce continued to be fuelled by population growth in 
the neighborhood and the area ( See Figure 26). The
Figure 26. Population growth in the Northern 
Zone of Sao Paulo, 1950-1970.
Subdistricts 1950 1960 % 1970 %
Santana^ 90,193 120,284 33.35 200,490 66.68
TucuruvL 88,720 175,653 97.98 255,515 45.46
Casa Verde 58,571 79,226 35.26 99,405 25.47
V. Maria ^ 54,373 94,118 73.09 116,916 24.22
N. Sjra. do 0 51,012 62,439 22.40 141,863 127.20
Limao ..a 51,837 -- 70,232 35.48
V. Guilherme _a 41,202 — 74,450 80.69
V. Nova Ca-
ch oeir inha 24,172 — 30,924 27.93
aThese subdistricts were created in 1965.
SOURCE: Mendes Torres (1970:111,171); IBGE 
(1970:90).
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bureaucracies continued to absorb Brazilian migrants from 
rural areas at an even greater rate (See Figure 17 ), and 
migrants of foreign descent arriving in Santana during the 
1940's and 1950 !s were able to set up independent commer­
cial enterprises. Commerce and real estate continued to 
be the main investments. Various voluntary associations 
were formed in the neighborhood during these years. Bran­
ches of the Rotary and Lions Clubs and the Sao Paulo 
Commercial Association opened in Santana as did a local 
store owners' association. Members in all of these asso­
ciations included prominent commercial figures, as well 
as the new local politicians, many of whom were bureau­
crats who had migrated to Santana during the Vargas years.
In addition to Santana's continued growth, the ex­
pansion of bureaucracies and the reintroduction of elec­
tions under populism promoted the careers of bureaucratic 
and non-bureaucratic individuals alike. It gave people 
of both groups advantages which had been absent during 
the Vargas years. Electoral politics meant that every 
man and woman could be a small scale politician and 
join a political machine. The implication of this 
new situation for immigrants is expressed by the son of 
an independent salesman of foreign descent, who said:
Uma vez meu pai ajudou tom vereador por duas 
coisas: ele queria finaneiamento pra uma casa e 
nao tinha liga<£oes politicas. Sem liga^o'es era 
dificil conseguir finaneiamento. A segunda coisa
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era conseguir uin lugar no estacionamento munici­
pal. Isso recefceu. 0 finaneiamento ele nsio 
conseguiu, porque o vereador nao podia, nao era 
bastante importante, entao ele foi falar com
o Gel. Joao id da ____ que tava ligado com o
grupo do governador . . . Meu avo tinha ajudado 
o irmao dele num negocio . . .
Once my father helped a councilman for two 
things. He wanted financing for a house and he 
didn't have the political connections. Without 
such connections it was difficult to get financing. 
The second thing was to get a parking space in 
the municipal parking lot. That he got. The 
financing he didn't get, because the councilman 
wasn't important enough and couldn't do it. So
he went to speak to Cel. Joao from _____ who was
connected with the governor's group. My grandfa­
ther had helped his brother in some business . . .
While I have little specific information on
such relationships among men, it is clear that populism
provided opportunities for mutual career advancement
for bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats alike. Thus, when
a popular commercial figure's religious affiliation
was being discussed, informants laughed and said,
Ah, esse ax que e politico, faz umbanda,espiritismo, 
vai pra missa todo domingo, e tudo projegao, e £e 
ve que deu bem, ne?
Ah, that one is really a politician. He does 
umbanda. spiritism, goes to church every Sunday.
It's all projection, and you see how it's worked 
out, don't you?
While they would not provide details on the connections
it is clear that for this non-bureaucratic individual as
well as for others, there were linkages to be found
through Rotary, Lions and commercial associations, in
party political associations or in the bureaucracies
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themselves. There was always a ieito. a person could 
always help, and in the process, help himself.
The populist years were particularly significant 
for the bureaucrats. As in the First Republic, electoral 
politics provided special opportunities for those in a 
position to manage votes. Most of Santana's elected 
politicians after 1945 were of bureaucratic backgrounds. 
Many more bureaucrats ran for political office. They 
were not elected, but they acted as sieves for patronage. 
Although the bureaucrats never reached the power and 
position of the old top of the hill elite, the reintroduc­
tion of elections greatly enhanced their political and 
economic fortunes.
According to a number of local politicians, 
Santana's re-entry into electoral politics was enthusias­
tic and at first violent. A shooting occurred at a poli­
tical meeting outside the Santana church and there vras 
a riot in the neighboring district of Tucuruvi. I was 
unable to get more detailed information on these incidents 
other than that they were connected with the Communist 
electoral victory which occurred in Santana and elsewhere,
in spite of the lack of local Communist Party leadership 
12in Santana. After this initial outburst, however, and
^According to a local politician: "£u nao sei 
_se acabou o fenomeno do Communismo. Agora ninguem se"
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the subsequent prohibition of the Communist party, Santana 
politics were controlled largely by the right wing parties 
which developed after the second World War (See Chapter 
II, PP.104§).
Santana politics were largely defined by the 
complementary trends of Adhemarismo and Janismo (Beiguel- 
man, 1971:325) which dominated the politics of Sao Paulo 
during the populist years. Adhemar de Barros, a doctor, 
began his political career in the 1933 elections for the 
Constituent Assembly as a PRP delegate (Skidmore, 1967: 
67-8; Cabral, 1962:29; Bloem, 1955:44). During the Vargas 
years, when Federal control over the states was maintain­
ed by a presidentially appointed interventor, Adhemar 
was one of the interventors for Sao Paulo. In 1946 he 
ran for Governor of the state and was elected. It is 
said that his party machine, the Partido Social Progres­
sists (PSP) was the most corrupt of all the allegedly 
venal post war parties. Adhemar's own motto was nRouba 
mas faz11 (He steals but gets the job done).
manifests por razoes compreensivas1* (I don't know if the 
phenomenon of communism is finished. Now no one manifests 
himself for understandable reasons).
13The husband of one of the Santana informants 
kept his accounts. There were two ledgers, one private 
and one public. Both were burned after Adhemar*s death 
in 1969.
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Adhemar's political strength seems to have come 
from Paulista industrialists and old PRP elements. In 
Santana he took over Goya's PRP electoral machine and a 
few of the old elite families at the top of the hill 
joined his electoral camp. His electoral strength 
derived from what Weffort has described as the. "politics 
of love" (1965:179), a generous paternalism which pro­
mised everyone a share of Sao Paulo's extraordinary 
post war economic growth. According to Weffort's analy­
sis of the 1962 elections in Sao Paulo state, his main 
electoral supporters in the state were among economically 
marginal landowners or independent businessmen who looked 
towards the state for protection, assistance and genero­
sity. They did not expect specific policies, but "a 
power which cared for the little man" (1965:180).
Weffort continues,
From this follows the importance attributed by the 
adhemaristas to distributive activities. The 
image of a leader, easily accessible to his follow­
ers suggests a behavioural style for the administra­
tive bureaucracy which vitiates the impersonality 
of the laws. Finally, the typical adhemari^ta 
whether "progressive" or "conservative" imagines a 
protective, helpful State to which one can appeal 
in cases of difficulty, without the technical obsta­
cles of a rational and impersonal administration.
It is this structure which permits the small land­
owner, the "lumpen" and marginal salaried man the 
certainty that he will survive, even if defeated 
in the violent competition stimulated by capitalist 
development, and above all the certainty that he 
may keep his aspiration of access to higher posi­
tions (1965:180).
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Adhemar's main opposition was from Janismo.
Janio Quadros was a primary school teacher who began his 
political career unaffiliated with any of the main Paulis- 
ta political parties. Janio provided the only signifi­
cant opposition to Aahemar's "politics of love," by 
promising justice, austerity and an end to corruption.
His was the rhetoric of "a revolugao do tostao contra o 
milhao" (the revolution of the penny against the million), 
of the end of politicagem (politicking— and corruption) 
and of non political administration (Ferreira, 1964:261-3). 
His political strength derived purely from his electoral 
appeal, which eventually led Sao Paulo's major parties to 
back him in the elections for state governor in 1955. In 
1960 he became president of the republic. Whereas 
Adhemar's electorate was largely among the petty bourgeois 
of the interior or in industrial neighborhoods whose 
populations were composed of impoverished recent migrants 
from the Northeast or other areas of Brazil (Weffort, 1965: 
181-2; Ferreira, 1964:239-40), Janio's appeal was basi­
cally to the urban electorate (Sloem:1955:70). According 
to Weffort, Janio's appeal was to segments of the urban 
working class and to middle income sectors who had no 
political connections, who expected no favors and who were 
increasingly dependent on their salaries for survival. 
Weffort argues that the
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Janistas are more stable /than the adhemaristas? 
in the sense that as a working class, or proletarian- 
ized middle class . . . they have not much to lose 
with capitalist development . . . they do not turn 
to the state cherishing hopes of personal protection 
but with hopes for justice, for what matters for them 
is no longer the expectation of favors, but their 
own ability to work . . . they expect justice and 
unconditional application of the law from the state 
(1965:18.2-3).
Both Janio and Adhemar were supported in 
Santana. Many of Santana's elected officials to munici­
pal, state and federal legislatures were of adhemarista 
backgrounds, but Janio derived much of his personal 
electoral strength from the Northern Zone of Sao Paulo, 
including Santana (Bloem, 1955:70). We shall see, how­
ever, that the distinction which Weffort makes between 
adhemaristas and janistas does not really apply to the 
families interviewed in Santana.
We have seen in Chapter II that populism inter­
related the electoral and administrative systems at the 
higher socio-economic levels. Bureaucracies and pane- 
linhas within them became the institutions through which 
electoral clans were revived (Mota, 1972:217), and the 
rivalries of electoral politics were expressed by pro­
motions or appointments within given bureaucracies.
Among the bureaucrats interviewed in Santana, the 
Secretariats of Health, Education and Finance and the 
Forga Publica were the loci for the rivalries of elec­
toral politics. They could deal with favorable place-
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ments and appointments for teachers, doctors and dentists
14as well as with legal and financial advice. Patronage 
possibilities were particularly important in the Porga 
Publica because of the opportunities for diverting mate­
riel. It was allegedly a bastion of Adhemarismo because 
of an improved automatic promotion law passed by Adhemar 
in the early populist years. According to a number of 
informants, advancement could depend on the ability to 
mobilize votes outside the bureaucracy and political 
standing within it. The ability to mobilize votes for 
a given faction depended on willingness to bring the 
benefits of government to friends who did not have them. 
Attempts, for instance, to check the redistribution of 
construction materials and automobile parts to private 
ends, were at least on one occasion penalized by delayed 
promotions.
In the political climate of 1972-73 it was un­
reasonable to expect informants to describe past achieve­
ments in the area of patronage and corruption. Under­
standably, discussions of politics and patronage were
^Teachers in the public system are assigned 
schools throughout the state. To receive a desired 
teaching location, usually in the capital, teachers are 
required to pass periodic examinations. It was commonly 
felt that people with connections got the placements 
they wanted.
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usually concluded with statements of this sort:
Eu nao gostava, nao gosto dê  politica. So faco 
por obriga^ao. A politica e' falsa, eu tenho 
impressao, acho que todo politico antes da 
Reyolujao, se nao fizesse, favores aos eleitores, 
nao seria eleito. Nao ha' mais aquela gloria do 
politico, de se valorizar a si proprio. Esse 
negocio do jeitinho melhorou noventa porcento.
Ainda existe. Eu nab tenho me servido^ e nunca 
gostei. Se me servia antes, era pra nao passar 
de bobo.
1 didn't like and I don't like politics. I do 
it because it is a duty. Politics are false, I 
have the impression, I believe that if the politi­
cians before the Revolution didn't do favors for 
the voters, they wouldn't have been elected. There 
is no longer that glory of the politician, that 
high self esteem. This business of the jeitinho 
/diminutive for ieito7 has improved ninety percent. 
It still exists. I haven't used it and never liked 
it. If I used it before, it was so that I wouldn't 
appear as a fool.
Many families helped others get jobs, presumably
through patronage and ieito: few were as explicit as
this woman, who was committed to the Adhemar network
because her husband, after several years of only being
able to find work as an accountant in the interior, got
a job in a Sab Paulo city bureaucracy through Adhemar's
political machine:
Nos procuramos sempre votar por pessoas honestas, 
nunca por interesse, dentro daqueles conhecidos 
que podem fazer alguma coisa.
We always try to vote for honest people, never for 
self interest, among those people we know who can 
do something.
Generally, however, I received gossip about
tax evasion, political appointments, promotion delays,
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disappearance of government materiel, which became more 
specific as it became more distant from the social milieu 
of Santana, usually up the social scale, or as it moved 
into the realm of legal or semi-legal favors or ieito.
As was the case during the First Republic, there was no 
evidence of gross corruption among Santana informants 
or Santana politicians, but again, as with the First 
Republic, we need not assume, or look for the grossest 
characteristics by which coronelismo or electoral populism 
were known. Small scale favors and ieito were 
implicitly and explicitly accepted as the currency of 
electoral politics. This was made clear by one infor­
mant, who said that she, rather than her husband, should 
have been the politician because, while his reputation 
for scrupulous honesty yielded him a great deal of 
prestige and respect, it did not yield the necessary 
vote when he ran for electoral office. According to 
this same woman, who had a large network of friends 
and clients,
Raro a semana que acontece que nao dou algum conse- 
lho. Essa semana ate que foi banal. Em geral eles 
perguntam pra mim, por que tenho idade e ja sei 
muito, e tenho uma grande rede de amigos. Tou 
sempre pedindo pra alguem ou dando . . .
It is rare that there is a week when I don't give 
someone advice. This week was actually banal. Gene­
rally they ask me because I am old and now I know 
things and I have a large network of friends. I 
am always asking £for information/ for someone or 
giving information.
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On a later occasion, she talked about people's voting 
behavior: some people asked her every year who they should 
vote for, or if they hadn't seen her, voted blank (votaram 
ew branco). One man, whose vote she was soliciting, told 
her that he had the highest respect for her candidate, but 
that the opposition candidate had taken his child to the 
First Aid Station (Pronto Socorro). nQ que se pode dizer
Santana politics during the First Republic. Electoral 
politics provided the opportunity for women to move out­
side their domestic interests, to assist their husbands 
by dispensing favors. Some women who sewed for charity 
regularly delivered their handiwork to poor families prior 
to elections to check on their voting intentions. Other 
wives of bureaucrats prided themselves on their abilities 
to collect votes in return for favors: the use of a tele­
phone, assistance in job placements, the acquisition of 
documents (birth, marriage certificates, records of edu­
cational careers), free medical care or legal advice are 
just a few examples of the kinds of favors they could 
bestow among friends and acquaintances. It is highly pro­
bable that charitable and religious organizations provided 
other areas for informal political activity, just as had 
been the case earlier among the elite families.
i?" (What can you say to that?) she
concluded
This instance suggests yet another parallel with
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In addition to the small scale favoritism and 
vote mongering described above, the effects of populism 
on bureaucrats went even further. Inflation, which is 
generally held to be contrary to middle income interests, 
ironically favored the bureaucrats, because it was easy 
for them to borrow money. While bureaucrats had only 
modest salaries, they also had access to loans from their 
institutions or from the State Savings Bank (Caixa Econo- 
mica). This was especially so among the officers of the 
For<pa Publica. who had a mutual loan association, the 
Caixa Beneficiente. Taking advantage of inflation and 
an anti usury law passed during the Vargas years which 
forbade interests higher than twelve percent, they 
borrowed money to build or buy houses. Indeed, buying 
or borrowing on time in the inflationary years, before 
the institution of monetary correction following the 
1964 coup, were prosperous enterprises because the value 
of what was eventually repaid, or paid, even with interest 
became so much less than the original value (Simonsen, 
1969:133).
Such loans were important to many of the bureau­
cratic families interviewed. Whereas they rented houses 
when they first came to Sartana, during the populist period 
they began to acquire their own properties. Owning one's 
own house, or having a casa propria, is an extremely 
important criterion for social status and mobility:
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Gabriel Bolaffi describes an unpublished study on Bra­
zilian political attitudes and aspirations, which 
revealed that owning onefe own house was the main aspira­
tion among urban Brazilians (1975:75).
Subjectively, the acquisition of a home becomes 
the main evidence of success and the conquest of 
a higher social position. Objectively, the casa 
propria not only improves access to credit lines, 
but liberates the family budget from the inexorable 
monthly obligation to pay rent (1975:75).
According to Otero and Amaral (nd:34-5), between 1938
and 1964, when the National Housing Bank (BNH) was formed,
housing loans were available to the public (in addition
to those loans we have discussed above, available to
bureaucrats or those with political connections) only
through the Previdencia Social, or Social Security system.
Because of inflation, this institution was unwilling
to make long term credit generally available, and during
those years only 120,000 housing units were constructed
with such loans in all of urban Brazil (Otero and Amaral,
nd:40-47). We may judge, then, of the importance of the
loans the bureaucrats received through the Forcpa Publica*s
Caixa Beneficiente. or through the Caixa Economica, simply
by virtue of their employment.
•^By Lloyd A. Free, undertaken in 1960. Accor­
ding to Bolaffi, the results of studies in countries 
considered to be politically unstable, including Brazil, 
were not published.
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Of the twenty families arriving in Santana 
between 1930 and 1950 in my sample, ten of the seventeen 
bureaucrats among them acquired houses through state loans, 
one was provided with an apartment on which only a main­
tenance fee, equivalent to a very low rent, was required, 
and only four did not get houses through public financing. 
Two informants did not know how their parents (long de­
ceased) acquired the houses they were now living in. Of 
the fourteen families interviewed who arrived in Santana 
between 1950 and 1970 from rural areas, eight worked in 
government offices, and of these, six acquired their 
houses through government loans.
It is possible that some individuals attempted 
to transform state loans into productive capital. Al­
though I do not know how common a procedure this may 
have been, I was told of a middle level bureaucrat who 
attempted to do so. Money was borrowed, allegedly to 
build houses for elderly female relatives, but in fact 
the man was attempting to set up a small plastics factory. 
He would not have been discovered had not competition 
from larger firms led him to bankruptcy and to the 
discovery that all of the elderly relatives for whom 
he claimed to be building were long dead. Regardless 
of the possibility of turning such loans to other uses, 
they were clearly an important economic resource for
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the bureaucratic families. If they were not large 
enough to generate investment capital, over time signi­
ficant proportions of the bureaucrats' salaries were 
diverted from rent payments to other concerns. In 
addition, we have seen above that the ability to get 
government loans for non-bureaucratic families was also 
a political resource which could generate electoral 
assistance.
All in all, then, the relations of populism 
provided a margin of comfort, prestige and savings which 
otherwise would not have been available to bureaucratic 
families, and through them to their clients and friends 
outside the bureaucracies. These observations have some 
bearing on Weffort's description of populism among 
middle income sectors in Sao Paulo, which we discussed 
briefly above. Especially with regard to the adhemarista 
political machine in Sao Paulo, he argues that the re­
lationships between the politician and the people were 
not "quasi-economic."
It is important to note that for the majority 
this relationship is an expectation rather than 
a concrete probability [of assistance/. Even if 
we attribute exceptional efficiency to the 
adhemarista machine, or to the state's welfar- 
istic abilities we cannot conceive of more than 
a minority receiving direct assistance (1965:181).
The Santana research suggests that the bureaucracies
and the bureaucrats who staffed them provided a more
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important means of redistributing wealth and resources 
than Weffort supposes. Unlike the middle income sectors 
he describes, as recruited primarily by the charismatic 
styles of the two political leaders of Sao Paulo (petty 
bourgeois adhemaristas from the interior in need of 
protection, or proletarianized middle income ianistas 
in Sao Paulo city demanding austerity and justice), the 
Santana bureaucrats seem to have had specific resources 
to use in the populist game. Thus, whether the Santana 
bureaucrats were adhemarista or ianista (and they seem 
to have been both on occasion) they all used the same 
general techniques in recruiting voters and acting as 
sieves for patronage through favors.
These conclusions are consistent with Leeds's 
(1972) and Leeds and Leeds's (1972, 1976) studies of 
populism in favelas in R.io de Janeiro. Personalist ties 
and clientelism were central to the populist organiza­
tion which did not permit the development of mass party 
bases, and they extended up from proletarian favelas 
through bureaucracies to national political figures. 
These ties were based on an exchange of material goods 
for votes, and both in favelas and among the middle 
income families interviewed in Santana, the quality of 
life was materially improved. The limits to such dis­
tributive activities should not be looked for, as does 
Weffort, in the inability of any political machine or
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state welfare institution to deliver goods and assistance, 
but in the political system itself which required con­
tinued dependence on the politician. As Leeds and Leeds 
have written about favelas,and the Brazilian political 
system,
Pi built in limit exists as to what the Brazilian 
politician can offer in terms of urban services 
for a give la— for he must be careful not to 
give too much. * . If the conditions he is osten­
sibly trying to improve are in fact improved 
!,too much" he will have lost his raison d'etre 
in the favela and consequently, will have lost 
a significant portion of his power base. Thus, 
the politician's interest must be fundamentally 
one of perpetuating the system in which he operates 
(1972:211);
From this perspective, the effects of political 
activity such as Santana's on the larger political 
system appears to have been negligible. During these 
years none of Santana's politicians or bureaucrats were 
close to the levels of policy formulation, nor were 
local politicians of the brand which polarized the 
population. In fact, favors seem to have knit groups 
of higher and lower economic status into a.web of 
mutual interest. However, we have discussed in 
Chapter II the potential draining effect of clientelism 
on the government's ability to implement established 
policy. While the drain was clearly small scale and 
indirect among the Santana families, if such relations 
existed among middle level bureaucrats in all the bureau­
cracies in the city, state and nation, the scale would
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have been of an entirely different order.
In listening to some informants reminisce about 
their careers during the populist years, one has the 
impression of a great bustling activity, an euphoric 
juggling of many balls at once, upon which depended one’s 
self esteem and social status. Upward, social mobility, 
or at least a comfortable stability was in the populist 
context felt to be a strong probability. For middle 
income families like those interviewed in Santana the 
blurring of class lines which characterised populism 
in Brazil seems to have provided an ideology of indepen- 
dent individual mobility (for all that it was in fact 
dependent on the redistribution of state resources), which 
could seemingly be measured by their expansion of social 
contacts and political activity. Much of this has changed 
in the years following 1964.
The events following the 1964 coup put an end 
to much of Santana’s political activity. While all infor­
mants claimed to be relieved and grateful for the military 
intervention, there is some evidence that families like 
these are being separated from the sources of influence 
and capital accumulation which were present during the 
populist years.
It may be noted that while all informants were 
preoccupied and frightened by the chaotic appearance of 
politics in the early 1960’s, none of the families inter­
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viewed participated in. the anti-Goulart mobilization
efforts in Sao Paulo which were described in Chapter IX.
While all were aware of the mobilization efforts, none
was enthusiastic or felt that the coup reflected a
"middle class movement" or an effort to benefit a
middle class.
Nab participei em '64. Nem as amigas, Eu de 
politica, assim, na rua, nada. Nunca me limei a 
essas coisas. Uma filha de Rosarioj:omou parte. 
Achei urn pouco errado, nao devia, nao era negocio 
dela.
I did not participate in '64. Nor did my friends. 
Politics, like that in the streets, I don't like.
I was never attracted to such things. One of 
Rosario's daughters took part, and I thought it 
was a bit wrong. She shouldn't have, it was 
none of her business.
A revolujao nao foi da classe jriedia nao. Preser- 
vou a classe rica. A media nao tinha tanto a 
perder. Quern perderia era o rico . . . o fator 
preponderante foi o Exercito Brasileiro. Pode 
ser que, teve uma peninha Americana, maia nao 
sei, nao.
The revolution was not a middle class revolution.
It preserved the rich class. The middle class 
didn't have so much to lose. Who would have lost 
would have been the rich. The most important 
factor was the Brazilian Military. Possibly there 
was a little American feather in there, but I don't 
know.
Nao sei se foi bem da media ou da rica. Da pobre 
nao foi nao. Aquela passeata que comepou tudo . . . 
as chefes eram da classe, alta. A classe media assim, 
deixa elas fazer. Eu nao fui ĉ ue nao gosto dessas 
coisas. Eu soube pela televisao, pela radio--todo 
mundo soube. Tambem pensavamos que ia ter quebra 
pau. A policia nao interferiu. / Geralmente, a 
policia dava en cima mesmo. Negocio de politica 
nab quero saber nao.
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I don't rightly know if it was a middle class or 
an upper class revolt. It wasn't a revolt on the 
part of the poor. That march that started every­
thing, the organizers were of the upper class.
The middle class, you know, let them do it. I 
didn't go because I don't like that kind of thing.
I knew about it through television, radio--every- 
body knew. We also thought there would be fighting. 
The police didn't interfere. Generally, the police 
would be very violent. I don't want to know about 
politics.
While most of the families seem to have been 
disconnected from civilian efforts to oust Goulart, 
they are largely ardent supporters of the military govern­
ment.^ Nonetheless, there is evidence that the benefits 
of the new government are at best mixed for families 
like the Santana families. Santana is an eminently staid 
neighborhood, and few of the families have had any di­
rect experience with the repression to which the working 
class and student groups were subject. While the re­
pression has affected the tone of political conversation, 
the families were more seriously affected by the centra­
lization measures of the new government which took the 
form of the moralization of middle levels of the bureau­
cracies .
Shortly after the coup, a number of moraliza­
tion campaigns and investigations into corruption
^According to an informant's letter in 1975, 
many of the Santana families interviewed voted ARENA--pro 
Government--in the 1974 elections, which were notable for 
the resounding victory by the opposition MDB in the coun­
try.
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occurred. While these were reminiscent of the moralist, 
ianista rhetoric of the previous decade, they were con­
ducted by the military. These "quasi-judicial proceed­
ings" (Schneider, 1971:61) had the effect in Santana of 
breaking up oanelinhas. As far as I know, only one 
individual was "cassado" (lost his political rights) for 
alleged corruption. However, bureaucrats who had pre­
viously helped each other and their clients now feel 
that to maintain their own positions they must often 
refuse favors. In some cases they have gone out of their 
way to prejudice relatives and former clients in order 
that they may themselves remain above suspicion.
Thus, one highly placed individual in the office
of the state treasury demoted or transferred to small
towns in the interior a number of individuals for whom
he had originally found jobs, or assisted in promotions.
In another case, a woman, whose husband formed part of
an important Santana panelinha requested a favorable
transfer for one of her relatives from a man whom her
husband had helped, and received a form letter citing
legislative articles and items as reasons for which her
request could not be met. She was outraged;
Imagine, citar artigos e items pra miml Hu, que 
conhe^o elehatanto tempo! / Hu nao tava pedindo 
alguma coisa desonesta, so pra ele ver se era 
possivel fazer alguma coisa. 2 ele ja me conhece 
bastante pra poder dizer simplesmente, e ou nao 
e possivel. Artigos e items, hah! Quero ver
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qus artigo e item diz que a mulher dele pode 
usar o chofer e o carro oficial pra vir 
comprar sapatos na 'voluntariesI So' quero ver!
Imagine citing articles and items to me. I, who 
have known him for so long. I wasn’t asking for 
anything dishonest, just for him to see if it was 
or wasn't possible for him to do something. And 
he knows me well enough to be able to tell me 
simply whether it is or isn’t possible. Articles 
and items indeed! I want to know what article 
and item says that his wife can use the official 
car and driver to go buy shoes on Voluntarios!
I just want to know that!
Yet another famil}'’ with a few building plots in Santana 
was shocked that a cousin in the mayor’s office had 
not warned them of an impending zoning law which would 
devalue their holdings unless they got building permits 
approved before the passage of the law. The ability 
to cement friendships with favors and government infor­
mation has sharply decreased. Influence and prestige 
of course still exist, but among fewer people than 
appears to have been the case before the military 
reforms.
Among the bureaucrats in my sample, the majority 
from the Forpa Publica and other bureaucracies are 
retired now, and spend their days at home. Only a 
minority was able to set up independent businesses 
during the populist years. A yet smaller minority 
was able to continue in political life, generally in 
appointed positions and often at fairly high levels. 
While these few individuals could, from their positions,
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continue to provide a few appointments for qualified 
friends or clients, their apparent success in weathering 
the political changes since 1964 has meant relatively 
little in terms of an increase in their personal power 
or influence within their bureaucracies. Although they 
are at higher levels than they were before, power seems 
to have moved yet higher. They are valued as administra­
tors simply, and as such can be replaced by other adminis­
trators. One relatively successful bureaucrat in Santana 
was aware of this, and told me that he always kept his 
papers prepared for an immediate withdrawal when the time 
should come. Another, who had been appointed as the head 
of an important state run enterprise, found that there 
were limits even to his administrative rights in the 
purchase of equipment. When he refused to sign a 
contract with a large foreign firm, because he considered 
it exploitative, he appealed to the minis ter who had 
appointed him for support. Instead, the minister signed 
the contract.
Although there were strict limits to the power 
and influence of even the most successful bureaucrats, 
those few who remain continue to be men of prestige in 
the neighborhood, and they are appealed to for assis­
tance when the random violence of the Sao Paulo police 
infringes on the Santana community. For example, when 
a man who had been drinking with relatives at a local
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bar was accused by another of parking his car illegally, 
within minutes he found that the whole block was surround­
ed by military police cars. The accuser had been a 
plainclothes policeman and he had the whole party taken 
to jail. An observer immediately called an influential 
bureaucrat, who arrived at the jail within the half 
hour with a judge and two district attorneys to "observe" 
the proceedings. 7.'7hile all were released an hour later, 
my informant felt that the fact that the plainclothesman 
had been drunk, and wrong about the parking violation had 
had much to do with it, and that a disproportionate amount 
of prestige or ieito (four influential bureaucrats) had 
been necessary to settle what should have been the most 
inconsequential of legal inconveniences.
In addition to the general lowering of levels of 
influence, the fact of official violence and its random­
ness has also affected the ease with which people speak 
of politics. Among some* a surface indifference masked 
fears of dangers that even they might face from police 
randomness.
Z^proibido falar. 0 que ve/no jornal e o que se 
pode falar. z'medo, ne? z'meio amarrado, ne?
Nao pode tocar em pontos que o Governo nao gosta.
Nao podemos nem eleger Governo! ̂  Kyso falar em 
vereador. Ninguem sabe quais sao os pontos 
proibidos . . . entao ninguem fala. 0 DOPS, eles 
expreme a gente pra saber o que sabe.^Se^a gente 
sabe um pouco mais, ex subversivo, entao e melhor 
nao saber nada. Dax, nao quis mais saber de 
politica.
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It's forbidden to talk. What you see in the papers 
is what you are permitted to discuss. It's fear, 
isn't it? It's all tied up, isn't it? You can’t 
discuss matters which the Government doesn't like.
We can't even elect a Government! We can speak 
only about councilmen. Nobody knows anymore which 
are the forbidden topics, so nobody speaks at all.
The DOPS ^Department of Public Order/, they squeeze 
you to find out what you know. If you know just a 
little bit more, you are a subversive, so then 
it's best not to know anything. When I realized 
that, I didn't want to know about politics anymore.
Although some of the families I came to know 
well were aware of the more terrifying aspects of police 
repression, of rumours of people who had disappeared and 
been tortured, others maintained an attitude of blind 
indifference:
Habeas corpus? 0 que que eu quero saber aisso? Hu 
nab preciso, nao fiz nada de erradot Quando precisar, 
ai me preocupo.
Habeas Corpus? What do I care about that? I don't 
need it, I haven't done anything wrong I When I need 
it, then I'll worry.
Yet others would not, or could not believe reports of
official violence and repression. The following is
condensed from my field notes.
I brought up the subject of the student who was 
run over by a truck while attempting to escape 
arrest with Sr. Lorenco. As far as I had been able 
to make out, a week or two earlier a notorious 
police torturer had been assassinated by an alleged­
ly terrorist group on Copacabana beach. Massive 
arrests occurred throughout the country. In Sao 
Paulo they included a student in the Geology Depart­
ment at the University of Sao Paulo (USP) who was 
arrested on bank robbery charges. On the day on 
which the robbery allegedly occurred, the student 
was said to be, depending on accounts, either in 
the hospital or on a field trip. These considera­
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tions, however, did not affect the police, who took 
him into custody. According to the official ver­
sion, the student attempted to escape and was run over 
accidentally by a truck. However, when he was de­
clared dead, the police refused to return the body 
to the parents for burial. It was commonly suspec­
ted that the body would show signs of more than being 
run over. On the day of the Mass of the Seventh Day, 
the USP campus was crawling with police. At the mass, 
which took place in the center of the city, the arch­
bishop made a reference in his sermon to the Romans 
who had returned the body of Christ to his parents 
for burial. At the close of the ceremony, the con­
gregation stood up and sang a song which had been 
banned for political reasons for several years. 
According to a reliable source, many who were in the 
church that day were arrested the. following day, 
although they were released, apparently unharmed 
at the end of the week.
I told Sr. Lorenco that I had heard that the 
accident with the truck had been staged and that 
the student was a Ire ad 37 dead when he was run over.
I asked him if he thought this was possible, and 
also why he thought the police would not return 
the body to the parents. He ignored the second 
question and made light of the first by saying that 
it was very hard to know what to believe unless 
one saw with one's own eyes, ne, however, found 
it hard to believe that the police should have 
lugged a dead body, placed it in the middle of a 
heavily trafficked avenue, and then given the go 
ahead to a truck to run it over, all this without 
anyone noticing. He closed the discussion by 
observing mildly that this kind of conversation 
probably could not occur in a non democratic 
country like Russia.
Where every man and woman had been able to be 
a small scale politician, people now turn away from 
politics and anything verging on the explicitly manipu­
latory :
Os politicos, essa gente, so come. Mao precisamos 
de representantes que nao fazem nadav  Houve uma 
epoca que politica era quase distrajao. Hssas 
mesas redondas na televisao, que se insultavam, 
mais aquelas fofocas, brigas, tudo isso, gramas
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a Deus, ja acabou. Hoje ha respeito, calma. Foi 
otimo a atitude do Governo feehar o p arlamento e 
diminuir o poder dessa camarilha. Atingiu a classe 
politica, a classe privilegiada que estava no poder. 
Esse pessoal ganhava rios e rios de diriheiro. 0 
povo trabalhava dez horas por pouco e viam toda ^  
aquela gente trabalhar pouco e ganhando muito— nao 
pode. Essa politicagem era pra cegar. Os ricos 
eram assegurados. A classe media e o pobre nab 
viam nada.
The politicians, those people, all they do is eat.
We don't need representatives who don't do anything. 
There was a time when politics became almost an 
entertainment. Those round table discussions on 
television, where they would insult each other, 
that gossip, those fights, all that, thank God, is 
over now. Today there is respect, calm. The Govern­
ment's attitude in closing parliament and reducing 
the power of that gang was excellent. It hit the 
political class, the privileged class which was in 
power. Those people made rivers and rivers of money. 
The people worked for ten hours a day and saw all 
those people working little and making much— it can't 
be. All of that politicking was blinding. The 
rich were safe. The middle class and the poor 
couldn't get a thing.
Just as political marginalization preceded econo­
mic decline among the elite families at the top of the 
hill, the enforced and self enforced political paralysis 
attendant upon fear and decreased opportunities for in­
fluence within government may have an effect on the eco­
nomies of many Santana families. As we have seen in 
Chapter II, the present regime has rationalized the 
economy and the bureaucracies; according to many infor­
mants this rationalization has brought certain apparent 
benefits. Older informants can see that their children 
are materially better off than they themselves were when 
they started their careers: educational facilities have
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proliferated and continue to expand. Most informants 
send their children to private schools anyway. Financing 
for homes is no longer a matter available to the few with 
connections: in principle all of their children may have a 
casa propria, apartments or vacation homes, for that 
matter, with financing from the National Housing Bank 
(BNH)c The proliferation of consumer credit card orga­
nizations in theory permits the younger generation of 
Santana families to have almost anything, from trips 
around the world, to automobiles, apartments, speed 
boats, electric gadgets such as ham radios and sophis­
ticated stereo equipment and color televisions--all on 
long term credit.
However, while the decrease of redistribution 
through corruption and influence in the bureaucracies 
assures the government of greater control and better 
cost accounting, it removes a margin of maneuverability 
for the Santana families. Bribery, tax evasion, inte­
rest evasion, currency speculation, featherbedding 
and the whole intangible area of favors, all of these 
undercut financial predictability for the government.
But for the Santana families they had provided a margin 
which probably could be calculated in financial terms: 
for example, if legal advice is not available from a 
friend, lawyers cost money; if one cannot use connec­
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tions to get a child into a free and good state school, 
a private one must be paid far;*^ if materials at a 
given bureaucracy are now carefully controlled, one must 
pay for one's own construction materials; if a friendly 
official will not grant a building permit, one must spend 
more on meeting building code requirements and so forth.
There are no longer any special advantages in 
working in government and bureaucrats are no longer at 
the apex of a system of privilege and redistribution to 
non-bureaucrats. According to one informant, bureaucrats 
are salaried people just like anyone else. Everyone pays 
taxes, everyone pays into pension or other programs 
which contribute to the concentration of resources for 
the creation of capital markets controlled by far larger 
interests than those of the Santana families. And, while 
the families interviewed who have their own commercial 
enterprises consider themselves to be in stable and even 
prosperous condition, a casual walk on Santana's main 
commercial streets reveals an increasing number of branches 
of large city-side stores, where local commerce had pre­
dominated .
*^In the past fifteen years the number of non-accre- 
dited private universities has increased to the point that 
many degrees are invalid. The proposed automatic accredi­
tation of such schools will devalue the diplomas of pre­
viously established institutions. Education is no longer 
a matter just for the "classes." See Veia (1975(380) :74).
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Furthermore, the extension of consumer credit may 
turn out to be a mixed blessing. It may be said that in 
strict cost accounting terms the combination of populism 
and inflation gave the older generation of Santana bureau­
crats and non-bureaucrats the opportunity to “get some­
thing for nothing." Inflation and low interest rates 
did not favor those who were selling on time, but it 
did favorrthose who were buying on time, because as we 
have seen, the value of what was repaid decreased over 
time. The combination of inflation, low interest rates 
and the kinds of information and favors that were struc­
turally available to bureaucrats and their clients under 
populism permitted many individuals to acquire property 
and to attempt to generate productive capital. From 
this perspective, it is clear that in the long run, 
not only will the younger generation pay for what they 
get in a way that the parents never did, but also, 
because of higher interest rates and monetary correc­
tion it is highly unlikely that they will be able to 
generate a capital base which will free them from de­
pendence on their salaries. Not incidentally, they will 
contribute with their monthly payments to the creation 
of capital markets which will increasingly exclude them • 
All of this suggests a picture in which the
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resources of middle income families like the Santana 
families may be skimmed off to their financial disadvan­
tage. In spite of explicit statements to the contrary, 
there is among many Santana informants a sense of unease, 
a sense of loss of prestige, of position and opportunity. 
While this sense of unease will be examined in more 
detail in the following chapter, two informants* observa­
tions are appropriate here. The first, an informants 
description of her father's funeral rites suggests the 
discrepancy between a public servant's expectations and 
the new reality. The father had been a Colonel from 
the For^a Publics. who in his retirement had become a 
self taught intellectual and author of many books. Even 
in retirement he continued to think of himself as prima­
rily a military man, and frequently recalled his wound, 
sustained in the face during the 1932 Sao Paulo revolt. 
Both he and his family expected that when he died he would 
be buried with military honors as a kind of capstone to 
his illustrious career:
Ele sempre quis honras mi1itaresv e falava que 
tinha direito. ̂ Dizia que se nos negavamos, ele ia 
sentar no caixao e dar um grito de raiva. Dai, no 
enterro, eu fiz tudo pra ter ̂ esses quatro soldados 
e toda^honra. Has o chefe la' do quartel dizia que 
ele nao tinha direito, que era aposentado, essas 
historias la. Na missa do setimo dia, caiu uma 
arvore e abriu o sepultamento dele. Hinha irma^ 
ficou com tanta raiva que quando abriram o caixao 
e ̂ ela viu que a ferida tinha aberto e tava vazando 
la" no rosto dele, ela falou, "Pai, o Senhor nao
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preeisava dos quatro soldados e as honras militares.
0 Senhor tern em vez dos soldados quatro filhos ao 
lado do seu caixao, e em vez da bandeira brasileira, 
tem o ceu azul que esta en dma de todos nos.*' liiih, 
e ai tinhamos medo que vinha o DOPSt "E em vez das 
honras^militares o Senhor tem os seus livros que 
rolarao pelo mundo." Foi emocionante. E a For^a 
Publica so^mandou dois soldadinhos. Um professor, 
muito ilustre que tambem falou na missa, se virou 
pra esses soldados e disse que agradecia a prasenca 
deles, mas queJionras militares na missa nao eram 
necessarias, e nao fazia falta, porque so iria impres- 
sionar os presentes, e como a filha, minha irrna, 
tinha dito, o Coronel tinha os livros que impressio- 
nariam o mundo.
Mas dax, na missa de trinta dias, ele teve 
honras. Acho que ficaram com vergonha. Eu tenho 
todos os recortes de jornais, as hamenagens feitas 
pelo Governador, pelos Institutos. E a Forpa Publica 
viu que tinha feito uma gafe.^ Abriram a Casa 
Anchieta, la'' no Patio do Colegiov Que eu saiba 
nunca fizeram is so antes pra reza missa de trinta 
dias. De um lado tinha a bandeira brasileira, 
do outro lado a bandeira de Sao Paulo. E o conego, 
com quern eu tinha falado antes que papai morreu, 
quando ele tava no hospital, ele fez um discurso 
lindo, lindo, lindo, que pra ser militar, tinha 
que estar no sangue, que a gente ou nasce militar 
ou nao, ne. Ele sentou praea soldadinho, e chegou 
aos mais altos^cargos, se eaucou, se ensinou^ 
flrances, alemao, tan to que quando^veio a Mis sao 
Franeesa, ele foi interprete. Nao sei, falou , 
muito bem. E minha mae notou um dos soldados la, 
um jovem, reto olhando pra frente, ma s com as 
lagrimas caindo no rosto.
He always wanted military honors when he died, 
and he told us he had a right to them. He said that 
if we denied them to hi®, he would sit up in his 
coffin and shriek with rage. Then for the funeral,
1 did everything to get those four soldiers and all 
the honors. But the head of the barracks said that 
he didn*t have the right, that he was retired, that 
kind of story. On the mass of the seventh day a tree 
fell down on his grave and opened it up. My sister 
became so enraged when they opened the coffin and 
she saw that his wound /from the 1932 revolt/ had opened and was draining there on his face, that she
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cried, “Father, you didn't need those four 
soldiers and military honors. You have instead of 
the four soldiers, four children by your coffin, 
and instead of the Brazilian flag, there is the blue 
sky which is above all of us." Iiiih, then we were 
afraid that the DOPS /Department of Public Ordeizj 
would cornel "And instead of military honors, you 
have your books which will roll around the world."
It was impressive. The Forca Publica only sent 
two little soldiers, and a famous professor who 
also spoke at the mass, turned to these soldiers 
and said that he was grateful for their presence, 
but that it wasn't necessary, because military 
honors would only impress those present, and as 
the daughter had said, my sister, the Colonel 
had his books which would impress the world.
But then, on the mass of the thirtieth day, he 
got honors. I think they were ashamed. I have 
all the newspaper clippings, the eulogies made by 
the Governor, the Institutes. The Forga Publica 
saw that it had made a gaffe . They opened the 
Casa Anchieta in the old College Square— as far as 
I know, they have never done that before for a mass 
of the thirtieth day— and on one side there was the 
Brazilian flag and on the other the flag of Sao 
Paulo. And the priest, whan I had spoken to before 
father died, when he was in the hospital, made a 
beautiful, beautiful speech, that to be a soldier 
it had to be in one's blood, that a person is either 
born to be a soldier or not. He volunteered as a 
private and reached the highest positions, he 
educated himself, taught himself French, German, so 
much so that whan the French Mission was here, he 
was an interpreter. I don't know, he spoke very well. 
And my mother noted one of the soldiers there, a 
young man, standing straight and looking straight 
ahead, but with tears streaming down his face.
The second informant had hesitant but explicit 
reservations about the progress of her sons' careers. 
While she and her bureaucrat husband had worried and 
saved to be able to put them through school, and while 
all four sons were securely employed in large firms as 
salaried liberal professionals, she feared that none
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of them would be able to repeat her husband's success 
in becoming financially independent. While she recog­
nized that his success was not the norm, she felt that 
circumstances had changed so much that even he might not 
have been able to make it were he starting all over again 
today. According to her, it was not only the steady 
drain of the debt load on their houses and other consu­
mer goods which limited their capital accumulation, but 
that the opportunities for and information for indepen­
dent investment were narrowing. The example cited was 
the new zoning law, discussed above, which, by requiring 
larger frontages for high rise buildings, not only 
devalued small plots, but made it expensive for the 
owner to continue paying taxes on land which yielded 
nothing, until an adjacent piece came on the market. 
Larger city-side construction firms, she pointed out, 
could wait and then would comfortably buy out the 
whole block.
Possibly the importance of the consumer 
economy which so clearly characterised Sao Paulo in 
1972-1973 is that it blinds people to such losses. 
However, it should be pointed out that what families 
like the Santana families lost— bureaucrats and non­
bureaucrats alike--they never had in a formal sense, 
nor indeed as a group. They had privileges and not 
rights. Although the privileges were part of a struc­
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ture, they were easy to remove: groups of people were 
not attacked, but rather the privileges were redefined 
as individual aberrations and abuses, to be attacked and 
corrected. Informally and discretely, however, a section 
of the "classes" have lost a significant measure of 
control over their lives.
In summary, the experience of immigrants and 
bureaucrats since 1964 and especially since 1968 resembles 
in many ways those of the old elite on the top of the 
hill after 1930. In all three cases, they were abruptly 
sheared off from sources of political influence. In the 
case of the old elite at the top of the hill, this expe­
rience of marginalization appears to have resulted in 
a certain degree of economic downward mobility. This 
was clear both in the statements by informants and in 
their genealogies. For immigrants and bureaucrats, 
the marginalization experience has been too recent to be 
able to do more than suggest what the economic consequen­
ces might be. It is clear that the economic policies 
of Brazil's new government affect all of the families 
interviewed regardless of origin or occupation. Many 
informants expressed a sanguine optimism about their 
futures. However,all informants, including these 
betrayed a kind of tension about their social positions 
which undercut optimistic assertions. This unease, 
focused in particular on their relations with other
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groups above and below them on the social scale, forms, 
I believe, a rudimentary consciousness of class, which 
is the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
•'NOSSA CLASSE MEDIA SOFRIDA:" THE OUTLINES OF 
A CONSCIOUSNESS OF MIDDLE CLASS 
This study has described the social and political 
careers of a number of Santana families of disparate 
origins. Their careers have been informed and to a great 
degree determined by the political and economic changes 
which Brazil and Sao Paulo have undergone in the past 
seventy years. The families of the old elite, the fami­
lies of immigrants and the families of bureaucrats expe­
rienced the political epochs of the First Republic, the 
Vargas years and the populist epoch in different ways 
at different times. The present period of military dic­
tatorship finds them in approximately similar socio-eco­
nomic-political positions, generally excluded from spheres 
of power or influence.
Nonetheless, within the limits imposed by history, 
these families also made their own lives, made their 
own choices in order to achieve or maintain their patri- 
monio and nivel de cultura (inheritable wealth and level 
of culture). In the process they have developed a set 
of ideas to explain and justify their successes and 
failures and to place themselves in Sao Paulo's class
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structure. In spite of their different careers, these 
ideas are generally shared. This chapter has two pur­
poses. xt argues first, that these ideas are the funda­
mentals of a consciousness of middle class, and second, 
it attmpts to document this inductively by drawing on the 
statements of interviewees about their class positions. 
These statements will be related to the structural dimen­
sions I have discussed in the preceding chapters. I will 
focus specifically on the implications of the shift in 
hierarchical organization entailed by the change from po­
pulism to military dictatorship. How this shift affects 
the meaning of social mobility as measured by increased 
consumption is also examined. I shall attempt to relate 
contradictory feelings about social mobility and achieve­
ment and the condition of being classe media to the world 
in which informants lived, and to judge the possible 
effects that a consciousness fueled by these feelings 
might have on the larger Brazilian political system.
I shall conclude that although the Santana fami­
lies are involved in a wider world of consumption than 
they were before, they are socially, politically and 
ideologically cut off from other groups in society, and 
often from each other in a way that was not characteris­
tic of the populist years. It would appear that the 
existence of a set of ideas such as that held by Santana 
families may be essential to the continuity of regimes
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such as the present Brazilian military regime, because 
it is atomizing, blind to the structure of society and 
therefore unable to affect it. While it does not cause 
it, such a mentality permits the political repression 
necessary for associated-dependent development. There 
is in addition, important evidence that the military 
dictatorship is aware of this and is actively interested 
in propagating a "middle class mentality" as a non-coer- 
cive method of domination.
The informants who gave me the information upon 
which much of this chapter is based were often older 
women, over fifty years of age. While some of 
these women had worked as teachers, or in offices as 
secretaries or typists before marrying, for most thsr 
work was limited to their homes after marriage: raising 
their children, running their households and caring for 
their husbands when they were home from work. It may 
be surmised that the personal experience most of these 
women had of the political and economic changes which 
affected their families' careers was filtered through 
their husbands' reports and through their own positions 
as financial managers of the household. To a great 
extent the mentality which I shall discuss is one which 
I saw especially among women, although the few men who 
participated in such conversations seemed to understand
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and share it.
Possibly the major key of the Santana informants* 
mentality is the emphasis on social mobility and achieve­
ment through struggle and work. The dominant characteris­
tics necessary for achievement are 11 luta.11 11 controls11 and 
Meguil^brio." The three terms, literally translated as 
"struggle," "control" and "equilibrium" or balanced judge­
ment recur constantly. They carry a host of implications 
which shade into each other: perseverance, thrift, self 
sacrifice, shrewdness and a strong dose of moral superio­
rity which occasionally borders on the sanctimonious.
preciso ter perseveranpa e fbr§a de vontade, 
tolerancia com certa reserva; altruismo, bondade, 
dignidade, a honradez . . . e carater de urn modo 
geral.
One needs perseverance and will power, tolerance, 
with a certain reserve; altruism, goodness, dignity, 
honor . . .  or character in general.
£ga*£a&g and eguil{b&io are not simply
moral prescriptions. They embody memories of economies
and privations among older women whose children are now
grown up, and vital concerns for younger women in the
midst of their childrearing cycles.
Minha vida tern melhorado, mais a primeira etapa 
tormina agora porque os filhos terminam e vab ganhar 
bem, e nos vamos melhorar sem aquela despesa. Minha 
vida agora nao depende de dinheiro. Trabalhar, tern de trabalhar sempre, mas com os filhos se formando . . . e Alfredo rnuito providente. • . e se precisar, 
eu posso vender as minhas coisas. Mais td chegando 
o tempo que os filhos nao vao dar mais dispesa, e que vamos melhorar. Nunca vou ser rica, e ja fui 
pobre naquela faze do Mappin, a£ eu fazia meus traba-
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Lhinhos e tive aceitapao. Mais que foi uma iuta. 
que precisou grande controle. foi, viu. 0 comeco 
nao foi facil.
My life has improved, but the first stage finishes 
now because the boys are going to graduate and make 
good money and we will improve without these expen­
ses. My life now doesn't depend on money. Work, 
we'll always have to work, but with the boys gradua­
ting . . . and Alfred very provident . . . and if 
necessary I can sell my things Zthis lady did sewing 
work for charity and for giftsj7. But the time is 
coming when the children won't be expenses, and then 
we will improve. I will never be rich, and I have 
been poor, in those Mappin days ^her husband had a 
poorly paying job in a department storejt and then 
I did my piece work, and people bought it. But 
it was a struggle, that required a great deal of 
control. The beginning wasn't easy (See Appendix
Luta. controle and eouilibrlo are important in coping
emotionally as well as in financial management;
A gente precisa aprender a ouvir, a calar, a ser 
cega. Falar no momento certo, mesmo que esteja 
no ponto de estouar. So" na hors que esta equilibra- 
da e que pode falar.
We must learn to listen and be quiet and be blind.
To speak at the right moment, even if one is at the 
point of bursting. One must only speak when one is 22ajLa&££d.
Controle and eouilibrio define the limits of a balanced 
emotional life, in which emotional excesses are not 
permitted. While the ideal of emotional control is not 
always met, it provides a scale of judgement and expla­
nation: it is felt that excessive anger, happiness or
Appendix 5 includes additional citations from 
informants which are too long to be included in the 
text.
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interest can lead to illness or death (See Appendix 5-B). 
Thus, when otherwise healthy individuals became sick, a 
discussion of the clinical symptoms (heart attack, stroke, 
intestinal disturbances) was often followed by an analysis 
of the person's emotional life. The patient was too invol­
ved in her children's lives, or too angry at a business 
contretemps, and the loss of eouilibrio resulted in the 
illness.
The theme of the middle way through the somewhat 
dour prescriptions of lyta, &g.&£rqiS and eouiljibrio 
appear to provide a substratum of a middle income ideology 
of mobility and achievement. Life is no bowl of cherries, 
nor indeed should it be. Success in the achievement or 
maintenance of a middle income position depends on indivi­
dual struggle and effort which is buttressed by interna­
lized norms of control, careful thought, anticipation of 
disaster and lack of excess.
The success itself is measured by material acquisi­
tions and the sense that one's children have a different-- 
higher--socio-economic springboard for their careers than 
one did oneself. These two criteria were unanimously 
held by all the families interviewed. Even among the 
descendants of the elite families from the top of the 
hill, achievement was associated with the successful 
management of the dwindling remnants of their inheritances,
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through Luta. controle and equil£brio. in order to 
educate their children and Maintain a "certain position," 
while witnessing the drastic decline of other less 
prudent or less fortunate relatives. Most of the fami­
lies interviewed who were in the midst of the childraising 
cycle sent their children to private schools and all had 
every expectation that they would continue on to univer­
sity. All informants claimed to be materially better 
off than their parents, and emphasised their enhanced 
powers of consumption.
Hoje sou Coronel. Minhas crianjas terao melhores 
chances na vida do que eu. Eu posso pagar os 
estudos.
Today I am a Colonel. My children will have better 
chances in life than I. I can pay for their studies.
Eu me considero realizado. Tenho casa e carro.
Meus filhos estudaram, casaram e tern casa e carro. 
Estou realizado.
I consider myself fulfilled. I have a house and a 
car. My children have studied, married and they 
have a house and a car. 1 am fulfilled.
/ y / /Eramos de uma classe media pobre; a classe media e 
a mais dificil de viver. Nao somos ricos agora, 
mas comparado com meu pai, que era funcionario, 
posso me julgar milionaria. 0 que pude presenciar 
na minha casa no tempo de menina. ^Chorei quando 
tive de parar os estudos. Agora nao,^ as meninas^ 
estao todas se formando, advogada, medica. Eu nao 
podia ter urn sapato novo, aquilo que eu queria.
Ho#e nao. Vira-se, mexe-se, mais tem o sapato.
We were of a poor middle class: the middle class is 
the hardest in which to live. We are not rich now, 
but compared to my father who was a public servant ,
I can consider myself a millionaire. What I was able to witness in my house as a child. I cried 
when 1 had to stop going to school. That»s not the
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case now, the girls are all graduating as a lawyer, 
as a doctor, I couldn't have new shoes, things that 
I wanted. Not today. We may wriggle and squirm 
but we get the shoes.(See Appendix 5-C).
Frequently discussions of personal achievements
were intertwined with an intense celebration of the
Brazilian economic •’miracle" of the early 1970's, The
same criteria, education and material acquisitions of
the casa propria (one's own house), automobiles and other
consumer goods were seen as the measure of personal as
well as national progress and both were celebrated in the
same breath.
A classe media hoje vive bem, tem casa, carro, 
saem de fim de semana. A maioria cam apartamento 
de fora, todos os filhos estudando, . . ja nao 
e facil distinguir entre a classe me'dia e a alta 
. . .  Tudo mundo tem me Ih or ado bastante. Tem mais 
facilidade de arrumar um emprego melhor, sem muito 
sacrificio, E'rara a familia que nao tem um 
universitario, mesmo os pobres, que estuda de noite.
0 Bras.il vai pra frente can essa nova gera^ao. E 
ja' comecou a£,jy£u. ^Em todos os set ores o Brasil 
tâ  indo bem, nao e so esportes. Agora ja conhecem, 
nao pensam que e Argentina.
The middle class today lives well, has a house, a 
car, goes out on weekends. Most have a vacation 
apartment, all have their children in school . • . 
it is not easy any more to distinguish between the 
upper and the middle classes. Everyone has improved 
tremendously. It is easier to get a good job, with­
out too much sacrifice. It is rare to find a fami­
ly which doesn't have a university student, even 
among the poor, who study at night. Brazil is 
moving ahead with this new generation, and it has 
already started. Brazil is doing well in all sectors, 
not just sports. Now people know about Brazil and 
don't confuse it with Argentina (See Appendix 5-D).
However, coexisting with this generalized optimism 
is a deep sense that they are threatened and on the verge
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of annihilation.
Agora a classe media ta um sanduiche, expremida entre 
os pobres e os ricos. Vamos desaparecer. A media 
4  que trabalha, e ff uma luta. Do jeito que vamos, 
td' sendo engulida. Uns vaoy pra baixo, me nos vao 
pra cima . . . o cpntrole e pra nao ser engulida 
por aJLnferior. E preciso^poupanca. Nos femos uma 
posi$ab que exige uma aparencia, boa camida, boa 
roupa. Agora o dinheiro que entra esta sempre dimi- 
nuindo, e sem controle nao tem jeito.
The middle class is now a sandwieh, squeezed between 
the poor and the rich. We are going to disappear.
The middle class is the one that works hard, and it 
is a struggle. The way things are going it is being 
swallowed up. Some go down, fewer go up. The control 
is necessary to avoid being swallowed by the lower 
class. We have to save. We have a position which 
requires a certain appearance, we need good food, 
good clothes. Now the money which is coming in 
is constantly diminishing, and without control, there 
is no way.
Temos pouca seguranca: tudo muda muito depressa e 
radicalmente. Nao ve as desapropria^oes, o progresso 
. . .  nao sou contra o progresso de maneira nenhuma, 
mais um pouquinho mais devagar. 0 cidadab tern de ter 
alguma seguranca. A gente nunca sabe quando pode 
espancar com a testa no chao.
We have little security: everything changes too 
quickly and too radically. You see the expropria­
tions, progress . . .  I am not against progress in 
any way, but a bit slower. A citizen needs to have 
some security. We never know when we may smash 
our heads on the floor. (See Appendix 5-E).
The tone of these statements is similar to 
the dour ness of the luta. controle. eqpijL^b^g themes 
which informants developed over the course of their 
careers. When juxtaposed to the optimistic themes of 
progress and achievement, there are, however, added notes 
of bitterness and betrayal. If life shouldn*t be a bowl 
of cherries, neither should it consist entirely of pits
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and stems.
Since all informants consider themselves better 
off than their parents, relatively stable, and have been 
able to educate their children and acquire more consumer 
goods than their parents, these complaints do not appear 
to have a primarily economic referent. Rather, they seem 
to reflect negative evaluations of changes in the politi­
cal sphere, and changes in class relations. It is as if 
the criteria for social mobility included not only econo­
mic factors but political ones as well. Thus, the physi­
cal markers of social mobility and class differentiation 
are "loaded*' with symbolic meanings which imply political 
relations besides or beyond the specificity of the material 
wealth involved in houses, automobiles, consumer goods 
and college educations. That is, for example, while 
material wealth and education for children are symbols of 
mobility and progress, the symbolic meanings attached to 
material wealth and education have varied with the politi­
cal relations maintained by these families over time.
One such major change occurred in the change from 
populism to the present military dictatorship. In the 
populist period, money meant power and education reflec­
ted wealth and power, or at least the opportunity for 
access to power through face to face relations with power­
ful people. Money and education seem to have reflected 
the manipulatory relations implicit in populism. The
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implications of material wealth and education have 
changed under the military dictatorship. The change elu­
cidates the common foreboding among informants that they, 
those in the middle, are •'sandwiched*' and about to be 
swallowed whole. What these feelings may reflect is 
their increasing isolation from other groups in society.
They are threatened by the extension of consumer 
goods to the poor, by the decrease in the manipulatory 
opportunities both up and down the social scale. Their 
concern with relations of dominance was apparent in 
some spiritist^ sessions I was able to attend as well 
as in the relationship many women attempted to maintain 
with their domestic servants and people who were the 
objects of their charitable efforts. There is some 
evidence that within their networks they no longer 
feel comfortable with people who are wealthier. They 
feel that among wealthier relatives, it is these who 
have ceased to extend aguela amizade. that friendship, 
to them. The result of their increasing isolation and 
the resentment and humiliation which appears to be 
entailed, has led to an entirely false view of the 
social structure of Sao Paulo and to an embracing of the 
government as their protector from rich and poor alike.
^Spiritism in a growing religion in Brazil. See 
Warren (1968) and Camargo (1961).
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Let us take each theme in turn.
The pressure on the "sandwich" from below is
apparent in a strain of iE will among some informants
commenting on the progress and the spread of consumerism
among the poor.
Agora asempregadas item tudo, geladeira, radio .. L. . 
e nos quanto tempo levamos pra ter. fe ve os pobres 
aqui na capital, tudo tem televisao.
Now maids have everything, iceboxes, radios . . .  
and you should have seen how long it took us to get 
those things. You see the poor here in the capital, 
they all have television.
A gente ve o progresso pelo numero de constru9oes 
novas. E'um sinal de crescimento e de progresso.
Tudo mundo tem carro, tudo mundo estuda. Ja' nao 
tem diferen^a entre patroa e domestica, com roupa 
boa e peruca. No meu tempo nunca comprariam essas 
roupas. Havia distin^ao muito grande de classe.
We can see progress by the number* of new construc­
tions. It is a sign of growth and progress. Every­
one has a car, everyone goes to school. There is 
no longer any difference between the housewife and 
the domestic, who has good clothes and wigs. In my 
day they would never buy those clothes. There was 
too great a class distinction.
In sum, not only is their status threatened by the exten­
sion of the material things which set them off from the 
lower classes, to the lower classes, but the things them­
selves no longer imply the class differences they former­
ly did.
Among families like the Santana families, popu­
list relations were based on personalist, face to face 
relations, implying the extended use of kinship and 
friendship in creating networks of patronage up and
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down the social scale. Paradoxically, although people 
were aware of class differences in these extended
networks, the populist idiom denied class distinctions
qbetween individuals. This is what Weffort means when 
he writes that "populism always directs itself to the 
people," and in this act "dissolves class distinctions" 
(1965:194).
Two contradictory aspects appear to have been 
basic to populism among families like the Santana 
families: an elaborate sense of manners using an idiom 
of friendship^ and an underlying contempt for those 
being manipulated. The contempt involved in populist 
relations has received little previous attention. We 
shall see it further on, directed at families like the 
Santana families. It is apparent in the following state­
ment by a man who ran for electoral office during the 
populist years:
Naquele tempo quem tinha mais dinheiro ganhava.
Tinha de fazer cedulas, cartazes . . . Fui derro-
3This personalist aspect of populism is extremely 
clear in studies of favelas. and seems to have continued 
in favelas after 1964. See especially Leeds (1972), for 
a description of the personalist way in which a female 
favela leader shames a politician into visiting her fave-~ 
la. prepares a celebration in honor of his birthday and 
writes a song for him, hailing him as the "ideal friend 
. . • our pride and passion" (Leeds, 1972:31-2). Although 
the idiom is one of friendship, the structure is that 
of patron clientage (See above, Chapter n ,  pp. 104-107)*
^This aspect of populism was pointed out to me by
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tado bonito. Descobri que tinha quinhentos e cin­
que nt a e seis amigos--um voto^foi meu— e que nao 
devia^confiar em ninguem a nao ser aqueles. Foi 
uma dor de cabepa, a cachapa, fui a terreiro de 
umbanda, tomei pinga no copo babado, pizza com 
oleo diezel, com sujeito bandido, negrada . . . 
e sempre aqueles pedidos, estandarte pras Filhas 
de Maria de Itanhaem, camisas de futebol . . .  
pagava pinga, comia lixo, ate"' cinco ; ovos fritos, 
e odeio ovos . . . Tiravam fotografias de mim . . . 
dancei can uma negrona num clube de pretos . . . 
nao gosto de pretos.
In those days whoever had most money would win. The 
candidate had to pay for the ballots, the posters 
. . .  I was soundly defeated. I discovered that I 
had five hundred and fifty-si* friends— one vote was 
mine— and that I shouldn't trust anyone but those.
It was a headache, the cane liquor, I went to umbanda 
ceremonies, I drank liquor from drooly cups, ate 
pizza with diesel oil with bandit types, blacks . . .  
and those constant demands, demands for standards 
for the daughters of Mary of Itanhaem, football shirts, 
. . .  I paid for drinks, drank drinks, ate garbage, 
even five fried eggs and I hate eggs. They took 
pictures of me I danced with an enormous black 
woman in a black people's club . . .  I don't like 
blacks.
Presumably politicians did not consciously show 
their contempt for their constituents, but we should 
note that these observations cast a new light on the 
ethic of luta. controle and eouil£brio. which becomes 
from this perspective, an instrument to develop an 
elaborate sense of manners, a tool to forge the bonds of 
populist friendship. In this respect, the anxiety of a
Sergio Miceli in 1973, when he suggested during the 
course of a discussion that the best clients are those 
who confuse the "idiom of friendship" with "friendship" 
itself.
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woman who had just seen a domestic servant publicly 
reprimanded at a religious meeting is suggestive:
0 certo e nao falar na hora. Eu nunca teria^ 
coragem de chamar atengao. Eu nao tenho, nao 
tenho coragem de falar. Dentro de mim posso estar 
preta que nem carvao, mas^ ninguem ve. E'muito 
dificil pra mim dizer "nao." Posso ver uma coisa 
errada e podia chegar e dizer "Ce acha que ta 
certo . . .  11 mais assim, aberto, "Voce deixou a 
casa suja," "Voce pegou aquela comida . . • " de 
jeito alguro. Ndt> se faz.
The correct thing is not to say a thing right away.
1 would never dare to correct someone. 1 haven't,
I haven't the cowage to speak. Inside myself I 
can be as black as coal, but on one sees, it is 
very hard for me to say "No." I can see something 
wrong, and maybe I could come and say "Do you 
think that's right . . . "  but that way, openly, 
"You left the house dirty," "You took the food," 
in no way, it is not done.
These citations suggest that those who could not, or
would not maintain controle and eauillbrio could not
play the populist game.
As for the betrayals involved in the withdrawal 
of the language of friendship which appears to have 
followed the imposition of a dictatorship, very few 
individuals were willing to suggest that in the past 
they had been more intimately involved with figures of 
higher social and political status than themselves, and 
that they were now cut off. Fewer still were willing 
to elaborate upon this theme. One man spoke of a boy­
hood friend who was now an editor of an important 
weekly magazine and who had on various occasions assis-
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ted him with gob placements or legal advice. The 
conflict between friendship and the self-interested 
idiom of friendship became apparent during an exchange 
with his daugher, when 1 asked the man how often he 
saw his friend and what kinds of things they did toget-
He: Nao vejo ele mais nao. Falamos pelo telefone 
de vez em quando, se eu precisar^
She: E/um^contato commercial . . .  nao e axnizade.
He: Ce nao sabe nada. Somos muito amigos, mais 
ele ficou rico, e eu pobre.
He: I don't see him anymore. We speak on the tele­
phone every now and then, whenever I need him. 
She: It is a commercial contact . . .  It is not real 
friendship.
He: You don't know what you are talking about, we 
are very good friends, but he became rich and I 
poor.
In spite of the rarity of such examples, state­
ments about rich and poor relatives suggest a shift away 
from the extended use of kinship to form networks up and 
down the social scale. Many families had wealthier rela­
tives who did not live in Santana, but in central city 
neighborhoods like Higienopolis, in new and modern 
apartment buildings. There were rare occasions for con­
tact, and these appear to have been strained and uncom­
fortable situations, which rarely took place in inf ori­
ents1 own houses.
Estivemos na casa do Fabio que tem fazenda, estudo 
. . . os amigos dele so' conversaram entre eles, nao 
nos procuraram pra fazer aquela amizade, aquele 
bate jpapo. A conversa vai sobre o que cada um faz.
Eu nao posso acompanhar conversa sobre yacht, casa 
no Guaruja, as cabe^as de gado na fazenda. . • me
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fizeram sentir insignif icante . . .
We were at Fabio's house, who has a farm, has 
been to university . . . his friends only spoke 
among themselves, they didn't seek us out to extend 
that friendship, that comfortable conversation.
The talk is about what each person does. 1 can't 
join in conversations about yachts, houses in 
Guaruja fan expensive sea side resort7, the heads 
of cattle on the farm • • • they made me feel insig­
nificant (See Appendix 5-F).
On the few occasions 1 was able to witness parties which
included many family members, some of whom were wealthier,
informants allowed that they were surprised they had come
at all, and pointed out the way in which the wealthier
relatives segregated themselves and did not participate
in the general merrymaking.
I was able to gather a few intimations of 
isolation from the world of power and wealth beyond 
Santana, which seem significant. As far as one can 
ascertain, the kinds of people who live in Santana are 
not readily recognized either by government agencies 
directly related to the modernization of the area, or by 
wealthier groups of people living in the elegant South­
ern Zone of the city. Thus for example, an agency con* 
cerned with modernization and construction around the 
northern terminal of the subway station in Santana was 
in almost complete ignorance of the neighborhood. These 
did not contact local and regional politicians in an 
effort to explain their plans,and while they felt this 
was a great gaffe, they were profoundly surprised at the
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turmoil which followed the announcement of the proposed 
project in the newspapers; they described with some 
sarcasm the arguments which were presented by local 
inhabitants against the project in the Municipal Legis­
lature. They contrasted the troubles they had in Santa­
na with the absence of any problems in Jabaquara, the 
neighborhood at the southern end of the subway line, 
where far larger tracts of land were expropriated than 
in Santana. The inhabitants of Jabaquara, much poorer 
than those of Santana, did nothing until they were 
"instigated" by a Santana lawyer. Agency officials said:
Nos nao estavamos acostumados a lidar^com "bairro." 
Tinhamos mais^experiencia com populagao desintegrada, 
sem essa coerencia, essa organizagao.
We were not used to dealing with fieighborhoods. “
We had much more experience with disintegrating 
populations, without this coherence, this organi­
zation.
In addition, in spite of the extensive coverage which 
Santana's opposition^ to the project received in the
The opposition appears to have been organized 
by a very few individuals, mostly merchants, who hoped 
to manipulate the government's interest in the neighbor­
hood to their advantage— according to the planning agency. 
I was unable to interview any of the individuals who 
actively participated in generating public opposition 
and press coverage of the opposition to the project.
Only two of the families interviewed lived in the path 
of the proposed expropriations, and these did not partici­
pate in the opposition. One family was fairly certain 
that if its house and plot were expropriated it would 
receive adequate compensation. The other, which had 
planned to sell its house, was more concerned because 
lands which have been designated for possible expropria-
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daily newspapers in the first half of 1973, an officer of 
an important real estate finance company with government 
contracts (with the BNH, the National Housing Bank) fear 
public housing in the Northern Zone, was under the 
impression that the whole of the Northern Zone, including 
Santana, consisted of favelas and mud roads without any 
public transportation at all (Cf. Figure 5, p. 4^
Ignorance of people like the Santana families, 
often tinged with contempt, characterised the views of 
residents from the wealthier Southern Zone of the city.
No systematic work was done among these people and only 
the briefest of descriptive sketches is appropriate 
here. These were people of varied origins, including 
foreigners and Brazilian "quatrocentao18 families often 
intermarried with members of other Brazilian regional 
elites or the descendants of foreign immigrants. All 
were vastly wealthier than the Santana families and 
associated with large, often international financial, 
industrial or real estate concerns. While there were 
differences in economic status among them, in general 
their life styles were characterised by the symbols of 
wealth and power: extensive property, extensive domestic
tion are frozen off the market and may not be sold.
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staffs, occasionally including armed guards, travel 
abroad, conspicuous consumption of imported luxury 
products (antiques, silver, clothes, liquor, etc.) and 
the presence of important political figures in their 
immediate entourages, as relatives, business associates 
or friends. Many had participated in the organization 
of the March of the Family for Democracy in Sao Paulo 
which preceeded the 1964 military coup, and while one 
might hear criticisms of the government among them, 
they were the criticisms of an extremely loyal opposi­
tion. As a group they fully supported all government 
efforts to suppress terrorism, to achieve order and to 
develop the country.
Among people like these the investigator's own 
concern with middle class formation was treated as a 
joke. I would be assured on the one hand that there was 
no middle class in Sao Paulo, except perhaps among 
domestic servants who sewed on the side, or who had 
saved enough money to be able to buy televisions or 
refrigerators on the installment plan, and on the other 
hand that a middle class was necessary for the orderly 
and progressive development of the country, and that 
perhaps they might be considered middle class themselves, 
since they knew people wealthier than themselves. When 
pushed however, some allowed with considerable discom­
fort that poor relatives might be “classe media mesmo"
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(really middle class). According to these accounts, what
made poorer relatives classe media mesmo was their social
invisibility, except on familial occasions, when they
could not be excluded:
Eg nao tem dinheiro^ trabalha, essa luta, nao 
aparece por ai, a nao ser em casamento ou missa 
do setimo dia . . . usa essa roupa velha, esquisita.
Well, they have no money, they work, it's that 
struggle. They are hardly seen except at weddings 
or at masses of the seventh day, and than in old 
and strange clothes.
Since a number of such relatives were described as 
middle level bureaucrats, the following comment, made 
in another context, by a Zona Sul (Southern Zone) indi­
vidual is suggestive:
0 funcionario publico e o cara mais nojento no 
Brasil. Sempre tem de agrada pra ccnsegulr algunia 
coisa.
The public servant is the most repulsive type 
in Brazil. You always have to bribe them in order 
to get something done.
Alternatively, persistent questioning on the 
existence of a middle class in Sao Paulo would elicit 
catalogues of codes of consumption, related to styles 
of dress, styles of luxury or intellectual consumption 
and even styles of setting the table. The underlying 
theme of such catalogues was the social invisibility 
of many middle income people. Examples made it clear 
that there were people in Sao Paulo who were physically 
visible— one saw them at beaches and certain business 
clubs, and in the bureaucracies, but they remained social­
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ly invisible. If these impressionistic and unsystematic 
observations are any indication of the distance between 
people like the Santana families and government or groups 
of higher social, economic and political status these 
families are isolated indeed.
In a process which may parallel the loss of 
contact with poor relatives which we saw among the elite 
families in Chapter III, many of the Santana families 
appear to be losing contact with their poorer as well as 
their wealthier relatives. The existence of poor rela­
tives is often denied in terms of the question "Do you 
know any poor people?" Occasionally contact has been 
broken already. At other times it is in the process of 
being broken. Thus, when one man was asked if he knew 
any poor people, he replied that he did not. His son 
interrupted and said "Mas Bai. tem sente pobre na familia." 
and the father replied, "S mais a gente nao ve muito."
(But father, there are poor people in the family. Yes, 
but we hardly see them). During subsequent interviews 
with this family, poor relatives came to visit, and were 
sent to the kitchen. Other comments on poor relatives 
included:
Su tenho parentes pobres: nao sao esforpados,^, 
nem pra ter uma posipao. Nao tem afnbipao. Nao ̂ 
querem lutar. Sab da familia da minha mae, um e 
operario que deve ganhar uns trezentos cruzeiros, 
e outro deve ganhar uns duzentos cruzeiros. Temos 
sempre que ajudar quando aparecem. Tinham terras, 
caminhoes e venderam tudo, nao controlaram nada,
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nada.^ Nem os filhos. ^Tao com oito filhos. Ey 
que nao tem vontade, nao fazem economia, sei la.
I have poor relatives: they make no effort, not 
even to keep a job. They have no ambition. They 
don't want to struggle. They are from my mother's 
side of the family: one is a factory worker who 
must earn three hundred cruzeiros /a month7 and 
the other must earn two hundered cruzeiros /a month7.
We always have to help them when they show up here.”
They had land, trucks, they sold everything. They
didn't control a thing, not even their children.
They have eight children. It?s that they have no 
will, they don't economise. I don't know /who caresy.
Minha mae tem contato com gente pobre. Nao sei 
se no interior e'mais facil. La'os parentes se 
ajudam, visitam, cuidam das familias e das empre- 
gadas. Mas, eu, contato direto nao tenho. Nao 
saio de casa. 0 marido tem um tio pauperrimo^ e 
ajudamos quando ele aparece por ai, Mais isso 
e meio esparso, nao e contato direto, ne?
My mother has contact with poor people. I don't 
know if in the interior it might be easier 
There relatives help each other, visit each other, 
care for the families and the maids. But I, I 
don't have any direct contact. I don't leave the 
house. My husband has a very poor uncle, and 
when he shows up we help him. But that's rather 
sparse, it is not direct contact, right?
In addition to increased isolation from rich 
and poor relatives, it is possible that the decline of 
opportunities for doing "favors" for one another has led 
to the re-emergence of invidious distinctions among 
themselves, which may previously have been disguised by 
the populist idiom of friendship. If the hypothesis 
that the bureaucrats acted as intermediaries for foreign 
immigrants and non-bureaucrats is correct, the language 
of ethnic distinction used by Brazilian families may
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express the contempt of manipulation as well as envy
at the success of families of foreign descent.
Ce ve nas esta^oes de agua . . .  pessoas que nao 
eram nada, carvoeiros, feirantes, agora ricos^. . .
Me sinto muito mal encontra-los. Nao e questao de 
orgulho. Prefiro falar com pessoas do meu nivel, 
ou mais alto. Esses italianos nem falam certo.
Mais ninguem percebe meu desgosto . . .  me tornaria 
ate antipatica se . . . nao, conversamos, ate' que 
as vezes as italianinhas sao simpaticas.
You see, you meet people at the watering resorts, 
people who were nothing,charcoal makers, salesmen 
at feiras /open air markets^, now rich. I feel 
very badly when I meet them. It’s not a matter 
of pride . . . these Italians don’t even speak 
properly. But nobody notices my distaste. It 
would make me unlikeable if I . . . No, we speak, 
and at times the little Italian women are quite 
pleasant (See Appendix 5-G ).
Ethnic distinctions are net new: we have seen 
that they existed in Santana as soon as large numbers of 
immigrants arrived in the area. However, while they were 
probably stronger in the past when such distinctions 
also reflected differences in political status and pres­
tige, to the extent that populism brought mutual advan­
tages to both parties, it is possible that the idiom of 
friendship may have kept feelings of discomfort, guilt, 
envy and contempt in control. The inability to do things 
together--in the populist way-- has the potential of 
isolating people from each other, as well as from classes 
above and below them.
Although this is never explicit, isolation 
is implied by their statements about rich and poor 
relatives, as well as by their vision of Sao Paulo’s
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social structure and their place in it. The social 
world of Sao Paulo was divided for most Santana informants 
into ricos, oobres and classe media (rich, poor and middle 
class). We have seen the contradictions and tensions 
involved in being classe media and have suggested that 
these arise from the shrinking areas of influence for 
these families which resulted from the shift from popu­
lism to dictatorship. Accordingly, the categories of 
rich and poor have become abstractions, because with the 
shrinkage of populist networks, they no longer see rich 
or poor people.
Both rich and poor alike are seen as contemp­
tible and to be avoided, although for different reasons. 
Money in large quantities is seen as an agent of corrup­
tion or complication which can threaten the unity and 
sanctity of the family.
Se eu tiver tudo, urn casarao, jo'ias maravilhosas, 
uma por^sfo de carros . . . o que que euj>osso dar?
0 que que uma pessoa assim pode dar? Nao pode dar 
nada, nao, pode dar de s£, o que e o importante. Ser 
egoista e humano e somos todos egoistas, mais com 
todas essas coisas e dificil nsto ser egoista e 
dar de si. Eu agora, veja s^, eu nao tenho nada.
So' tenho arnim mesma, e so posso dar de mim mesma, mesmo 
que seja so' urn sorriso.
If I had everything, a mansion, marvelous jewels, a 
bunch of cars, what can I give? What can a person 
like that give? Nothing, one can*t give of oneself, 
which is the important thing. It is human to be 
selfish, and we are all selfish, but with all of those 
things it is difficult not to be selfish and to give 
of oneself. Me, for example, I have nothing. I have 
only myself and I can only give of myself, even if 
it is just a smile.
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0 dinheiro cria problemas, viu. Poderiamos acertar 
na Loteria Esportiva . . . seria for^ado a ter tana 
outra posi^ao. Um bairro mais chique seria necessario. 
Meu modo de^tratar nab mudaria, mais teria de comprar 
coisas. Nao gostaria de mudar meu padrao de vida. 
Sofreria interferencia da familia: especariam que 
desse alguma coisa^jpra eles. E^ £a ajudar, mas 
criaria uma situacao incomoda. 0 dinheiro cria 
problemas.
Money creates problems, see. We could win the 
Sports Lottery . . .  1 would be forced to have 
another position. A more elegant neighborhood would 
be necessary. My way of behaving wouldn't change, 
but I would have to buy things. I wouldn't like to 
change my life style. I would suffer interference 
from the family: they would expect me to give them 
something. Of course 1 would help, but it would 
create an uncomfortable situation (See Appendix 5-H).
The Santana vision of the rich is consonant 
with the perception of money involving potential dangers. 
While envy and a sense of personal indignity characterises 
some of the perceptions of the rich, the rich are repeated­
ly described as thoughtless, frivolous, ungenerous, idle 
and immoral. They are repeatedly described as people 
who do not need to think (Nao precisam pensar). For 
example,
Minha imagem dos ricos: tem,urn patrimonio grande.
Nao posso imaginar quanto e. Por exemplo, quer 
comprar a fazenda, vai um milhao a vista, sem pensar. 
Um industrial, um homem de negocios, ta"" sempre 
viajando pro Rio Grande do Sul, pro Peru. Se afasta 
da casa dele, que e uma mansao que nao tem vizinho 
pra conversar. A casa e grande, com toda uma equi- 
pe de mordomo, criadagem, cozinheira, passadeira, 
jardineiro . . .  A esposa nab fica em casa, sai pra 
reuniao, viagem pro exterior, o mundo todo. Nem 
sempre o marido viaja com a mulher. 2 uma vida meio 
futil. Os filhos . . • nao^saojcomo a classe media 
com as mamadeiras. 2las nao vao perder tempo cuidan- 
do dos filhos, tem baba. Entao surgiu o problema do
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout permission.
276
playboy, dinheiro facil, nao tiveram educagao, se 
ajuntaram e formaram quase uma classe. Nao conhecem 
os pais. Acham quadrados, velhos, nao ha dialogo.
Vivem a vida deles. 0 James Dean era o sunbolo do 
playboy. ^Os pais nao se prendem as coisas. As 
mulheres vao fazer compras no Dener, Clodovil, fazem 
questac de comprar o mais caro. Quer comprar joias^
0 joalheiro vem pra casa delas. Mas via de regra vao 
pra Franga. E'provincialismo comprar aqui.
My image of the rich: they have a large capital base.
1 cannot imagine how large. For example, you want 
to buy a farm? Down goes one million cash, without 
thinking. An industrialist, a businessman, is always 
travelling to Rio Grande do Sul, to Peru . . .  He
is away from his house, which is a mansion, with no 
neighbors to speak to. The house is enormous, with 
a staff of butler, a bunch of maids, a cook, an 
ironing woman and gardner. The wife doesn't stay 
home. She has a social life to develop. Most of the 
time she is out of her house at meetings, trips abroad, 
throughout the whole world. And the husband doesn't 
always travel with his wife. It is sort of a futile 
life. The children: they are not like the middle 
class with their baby bottles. They don't waste 
time caring for their children, they have nursemaids. 
And so the problems of playboys arose, from easy 
money, they had no upbringing, got together, almost 
formed a separate class. They don't know their 
parents, find them square and old, there is no dia­
logue, They live their lives. James Dean was the 
symbol of the playboy. The parents do not become 
involved with /important^ things. The women go 
shopping at Dener, Clodovil /two expensive dress de­
signer sj and insist on buying the most expensive.
You want to buy jewels? The jeweler comes to their 
houses. But as a rule, they go to France, it is 
provincial to buy here (See Appendix 5-1).
Santana informants' vision of the poor is
also filled with contempt because the ethic of luta.
controle and eauilibrio is felt to be absent from their
lives.
No Brasil so^morre de fome o vagabundo que nao 
quer trabalhar.
In Brazil only good-for-nothings who don't want to 
work die of hunger.
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Os^pobres: nem sei classifica^ portjue quase nao sao gente.
The poor: I hardly know how to classify them, 
because they are hardly human.
But there is also the additional disdain felt
for people who can be manipulated and anxiety because the
opportunities for manipulation appear to be decreasing.
The manipulatory aspect of many of these women*s relations
with poor people are apparent in the charity work they
undertake. Sane felt that perhaps the poor were poor
because they hadn*t had a chance to be anything but poor
("Nao tiveram chance"). Their charity work was precisely
to give them a "chance." But, although this was rarely
explicit, there were strings attached. The individuals
they helped had to acquire their values of luta, controle
and equii£brio as well as maintain a properly deferential
attitude, or help would cease. Thus s woman describing
her charity work said,
Eu fazia servipo social na Sociedade de Tsoscfia. 
Davamos assistencia a umas vinte ou trinta familias 
por ano. Arranjava trabalho pro chefe, davamos 
presentes pras/crianpas no Natal,^davamos roupa, 
tudo isso. Dai, largava os que nao progrediam, os 
que nao faziam nada, deixava. Nao podia fcirar o 
lugar de outro que teria fibra e controle. e que 
queria lutar.
I used to do social work at the Theosophic Society.
We would help twenty or thirty families a year. We 
got jobs for the head of household, and gave presents 
to the children at Christmas, clothes, all of that. 
Then we would drop the ones who didn't progress, the 
ones who did nothing. We couldn't let them take the 
place of another who might have fiber and control and 
who wanted to struggle.
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I was once present at a food distribution to poor women 
in the Santana parish house. The following is an abridge­
ment of my notes at the time;
At two O'clock I arrived with a number of women 
who were volunteering their services to the social 
assistance program of the parish. The women put on 
pink and blue cotton smocks over their street 
clothes and began unlocking the cabinets in which 
the provisions to be distributed were kept (rice, 
beans, sugar, spaghetti, cooking oil, detergent and 
bleach). They had brought cakes and a thick sweet 
chocolate drink for themselves and spread these out 
on a table in the back of the room.
In another room the poorer women arrived and 
sat on benches against the wall in silence. They 
looked wary. Snuffly children leaned against them.
One of the volunteers went into that room to register 
on file cards any new applicants for aid. In exchange 
for the food the women were required to learn to sew 
and embroider. First the raw cotton flour and sugar 
sacking were given them to take home, where they were 
to be washed until they were white and the letters were 
bleached out. The following week they would take a 
number c£ these white bags home to cut and hem them 
into dishtowels. Once hemmed, the volunteers who were 
dispensing the charity would trace a design on the 
fabric and teach the women how to embroider the design, 
usually one of fruits and vegetables. A1 te rnatively, 
if a woman already knew how to embroider, she would 
be taught needlepoint, rag rug making or crochet. All 
of this handiwork was sold at periodic church bazaars 
and the money earned would pay for some of the cost 
of the food distributed.
The main point was that no food would be given 
to any woman who did not work. This was made clear 
in my presence when an older woman complained that 
the mistake she had made in her embroidery didn't 
show very much and that she didn’t want to pick out 
the whole pattern and start all over again. She only 
did this at all, she said, so as to get the food. The 
volunteer social worker said nothing and continued 
showing her how to pick out the pattern. Emboldened 
by the silence, perhaps, the older woman declared that 
she wouldn't do it. Quietly and with a small smile
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/the social worker said 11 2. e se eu rasaasse a sua 
a Senhora^naoteria de vir mais. nem pra 
pegar os mantimentos" (Yes, and if I tore up your 
card you wouldn’t have to come here anymore, not 
even to collect your supplies). The pattern was 
picked out and started over again.
It is difficult to see how some of these
charitable activities would affect the life chances of
the individuals many women were trying to help. Two
aspects of the organization of charitable works suggest
that such activities play a fundamentally different role
today than they did during the populist years. First
of all, informants said that all such organizations are
under much tighter government control than they used to
be. While many parish organizations in Santana were
rife with internal factions and disputes, these disputes
could not spill outside the organization in a scramble
for populist type followings, because the control over
bookkeeping and materials seems to be much greater. It
is no longer possible to sell or distribute materials
(food, textiles ) clandestinely or privately in order to
extend personal networks among the poor.
A nossa paroquia ficou privilegiada. Somos todos 
do mesmo nivel social e de educa^Ko. Tinha gente 
desonesta, diretora de paroquia que quase nem 
sabia ler. Tinha^muita politicagem, e muita coisa 
desaparecia. Sntao, ehtrou esse controle . . .
Our parish became privileged /among those of the 
Northern Zone of the city*. We are all of the same 
social and educational level. There were dishonest 
people, parish leaders who hardly knew how to read. 
There was lots of politicking and lots of things 
disappeared. So then this control was introduced . . .
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Second, items which were made by the poor
women in the Santana social assistance group described above
were sold very cheaply at periodic bazaars where they were
bought by middle income women like my informants. Because
the money which was earned at church bazaars paid for
much of the food which was distributed to the poor, the
poor women who made the merchandise might be considered
literally as working for subsistence— food. This and
the decreasing opportunities and incentives to extend
personal networks among the poor suggest that at present,
charity work acts as a way of putting cheap merchandise on
the market for the consumption of middle income women
like my informants.
Thus, in spite of their charity, many charity
volunteers did not see much poverty and in fact chose
to avoid situations which put them in contact with the
poor and clearly unfortunate. In the example cited above,
the food was distributed from the parish house: no one
took it to the houses of the women who needed it. In
other cases, women donated money or goods to organizations
which would distribute it among the poor. In yet other
cases women who had actively participated in charity
efforts in the past had simply given it up.
Contato com gente pobre? Nao tenho muito nao. Eu 
dava aula jde artesanato lax na paroquia, fiz cur so 
de voluntaria da parte social, mais jtgora ja nao vou mais, Sabe, eu nao quero saber. Nao gosto de £azer visita^ao domicilar. Sou uma pessoa muito sensivel,
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e ve todajsssa miseria, pobreza, nao posso fazer nada, 
prefiro nab ver, nao saber. Ce nao vai modificar o 
mundo, nao e mesmo ? Tambem sou muito sensxvel pra 
ver doen^as, visitas de hospital.
Contact with poor people? I haven't much. I used to 
teach sewing at the parish house and I took a social 
work course to be a volunteer, but I don't go anymore. 
You know, 1 don't want to know. I don't like to visit 
their houses. I am a very sensitive person and to see 
all that misery, that poverty, I can't do anything 
about it, so I prefer not to see, not to know. You are 
not going to change the world, isn't that so? I am also 
too sensitive for illnesses, visits to hospitals.
Contato direto? Nao, eu fa^o costura, levo pra Liga, 
e eles que dispoe •
Direct contact? No, I sew, take it to the League and 
they dispose of it.
Fazemos caridade pelo nosso centro Espirita. 0 nosso 
centro manda pra outro centro, e eles que distribuem.
We do charity through our spiritist center. Our center 
sends it to another center, and they distribute it.
Once an interview was interrupted by a woman who came in to
collect the plastic bags in which milk is sold in Sao Paulo.
She explained that it was for a hospital in Uberaba, Minas,
for people suffering from Fogo.Selvagem. or P e ^ g o ,  Folia-
ceo (literally, "Wild Fire;" shingles). The patient gets
watery boils which stick to the sheets, so plastic sheets
are made out of the milk bags. The interviewee had been
collecting them from the neighbors for some time, and as a
result had several large cartons full. The visitor said she
was taking them to the hospital herself, and the interviewee
was astounded:
Eu nao teria coragem, que horror meu Deus^ ir ver toda 
essa carne crua, ah, nao tenho coragem, nao: prefiro 
ajudar, mas nao saber.
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I wouldn't have the courage, how awful, my God 
to go look at all that raw meat, oh, no, I don't 
have the courage. I would rather help, but not 
know about it.
The number of women who used to participate 
in charitable activities and no longer do so, and the 
fact that increasingly charitable organizations are 
being bureaucratised under government scrutiny suggests 
even in this sphere the opportunities for influence 
are decreasing. Among these women, in the absence of 
the populist payoff, the incentive to deal with poverty, 
which seems to make many women uncomffor'table, has obvious­
ly decreased. The only constant and daily contact that 
most of these women had with people significantly poorer 
than themselves was with their own domestic servants.
Certainly the difficulty of training and 
keeping maids is a constant theme in many conversations. 
However, I suspect that the nature of the constant 
contact gives a domestic servant an ambivalent status 
that is no longer simply "poor." Servants are part of 
the household, almost "part of the family," and they 
are "honestly" employed (there is a great preoccupation 
to protect maids from prostitution). If the servant 
lives in she brings with her a minimum of the misery 
associated with "poor" surroundings: if she does not 
live in she is rarely seen in her own surroundings and 
these need not be considered. Furthermore, a good deal
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of effort is spent attempting to eradicate the evidence 
of poverty and to instill in domestic servants values 
consonant with those of the housewife. Besides their 
domestic duties, many of the Santana women claim to have 
taught their maids how to bathe, use deodorant, brush 
their teeth and go to the dentist, and to have given them 
incentives to “better themselves.“ Such incentives 
ranged from free time at night to go to night school, 
small and more rarely large gifts, such as loans (which 
are never repaid) to build small houses on the outskirts 
of the city, or the use of an unrented house. One woman 
offered to send her servant*s children to boarding 
school. However, these gest ures are made in the context 
of some tension: there is the explicit expectation that 
the servant will follow her employer's plan for her life. 
Not umdrurally, the expectation is frequently not met. 
Thus, one young woman was fired because she married 
against her mistresses* wishes. Another was unwilling 
to be separated from her children, no matter how much 
more money she would have earned as a live-in maid. And, 
of course, servants often leave to find better paying 
positions in other houses, leaving the housewife embitter­
ed for having been so “generous11 and with a sense of 
increasing lack of control over her own domestic servants. 
The following are a few comments made by Santana infor­
mants :
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Ajudo muito as familias das empregadas. Ajudamos 
a comprar geladeira, televisao, moveis. No Natal 
mando de tudo, roupa, alimento, sapato, agasalho.
E fizemos grandes compras pra ela. Ela queria pagar 
em dez vezes mas o^marido diz que os juros xam ser 
muito grandes. Entao pagamos a vista, e ela 1a pagar 
pra gente. Depois, ela pagou metade e ele desculpou
0 resto da divida. No fim de tudo, foi bem pouco o 
que ela pagou. Mas o problema e o mau humor 
delas, a ma" vontade. Pois el mais voce faz, mais 
querem que faca. Cada ano de casa dou uma pe^a de 
enxoval, um dinheiro. Mas saem de qualquer modo.
£ custa ensinar. Elas comem a mesma coisa_ que eu 
como. Se e filet mignon ou camarao, tambem e pra elas. 
Podem coiner de tudo que tem em casa. A^ ultima 
trabalhou numa casa rica com piscina: so^ comia arroz, 
feijab, ovo, banana e laranja. Geralmente e classe 
rica, tanto brasileira como estrangeira que trata 
empregada assim. Mas por bem que trate, elas 
sempre saem.
1 help the maids* families very much. We helped them 
to buy refrigerators, televisions, furniture. At 
Christmas I send everything, clothes, food, shoes, 
sweaters. And we have made large purchases for her. 
She wanted to pay /'for somethings in ten installments. 
My husband said the interest would be too high. So 
we paid cash, and she was going to pay us back. Then 
she paid half and my husband let her have the rest of 
the debt. In the end she paid very little, but the 
problem is their bad humor, their ill will. That*s 
the way it is, the more you do, the more they want 
you to do. Every year they stay at my house I give 
them a piece for their dowry or some money. But 
they leave anyway. And its hard to teach them. They 
eat the same thing I eat. If itfe filet mignon or 
shrimp for me, it is for them, too. They can eat
of whatever there is in the house. The last maid 
worked in a rich house with a swimming pool: she 
only ate rice, beans, eggs, bananas and oranges.. 
Generally its the rich, whether Brazilian or foreign 
who treat maids like that. But no matter how well 
you treat them, they always leave.
. y /0 pior e quando e casada, falta muito. A crianpa ta 
doente, e ai ce fica se preocupando com as criancas 
dos outros. Ce faz, traz, eu tinha de fazer comida 
pras crianpas dos outros.
The worst is when they are married, they miss work 
a lot. The children get sick, then you end up
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worrying about other people's children. /She brings 
them to my house7 and I had to make, to carry, I 
had to make food for other people's children.
Domestic servants, because of their ambigu­
ous status— "poor" yet "part of the family" (Jelin, 1974) 
--seem to provide one of the last areas of manipulation 
for many women, regardless of the "alibis" of concern 
for their future welfare (See Appendix 5-J ). Obviously 
the control over domestic servants is not absolute because 
other jobs for them are available. Furthermore, to the 
extent that they and other representatives of the poor 
approach the consumption patterns of nossa classe media 
(our middle class), through schooling, credit facilities, 
not to mention gifts from the housewife, they become 
a threat to the housewife's vision of social stratification. 
It is as though in the view of their employers, domestic 
servants can best rise above their stations (syirbolically) 
by scrupulously maintaining them (materially), through the 
liens of dependence and deference to the housewife.
The increasing isolation experienced by many 
individuals seem to have generated feelings of anger, 
resentment and guilt which were only openly expressed in 
the spiritist sessions I was able to attend. The three 
sessions which I witnessed were Kardecist, or Espiritismo 
Mesa Branca (White Table Spritism), which is not to be 
confused with Umbanda. which combines Kardecism with 
Afrc-Braziiian cults (Brown, 1974,; Camargo, 1961).
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Spiritism is a rapidly growing and developing religion 
in Brazil (Warren, 1968; Camargo, 1961) and indeed Brazil 
has one of the world's largest spiritist populations. 
Imported from France at the turn of the century, through 
the writings of a medium, Alain Kardec, it spread signi­
ficantly among the educated classes in Brazil following 
the 1940's.
To my certain knowledge only six of the Santana 
families interviewed were spiritists although many more 
may have been spiritists as well as Roman Catholics. Many 
had attended spiritist and umbanda sessions out of curio­
sity, but professed themselves uninvolved. Some of the 
women interviewed in Santana had been attracted to spiri­
tism, but had subsequently abandoned it, apparently 
because it violated the ethic of luta. controle and equi- 
librio.
Eu tinha medionidade, e no comeco achava tudo isso lindo. Mais deixei, nao gosto daquele escandalo, aquela gritaria, sem controle nenhum.
I had the capacity to receive spirits and in the beginning I thought it was marvelous. But I left it,
I don't like that scandal, all that shouting, with 
no control whatsoever.
Acho o espiritismo muito ruim. A pessoa fica biruta, a espSsa do Pedro ficou meia . ... desmoronou . . .
Pra seguir o espiritismo como se deve, tem de ser , 
pessoa muito controlada#, evoluida, equilibrada, ne, 
e e raro ter tamanho controle.
I think spiritism is very bad. A person goes nuts. 
Peter's wife got sort of . . . she came apart . . .
To practise spiritism properly, a person has to be 
very controlled, developed, balanced.and it is rare 
to have that much control.
Others who were familiar with spiritism through relatives
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or friends were similarly repelled: the apparent abandon­
ment of self and self control appears to be almost phy­
sically upsetting to many women. While all were aware of 
the large volume of charity works performed by spiritist 
associations (Warren, 1968:402), and approved Of that 
aspect of spiritism, they found the loss of self and 
equilibrio during the sessions themselves repugnant.
The sessions which 1 was able to attend took 
6place in the mid afternoon in a large garage in a private 
house which had been converted into a formal meeting 
place. The room was dimmed, and in back there was a table 
covered by a white cloth around which the leaders, a man 
and a woman, and the mediums would sit. On the wall 
behind the table hung portraits ofrthe Virgin Mary. 
Gounod's Ave Maria was playing softly from a victrola 
behind the table. In front of the table were rows of 
benches and chairs for spectators and new converts 
called assistentes (assistants). The meetings were 
extremely controlled and patterned until the point when 
the mediums were possessed. Then the room became extreme­
ly noisy with much unintelligible speech as various
^There were smaller groups who held their 
sessions in their living rooms at night. I did not 
attend any evening ceremonies. After I left Brazil one 
of these smaller groups expanded and the householder con­
verted his garage into a spiritist center.
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spirits made their presence known (See Appendix 5-K ).
Many spiritists emphasize the beauty iHs uma 
beleza. e tao U n d o ") of spiritist sessions, especially 
sessions in which the air is allegedly filled with 
flowers. I was not able to attend any such sessions, and 
admittedly the three sessions I was able to attend are few 
to base judgements on. Nonetheless, what was interesting 
was the abandon the women fell prey to and the excesses 
of the spirits' demands and exaltations. The spirits 
I was able to hear, because they spoke the loudest, were 
the spirits of clearly lower class and brutal men, almost 
caricatures of the vagabondos the women spoke of when 
describing the poor. It may be pointed out that the 
opportunity for the emotional purge undergone by both 
mediums and assistentes is rarely available during most 
of these women's daily lives because of the ethic of 
luta. controle and eouilxbrio. However, in addition to 
providing almost disproportionate confirmations of the 
women's visions of the poor, the spirits many women were 
receptive to were peculiarly concerned with power. In­
deed, one spirit was especially troublesome: he had pos­
sessed an elderly woman and kept shouting, "Eu nao pe^o. 
eu mando. eu sou Deus" (I don't ask, I command, I am 
God" ).7
71 attended one umbanda session in a favela 
which contrasted interestingly with these sessions. Phy­
sically the ceremony was much less structured than those
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This vulnerability, together with the anxieties,
resentments, guilts and envies implied in their visions of
the rich and poor suggest the reasons for the development
of a shared view of society which is increasingly turned
in upon itself and willfully blind to the rest of society
(cf., nEu nao ouero saber." 1 don't want to know). The
Santana families of all three origins appear to have
developed an extraordinarily inaccurate perception of
Sao Paulo's social structure, which often contradicts
their vision of the middle class as squeezed and about to
be swallowed whole, it was not an uncommon belief among
the same people who held the "sandwich theory" of the
middle class that Sao Paulo was largely populated by
people like themselves, because of national progress.
A maioria de Sao Paulo a de classe media . . , e 
metade media, um quarto rica e um quarto pobre.
Agora vem muita gente do norte, essa popula^ao
in Santana. The arrival of the spirits, however, was 
much more controlled and structured. The room was smaller 
with an altar in the corner covered with Afro Indian and 
Roman Catholic saints. Women stood on one side of the 
room and men on the other, but the distinction vanished 
when spirits took control of the mediums or cayalos (lit- 
erally,"horses» ) when both wandered or danced around the 
room. The session began with songs. No victrola and no 
rhythm instruments. Then an orderly progression of spirits 
possessed the oldest mediums or cavalos: "preto velho" 
and "boiardero"(old black man, cowboy) who were consulted 
by the participants on matters of health, money and emo­
tional difficulties. The cavalos possessed by unruly 
spirits grunted, flayed their arms and occasionally fell 
on the floor, but they did not interfere with the orderly 
arrival of spirits expected on that evening.
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que eles fala flutuante . . . c e  ve aquele pessoal 
chegando do norte, ai, que lastima, meu Deus . . .  
o' esses imigrantes que dab a impressao de pobreza.
Has deixando de lado essa parte, a maior£a e media.
Tem a media e a media um pouco mais rica . ^ . mas 
ce repara na favela como tem televisao. Nao pode 
ser tab pobre assim.
Most of Sao Paulo is middle class. It is half middle 
class, one quarter rich and one quarter poor. Now 
many people come from the north, that population 
which they call floating . . • you see those people 
arriving from the north, oh, the pity of it, my Lord, 
. . .  and it is these immigrants who give the impres­
sion of poverty. But leaving that part aside, most 
of Sao Paulo is middle class. There is the middle 
class, and the middle class which is a bit richer • . . 
but you notice in the favelas. how many television 
antennas there are. They can't be all that poor 
(See Appendix 5-L ).
Itlis clear, howevei; that Sao Paulo is not 
populated largely by people like the Santana families 
(See Chapter I, Figure 10 , p. 52 )8 and we have heard 
contradictory statements from Santana informants which 
suggest that although they know it, they choose not to see 
it and to limit their perceptions to the celebration 
of their own achievement through luta, controle and eoui- 
l^brio. I have suggested that this follows from changes 
in their structural position and from the resentment
g
It was suggested to me by a young doctor that 
in Brazil's largest cities it was relatively easy to for­
get about poverty. He had friends in Salvador, Bahia, 
who forced themselves to go to the mud flats where the poor 
build their ̂ houses and watch the children fight with vul­
tures (uyubus) and dogs over garbage and stray crabs for 
food. He sai.d, "Se a gente nao fizer isso. devagar comeca 
pensar que ta tudo dtimo. que o prostes so tg_ pcaftCgflJrfl&r 
(If people don't do that, slowly they begin to think that everything is wonderful, that progress is progressing).
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attendant upon their increasing isolation from groups 
of higher socio-political status and their loss of in­
fluence through populist networks. Moreover, to the 
extent that they are indeed isolated from other strata 
in society and that families of disparate origins and 
careers share the set of ideas described here, 1 have 
argued that the Santana families are undergoing a process 
of middle class formation. They are no longer a part of 
the "classes."
Their present achievements have resulted from 
their own efforts in the populist context. In the present 
context they seem to feel that the maintenance of their 
achievements depends on government protection, which en­
sures stability and "protects" them from developing their 
own bases of influence as well as from political manipu­
lation by politicians and from exploitation by the rich.
It is interesting that it is only in connection with 
government protection that the rich are seen as predatory, 
as raising prices, as evading taxes, and as other than 
lazy, futile, frivolous or immoral. In 1972-1973 all 
informants felt themselves economically stable: things 
would change for the better if they won the Sports Lottery9
9See Miceli (1972:222), who suggests that the 
concept of upward social mobility as one subject to 
chance rather than individual effort is one typical of television programs aiming specifically at the poor, un­employed or marginally employed Brazilian viewer.
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or for worse, if the government collapsed* Their
personal futures appeared intertwined with the Brazilian
economic •'miracle" of the time, for which the government
was seen as exclusively responsible:
/• „Quem foi responsavel? 0 governo brasileiro. Essa 
mao dura que temos. Com liberdade total, essas 
coisas lengua lengua . . .  0 brasileiro e muito 
indolente.
Who was responsible? The Brazilian government. This 
hard hand we have over us. With total liberty 
these things lag. The Brazilian is very indolent.
Quem foi responsavel? Os benditos militares que 
deviam ter feito issoha tempo. Foi dificil pro 
povo,^mas^o povo sabia que tinha que ser assim, 
se nao, nao era possxvel a restauraqao da nossa 
economia. Graces a esse governo que foi muito cri- 
ticado.^ 0 Castelo Branco foi o melhor*. forte, nao 
tinha medo, nao queria popularidade. Viu unicamente 
o bem da na^ao, ey viu que o povo ia fazer sacrificio.
E ce ve, agora ta tudo mundo com casa e carro, com 
os filhos estudando.
Who was responsible? the blessed military who should 
have done this a long time ago. It was difficult for 
the people, but the people knew it had to be this 
way, otherwise it would have been impossible to 
restore our economy. Thanks to this government which 
has been harshly criticized. Castelo Branco was the 
best, strong, unafraid, he didn't want popularity.
He aimed solely at the the good of the nation, and he 
understood that the people would make sacrifices.
And you see, now everybody has a house and a car and 
their children in school.
Two recent studies of television programs 
(Miceli, 1972; Pessoa de Barros, 1974) have shown that the 
government is actively interested in propagating a middle 
class world view which coincides in many respects with 
the one described here. The basic themes in soap operas 
(Pessoa de Barros, 1974) and in a talk show aimed at a
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middle class audience (Miceli, 1972) were nuclear familism
and social mobility. On the talk show, neighbors, who
we have seen in Santana had provided a source of clients,
are defined as people from whom one expects no more than
momentary entertainment;
De uma vizinha nao se exige mais que um bom papo, uma 
boa fofoca, uma gargalhada.
From a neighbor you don’t expect more than a good chat, 
a piece of gossip and a laugh (iiebe Camargo, cited 
in Miceli, 1972:51)
The entire social arena of the talk show was 
defined as a family living room which exibits celebrities 
(popular musicians, fashion designers, actors and actress­
es, scientists, religious figures and occasionally politi­
cians) as the household “bibelots'1 (Miceli, 1972:60). The 
show encouraged consumption by displaying the latest fa­
shions in clothing, furniture and other household items. 
Poor people did not appear on this show.1® To the extent 
that an upper class was alluded to, it was characterized 
by excessive consumption rather than political power.
After exhibiting the talents which made them famous, the 
celebrities were regularly reduced to their familial roles 
and relations. The hostess’s questions revealed that for 
all their fame, the celebrities were just like the spec-
^®With the exception of domestic servants, who 
may be referred to as the housewife's "secretariat" or 
"assistants."
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tator “who faces the same problems, suffers, loves, has 
children, a home, a husband, goes to the supermarket, 
uses blankets, tidies drawers and feels cold11 (1972:79, 
emphasis in the original). Never is any conflict presen­
ted between the demands of the family and the demands of 
society or the career.
By turning the exception into the rule, the fable of 
social mobility opposes a state of privation and 
iovelessness to one of success and happiness. In 
general, the people who illustrate the fable are 
celebrities, who are presented as having been able to 
surmount any obstacles or difficulties interfering 
with their ascension. At the end of the trajectory 
the celebrity remains unaltered. He continues to be 
the same good soul, modest and pure. The celebrity 
keeps the good qualities from either pole of his 
career; this permits him to remain immune to “relevant11 
modifications as he travels the route of social ascen­
sion. In other words, the fable wishes to create 
a belief in the existence of a Salvationist project 
which is at everyone*s reach. Everyone should aspire 
to become the protagonist of this “positive11 and 
"optimist1' story, in which men and the world appear to 
be improving daily (1972:97-100, emphasis in the ori­
ginal).
In the soap operas studied by Pessoa de Barros 
(1974) there were always two core elements, a love story 
which must terminate in marriage and the creation of a new 
nuclear family, and a social drama, which may or may not 
be superimposed on the love story, involving upward social 
mobility. Differences in social stratification and social 
inequalities are presented only to be minimized. Inequa­
lities can always be resolved by love, by social mobility 
or by familism. Thus, the poor differ from the rich 
only in the absence of superfluous luxuries:
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They resemble each other in the fundamentals: clean­
liness, plenty to eat, a loving and concerned mother, 
and harmonious relations between members of the 
family (Pessoa de Barros, 1974:59).
When class conflict arises, it is the result not of 
inequities in the social structure, but of the conflict 
between equally rich •'good" and "bad" sides of an exten­
ded family: the class conflicts are resolved by the reso­
lution of the family conflicts— namely the expulsion or 
death of the "bad" elements (1974:69).
The explicitly political sphere is entirely 
absent from both types of programs. This is apparent in 
their treatment of the nation and the law, as well as in 
their treatment of social stratification. In the talk 
show, the progress of the nation and state is intimately 
and explicitly linked to the "•love,' loyalty and labor 
of every native . . . regardless of other considerations, 
we are all the same in the national and domestic arena" 
(Miceli, 1972:123). Far from representing an institution 
of power or domination, the nation state is conceived of 
as "protective, •enveloping* and icuddly* /sic. !_/--as 
a shield against the anxieties and aspirations of the 
collectivity" (Miceli, 1972:123).
In the soap operas analyzed, Pessoa de Barros 
noted a progressive identification of the moral and 
judicial worlds over time: whereas in the earliest soap 
opera analyzed, moral infallibility was an attribute of
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the people (2 p o v o ) and the state and its representatives
were represented as fallib&& and distant from the action
on the screen, by the last soap opera analyzed the moral
and-judicial worlds were united. The hero*s mistakes— or
crimes--can only be absolved in court and his forgiveness
there is what guarantees his moral integration into
society (1974:96). Pessoa de Barros notes that
To the extent that political themes and political 
institutions do not exist in soap operas, the fusion 
between legal and moral authority carries a strong 
ideological charge, since it is presented as natural 
and self evident (1974:96).
In addition to propagating a world view which 
is blind to inequalities, isolated in its familism, and 
which ignores political power, this set of ideas also 
provides a code to limit the input of new information.
This is clear in Miceli*s analysis of the panel discussions 
on various topics in the talk show. While the code 
borrows the outward signs of academic discourse (concern 
for "definitions," "debate," "objectivity" and "scienti­
fic method") to justify the assertions and opinions voiced 
during the discussions, the subjects of debate are forced 
into a restricted affective treatment: this is apparent, 
not only in the choice of topics (macumba. candomble. 
gossip and eroticism, fear example), but in the way the 
"academic techniques" (appeals to anecdotal and circum­
stantial historical fact, or to "scientific investigation") 
are used or ignored in the face of new information. For
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example, in a debate over spiritism, two panelists 
quibbled over its scientific status:
-Em que sentido o espiritismo e ciencia? ^
-Nesse preciso sentido, investiga^ao em laboratorio dos fenomenos supranorxnais para poder descobrir 
as leis desses fenomenos.
-Que laboratorio?
-Nos laboratories, naturalmente os laboratorios ^ 
devem ser de pesquisa cientff ica— ou o senhor nao 
conhece isso?
-In what sense is spiritism science?
-In this precise sense, investigation in laboratories 
of supernatural phenomena to discover the laws gover­
ning these phenomena.
-What laboratories?
-In laboratories, naturally the laboratories have to 
be those of scientific research— or don't you know 
that? (cited in Miceli, 1972:109).
On another occasion, a female deep sea diver was attemp­
ting to describe recent underwater research and was re­
peatedly interrupted by the hostess with requests to 
describe her sensations, whether she didn't miss her 
husband, and whether she didn't get lonely way down 
there underneath the ocean (Miceli, 1972:112).
The emphasis on optimism, mobility, consumption 
and national progress touches en all the themes elabo­
rated by Santana informants, with the exception of envy, 
guilt, angerrandrdespair. These appear in soap operas 
only to provide plot tension. However, these demons 
must always be exorcised before the final epithalamion, 
and they are thus exorcised for the viewer as well, but 
as Pessoa de Barros notes, such conflicts must be resol­
ved ritually and perpetually— by watching the next soap
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opera (1 9 7 4 :7 9 ) .
Both writers present evidence of increasing 
government control over television programming in an 
effort to propagate this middle class world view as 
opposed to a populist ideology or one which aims speci­
fically at the poor. Increasing government censorship, 
the abolition of live broadcasting and the fact that soap 
opera writers must hire lawyers in order to keep abreast 
of government cultural manipulation (Miceli, 1972:159-88; 
Pessoa de Barros, 1974:41-46) support their contention 
that television is not only an agent of secondary socia­
lization, but that behind the overt concern for culture, 
education and wholesome recreation, the real concern of the
Miceli*s insights on programming for the poor 
are extremely revealing. These are aimed at the largest 
audiences presumably in order to attract the largest pro­
fits for the program sponsors. These are generally audi­
torium programs with two basic characteristics. First is a 
surrealist disproportion in style which is apparent both 
in what is exhibited and in the way it is exhibited. The programs act as a showcase of the material goods of the advanced sector of the Brazilian economy and the dispropor­
tion lies in what is exhibited and the consumption power of 
the impoverished audience. In one of the more popular 
programs aimed at the poor, the material wealth is exhibi­
ted by an equally surreal male personage who might wear 
a mini-skirt, Louis XVI boots, a ruff around his neck and 
a pirate hat, who is generally surrounded by voluptuous 
and largely naked female flesh. Second, through the sur­
realism, the social scale is inverted. Such programs 
exhibit the extreme types of exclusion, misery and exploi­
tation by the promotion of contests of misery, contests of 
the grotesque, whereby the most miserable contestant (the 
woman who has had mos£_children, the wpman who can peel
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powers that be is to substitute one world view for 
another which conceals the facts and mechanisms of domi­
nation more effectively (Miceli, 1974:250-1).
Populist imagery had entailed a clear class 
hierarchy with fairly precise perceptions of the upper 
and lower reaches of society. The connection between 
wealth and the potential for power or manipulation was 
clearly present. Among middle income people like the 
Santana families, populism was based on face to face 
relations between friends or relatives: the idiom which 
informed clientelism and patronage was one of friendship. 
While it denied class or status differences or inequalities 
between friends or relatives (this of course was the myth 
in populist rhetoric), it extended the social hierarchy to 
its full ranges and created at least a context for various 
kinds of political mobilization. The politician may 
have felt contempt for his electorate, but he spoke to it 
as a friend and leader. The wealthy relative may have
coconuts with her teeth, or who can eat pins and little 
stones, the man with no hands who writes with his mouth, 
etc.) becomes the most enviable. While the surrealist 
treatment of these programs dedramatizes the extremes 
of exploitation and poverty associated with associated- 
dependent development, the contrasts and disproportions 
are there and central to the programs. They are not so 
at all in the "middle class culture" of soap operas 
and other programs which are gradually replacing this 
style of program (Miceli, 1972:218-24; Pessoa de Barros, 
1974:139).
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felt contemptuous of public servants, but he spoke to 
them as friends or relatives, as did upper level bureau­
crats to lower level bureaucrats or bureaucrats to their 
clients. The "man in the middle," no matter how declasse 
or unworthy or manipulated he may have felt himself to 
be, drew on his inner resources, his own controle and 
eauilifbrio in order to contornar (by-pass, smooth over, 
avoid) these difficulties, in order to maintain the idiom 
of friendship, because it was in turn the basis from 
which he could exert his own manipulatory efforts— it was 
the basis of his luta. and it depended on a constant 
readiness to make connections up and down the social scale.
The present a-political social hierarchy glosses 
over the existence of the rich and the very poor and con­
ceals power behind the slogans of "progress" and "protec­
tion." It blows up the middle range of society and empha­
sizes "Todo mundo tem" (Everybody has . . . e due at ion, autos, 
etc.) so that the poles of the social scale tend to become 
invisible. Connections are no longer made and, implicitly, 
they should not be sought out. The statements which have 
been quoted here reflect the Santana families* increasing 
marginalization from sources of power or influence which, 
informants seem to imply, will ultimately threaten a loss 
of wealth, their main criterion for mobility and achieve­
ment. No one savs the redefinition from a populist hierar­
chy to the present one is troublesome, but the data suggest
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the tensions involved in increasing isolation and help­
lessness and the resulting development of a consciousness 
of class which is inward turning and willfully blind to 
society, and which is exacerbated by government manipula­
tion of the media.
Finally, families like these no longer seem to 
be part of the ,,classes,, in the two class model proposed 
by Leeds (1965), but rather seem to be forming a consumer 
and lubricatory— middle— class with cultural as well as 
structural boundaries between them and other classes. 
Historical changes over time have not only brought three 
types of families of disparate origins to similar socio­
economic positions; they have also made these three groups, 
who in the past had recognized their separateness from 
each other, and their different social and political 
positions, come to share a set of ideas which places them 
in Sao Paulo*s social structure and which defines them 
as apart from either the "masses" or the "classes" of that 
city. While the rudiments of a similar set of ideas may 
have been present among any of these middle income groups 
previously, especially following periods of exclusion 
from the "classes" (as for instance among the old Santana 
elite), what suggests that such ideas might today be 
considered as a developing consciousness of class is that 
they are shared by previously disparate groups as a re­
sult of shared changes in political relationships, or
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class standing.
Moreover, whereas some groups at different
times have been included in and used by the ruling
circles of the "classes," only aspects of their conscious-
12ness of class are useful to the present regime. When 
sane of these ideas are elaborated and propagated by 
government controlled media they become instruments of 
domination because by presenting a false vision of society 
they make it difficult for anyone of any class to attempt 
to change it.
12The culture and class consciousness of the 
poor have been frequently manipulated by groups in power 
(see, for example, Gross, 1971). There is an interesting 
contrast between a Peronist type of manipulation and the 
present Brazilian development of a consciousness of 
classe media.
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CHAPTER VI
MIDDLE SECTORS AND A MIDDLE CLASS 
I have shown in this work how over the course 
of seventy years the descendants of families of three 
entirely different origins at the beginning of the 
century have been brought to similar social, economic 
and political positions. I have argued that among fami­
lies like these, a middle class may now be said to be de­
veloping, as they are increasingly segregated both by 
their own consciousness and by historical factors beyond 
their control from classes above arid below them. By 
way of conclusions, this chapter will summarize what 
has gone before and make general observations for future 
research among middle income sectors.
The material resources of ninety families 
residing in Santana, Sao Paulo, Brazil were described 
in Chapter I. In terms of their standards of living, 
families like these are extremely well off compared to 
the rest of the city of Sao Paulo, although they are far 
from bourgeois. Most owned their own homes, were steadi­
ly employed and either planned to send their children to 
university or had already done so. Besides their homes, 
their property included rental houses, vacation houses,
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automobiles, televisions and other expensive consumer 
durables. Families like these belonged to the top 10.6 
percent of listed recipients of incomes in Sao Paulo.
Socially and politically, they were increasingly 
isolated from classes above and below them. Most informants 
believed that Sao Paulo was populated largely by people 
like themselves, whereas the income distribution figures 
for the city show clearly that this is not the case. Very 
few among them have any contact at all with the truly rich 
and powerful in Sao Paulo city, and although Santana is 
surrounded by neighborhoods poorer than itself, very few 
of these families have any contact with the poor beyond 
that supplied by their servants. There is hatred and 
contempt for rich and poor alike, who, for different 
reasons, are seen as lazy and thieving. While many have 
both poor and wealthy relatives, contacts with these 
are sparse and strained.
While they presently have little political 
power or influence beyond the power of their ballots cast 
in elections, this was not always the case. By juxtapo­
sing the careers of the Santana families against the poli­
tical epochs Brazil has undergone since the beginning of 
this century, it was shown that each of these epochs, 
discussed in Chapter II, created different political and 
economic opportunities for different families among them. 
Thus, during the First Republic, when Brazil was a neo­
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohib ited w ithout permission.
305
colonial country exporting primary products, local land­
owning families became a local elite as a result of the 
growth of Sao Paulo city and of the Paulista coffee poli­
tics which dominated Brazilian national politics. When 
these politics ended in 1930, the Santana elite was 
sheared off from ruling groups in Sao Paulo city and state: 
their economic positions dwindled as they sold off their 
capital base: some of their descendants joined anonymous 
middle income sectors, others became downright poor.
The Vargas years stabilized the positions of 
literate rural migrants and foreign immigrants in Santana. 
With their move to the city, rural migrants had lost what­
ever local power they had in their areas of origins. The 
trajectory of downward economic mobility which had been 
theirs in the countryside was reversed by the centraliza­
tion of the Vargas regime. Through their employment in 
bureaucracies, this potentially dissident group was rein­
tegrated into the new political system and contributed 
to the state's increasing control over other groups of the 
population. In this respect, Vargas's bureaucracies 
divided middle income groups just as his labor policies 
split labor groups, while linking them to the central 
state ^paratus.
Indirectly, the social stability of bureaucrats 
contributed to the development of a varied commercial 
center in Santana which was dominated by foreign immi­
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grants or their descendants. These had been present in 
Santana since the previous century but had simply provi­
ded ballot fodder for the local elite during the First 
Republic. During the Vargas years they laid the founda­
tions for populist access to government influence through 
their friendships with the bureaucrats.
The Santana bureaucrats acted as intermediaries 
for the non-bureaucrats during the war years and after. 
However, during the populist years, their efforts in this 
respect also served to promote their own careers and to 
increase their own prestige. With electoral populism 
clientelistic networks expanded up and down the social 
scale, and while none of these public servants ever 
reached positions of direct influence on policy, I sugges­
ted that their indirect influence, in conjunction with 
that of all other bureaucrats in Sao Paulo and throughout 
the nation, may have been considerable.
With the advent of transnational domination of 
the economy under a military dictatorship, clientiLism, 
corruption and informal influence has sharply decreased 
among the Santana families. Their loss of influence and 
their increasing social isolation from groups above and 
below them has led to a sense of malaise, tension and 
fear and frequently an overt disinterest in politics. 
All appeared to support the military government as pro­
tector against the demands of the poor and exploitation
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by the rich, but government itself was entirely out of 
their control or influence. The loss of the material 
benefits of populism, especially in conjunction with infla- 
tiorijmay have adverse consequences on their economic status. 
This may have been partly compensated for by the extension 
of consumer credit lines, which allow many families like 
these to have almost anything that can be purchased, but 
which also exchanges political influence as a measure of 
status for life style and poder consumidor (the power to 
consume) as a measure of status.
All three groups have undergone a process of 
redefinition as the nation readjusted itself to a new 
phase of capitalist development. Whereas in the past, 
there were differences between the three groups as regards 
access to political and economic resources, they are now 
all defined as consumers. Although the Santana families 
participate in defining themselves this way, they are 
defined as consumers largely by the large corporations 
and market research companies, on whose sales much of 
Brazil's economic growth depends. This is why there is 
such an emphasis in the Brazilian media, whose time and 
space is bought by such companies, on concepts such as 
Classe A. 3, C, etc., which define groups with specific 
abilities to consume. The government participates in 
this definition because it encourages this kind of econo­
mic development and because it wishes to depoliticize
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middle income groups which had previously been part of 
the "classes." Wealthier Brazilians participate in the 
redefinition of previous relatives and clients because 
they no longer need them. Many of them have become classe 
media themselves, distinguished only by their superior 
poder consumidor. rather than their superior proximity to 
power or influence.
Among the elite at the top of the hill, political 
decline preceded economic decline. While it is too soon 
to say definitely what will happen to the descendants of 
immigrants and bureaucrats, the possibility of economic 
decline is recognized by some. As a result, all three 
groups share an emerging sense of consciousness of middle 
class as distinct from classes above and below them. Un­
like other class consciousnesses, an important aspect of 
this consciousness is the inaccuracy of its vision of 
society. Indeed, some informants simply didn't want to 
know. Chapter V explored the logic behind this willful 
blindness and suggested ways in which the government's 
control of the media manipulates it to its own advantage.
There are two salient characteristics of the 
Santana family histories. Families like these have play­
ed an increasingly passive role in Brazil's political 
process. Among the three groups discussed, the old elite 
at the top of the hill controlled the most political 
resources: because of their electoral control of Santana
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they formed a distinct group which controlled Santana 
directly in the interests of the dominant Partido Reoubli- 
cano Paulista during the First Republic and they were
linked by kinship and fictive kinship to Sao Paulo's oli­
garchy. With the reintroduction of elections during the 
populist period, the bureaucrats greatly enhanced their 
situations, but theirs was an an order of influence which 
was considerably smaller than that of the old elite.
They did not form a distinct group. Instead they formed 
networks and panelinhas which were extensions of the net­
works and panelinhas of more powerful groupse Non-bureau­
crats participated in the populist game, but they did 
not control the kinds of resources that were potentially 
available to bureaucrats.
We have seen that the political relations each 
of these groups has maintained with groups above and 
below them have changed over time. Periodically, one or 
another of them have been included in the ruling “classes" 
while others remained among, or returned to the “masses" 
of working class or middle income people. At present, 
and we need not belabor the point, most of the families 
are increasingly disconnected from sources of power or 
influence in Sao Paulo.
Economically, families like these have not 
held the initiative in Brazil*s development, and over 
time their resources have decreased. Among the three 
groups, the old elite at the top of the hill again con­
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trolled more than the immigrants or bureaucrats, but 
all three have in the past had access if not to strategic 
resources— rcoffee, industry, finance--to resources which 
permitted them to generate money, at least for a time, 
no matter how they spent it (urban real estate, commerce, 
loans at negative interest rates). Regardless of 
decline, none of the three groups ever stood at the 
polar extremes of income distribution during the periods 
we have considered. They were never at the apex of 
economic power. They were simply there, pushed and 
shoved by economic forces over which they had no control: 
the initiatives in Brazil's economic development were 
taken by more powerful groups in response to changes 
in the world and national economies. The economic func­
tions of families like the Santana families were limited 
to those Leeds has called "lubrieatory:"
The making effective of transactions involving the 
strategic resources of society; the implementation 
and exchanges of resources including money; collec­
tion of information, transmission of knowledge; the 
processing of information for ultimate users (1973:: 
53).
When applied to families like these, expectations that 
a middle class might take the initiative in the develop­
ment process towards modernization are clearly inappro­
priate and misleading and should be decently laid to 
rest.
The data suggests that the lack of political 
influence or economic initiative translates in a complex
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way into economic vulnerability— or potential vulnerability. 
The potential fluidity of inclusion or exclusion into the 
“classes” and the implications thereof are suggested by the 
fact that while most informants regarded their personal 
histories as success stories, what most informants seem to 
fear above all is downward mobility, even while they are at 
the height of their economic and political powers. “Sao 
que^o.miQfra.,,tijbajarafflS,j-g£a d»agua,pa.,cabe.pa“ (1 
don*t want my daughter to carry cans of water on her head), 
a patriarch from the top of the hill is alleged to have 
said, thus recognizing a possibility that his descendants 
might live in a favela without running water. And indeed, 
the research among elite families and bureaucratic families 
suggests that there might be a relation between political 
marginalization and economic decline.
The dialectic of inclusion and exclusion of 
middle income families into the “classes” may lead us to 
reconsider the meaning and implication of social mobility 
for families like the Santana families when their careers 
are placed in historical context. Over the long run, 
careers which informants consider modest success stories 
have the quality of survival rather than social mobility,. 
Among the Santana families interviewed there was only 
one frequently cited local myth of an ascent from rags 
to riches:* most tales of mobility reflect not only
*One immigrant (whom 1 was not able to interview)
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different stages in informants* life cycles but political 
and economic developments in Brazil. Hutchinson (1960:10) 
has already noted that upward economic mobility in Brazil 
resulted from structural changes in the Brazilian economy 
which created more highly paying positions.^ Indeed, this 
is supported by the early histories of bureaucratic and 
immigrant families, although it does not account for the 
high rate of downward economic mobility among the relatives 
of the elite families interviewed. The quality of survi­
val may arise from the fact that in order to remain in a 
"middle income" standard of living during the transitions 
which have periodically redefined groups among them from 
the sources of power or influence, Santana's families have 
had to consume more, have more education, more of various 
status criteria than did their fathers (See Hutchinson, 
1960:204; lutaka, 1962, 1963).
These observations raise more general ones on 
the nature and functions of middle income sectors and 
the development of a middle class in Brazil. The 
dialectic of inclusion and exclusion of middle income
was allegedly able to transform an animal based transpor­
tation company at the turn of the century into a world 
wide moving and storage enterprise fifty years later.
^Hutchinson contrasts "structural mobility" to 
that in which individuals circulate to positions in the 
population "in accord with their individual capacities" 
(1960:10). It is highly doubtful that this degree of 
mobility can exist by definition in a capitalist society 
(See Leeds, 1973:52).
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groups which we have seen in the Santana histories 
suggests that the “class/mass" dichotomy may have been 
more fluid over time than we previously supposed, and 
that middle Income sectors have acted as political as 
well as economic ,,reserves,, or “ lubricators." If this 
is true, then we can perhaps speak of the manipulation 
of middle income groups like the Integralists or like 
the populist bureaucrats for the political ends of more 
powerful interests. It is possible that over time, the 
exclusion or incorporation of middle income sectors into 
ruling groups may operate like Wallerstein*s formula for 
semi peripheral countries in world economic systems. 
These systems, he argues, must have three layered struc­
tures :
The existence of the third (middle) category means 
precisely that the upper stratum is not faced with 
the unified opposition of all the others because the 
middle stratum is both exploited and exploiter. It 
follows that the specific economic role is not all 
that important, and has thus changed through the 
various historical stages of the modern world system 
(1974:405).3
If these ideas and the analysis of the Santana 
histories are correct, it is possible that middle class
•*See also Simmel (1964:59-61) on the social 
“magic1' of the number three: “The appearance of the third
party indicates transition, conciliation and the abandon­
ment of absolute contrast." He believes that the third 
party introduces “objectivity" which serves towards recon­
ciliation. With regard to a three layered income struc­
ture in capitalist societies, we would maintain that in 
general the third party prevents objectification.
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formation is a far longer and less defined process than 
we have thought and that there should be no "illusion of 
finality" (Bury, 1920:351) when the process does begin.
The Santana histories show that before a middle class 
can emerge, there must be middle income sectors. Often 
as not, in the Santana case, political considerations 
created the economic circumstances for the expansion of 
middle income s e c t o r s T h a t  is, the expansion of state 
services, state control for political reasons entirely 
unrelated to the lives of people like those in Santana 
generated a need for increased goods and services. If the 
analysis of immigrant employment in the first four decades 
of the century presented in Chapter IV is correct, this
^This may be so in dependent countries; see 
Soares (1969) on "premature bureaucratization"in dependent 
countries. In England, for instance, the economy had 
generated middle income sectors who participated in the 
formation of the English working class consciousness and 
political intransigence. The formation of a middle 
class, however, was no less political than in Brazil.
E. P. Thompson describes the concern of the ruling class 
to "associate the middle with the higher orders of so­
ciety in the love and support of the institutions and 
government of the country" (1964:817). Accordingly, before 
the passage of the great Reform Bill which extended the 
suffrage in 1832, the government undertook a massive 
survey to discover the "numbers and respectability of 
£ 10 householders in Leeds." The results stated "una­
nimously that the c£l0 qualification did not admit to 
the , exercise of the elective franchise a single person 
who might not safely and wisely be enfranchised; that 
they were surprised to find how few would be allowed to 
vote." "'We foresaw,1 ■ wrote a commentator on the Reform 
Bill, " that its effect would be to detach from the working 
classes a large portion of the middle ranks, who were then 
more inclined to act with the people than with the aris­
tocracy which excluded them.'" Thompson comments that what
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process is particularly clear in the development of 
Santana's immigrant commercial center. This, as we have 
seen (Chapter IV, pp.190-6 ) may have been indirectly 
affected by Vargas's centralization policies: the growth 
of bureaucracies and the large number of bureaucrats 
migrating to Santana in the 1930»s provided a stable and 
growing market for immigrant commercial concerns.
If the process of class formation is as fluid 
and vacillating as we suggest, how do we know that a 
middle class is emerging in Sao Paulo? One approach 
is to examine the development of class consciousness as 
we did in Chapter V. There it was pointed out that 
informants harbored latent feelings of resentment and 
fear towards those above and below them in the social 
order and that those feelings, even if they obscured the 
realities of social structure, contributed to a sense 
of boundaries between them and others.
However, because of the oscillating situation of 
middle income sectors in general, we can assume that a 
set of ideas similar to these will always be present among 
some marginalised groups at any point in time. Literature
the researcher had done was to “offer a definition of class 
of almost arithmetical exactitude. In 1832 the line was 
drawn in social consciousness by the franchise qualifi­
cation with the crudity of an indelible pencil” (1964: 
817-21).
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from other times and places is rich with pertinent exam­
ples in which marginalization and ideologies of resentment 
are closely related. Recent studies of witchcraft accusa­
tions are a case in point.^
What is special about the Santana histories is 
that they show how middle income sectors of diverse origins 
and experience have come to share ideas such that the ideas 
themselves transcend the particularistic experiences of any 
given sector and apply in a general way to middle groups 
as a whole. Their shared ideas reflect differences in 
their structural positions: that is previously distinct 
groups have been assigned new functions, namely the 
underwriting of Brazilian development by consumption and 
by the lubrication of the administrative system for ratio­
nal growth of transnational production. This suggests 
that a middle class which is distinct from "classes'1 or 
"masses" or middle income sectors within them, only
It might be interesting in this connection, to 
re-examine the periodic outbursts of witchcraft in Europe 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. MacFar- 
lane's (1970) study of witchcraft in Essex, England, is 
especially revealing of the way in which the incidence of 
witchcraft accusations arose as a function of the redefi­
nition of the local class structure in response to natio­
nal economic development. It was not the poor who were 
a problem. "They could be whipped and sent on their way, 
or hired as laborers. It was the slightly less affluent 
neighbors or kin who demanded only a little help, who 
became an increasing source of anxiety" (1975:205)— and 
who were regularly burned as witches. See also Bendarsky 
(1970) on the Salem witch craze, which also followed a 
period of redefinition of political and economic status.
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begins to emerge when the nation*s political and economic 
resources are vastly increased and vastly concentrated.^ 
It would be interesting to inquire whether a middle class 
might not also be in the process of definition in other 
dependent countries which have become staging areas for 
manufacturing by transnational corporations.
As we have said earlier, however, there should 
be no illusion of finality about these developments, 
because as we have seen in Chapter 11, the political 
considerations which created middle income sectors and 
defined a middle class in Santana, often arose in res­
ponse to changes in the nation*s position in the world 
economy. As the latter develops, the process could be 
reversed.
See footnote 4 above. Jane Schneider (personal 
communication) raises the question of the relationship 
of middle class formation to imperium. Empire needs 
consumers and ideologues. Modernization theorists are 
cast in an interesting light from this perspective.
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Appendix I: Sub-Districts of 3ao Paulo, ranked according
Pooulation Area Income
1. Tucuruvi 1. Sto. Amaro 1. Jardim America
317,219 11,472.2 1,308.74
2. V. Nova 2. Butanta 2. Consolacao
Cachoeirinha 4,680.3 1,132.63
313,615 3. Pirituba 3. Cerqueira Cesar
3. V. Prudente 3,248.4 1,127.24
313,064
4. V. Prudente 4. J. Paulista
4. Tatuape 3,214.0 1,094.42
252,927
5. Tucuruvr 5. Pinheiros
5. Saude 3,187.9 1,040.36
220,743 6. Ibirapuera 6. V. Mariana
6. Sto. Amaro 2,775.1 986.25
218,293 7. Capela do 7. Perdizes
7. Santana Socorro 913.35
166.049 2,687.2 8. Aclimacao
8. Ipiranga 8. Tatuape’ 892.00
165,049 2,354.8 9. Sta. Cecilia
9. Alto da Mooca 9. Santana 839.19
146,927 2,106.7 10. Indianopolis
10. Jabaquara 10. V. Katilde 830.44
144,606 2,093.5 11. Bela Vista
11. Fenha 11. Saude 823.81
138,974 2,033.0 12. Cambuci
12. V. Katilde 12. Lapa 609'. 24
128,366 1,989.2 13. Ibirapuera
13. V. Maria 13. Ipiranga 802.10
119,990 1,620.0 14. Liberdade
14. Butanta 14. Jabaquara 794.53
119,195 1,431.3 15. Sta. Sfieenia
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9. Alto da Mooca 
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13. Bom Retiro 
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No. Autos Public Industrial Serviceper 100 people Servants Workers Workers
16. Lapa 16. Bom Retiro 16. V. Mariana 16. Alto da Mooca12.00 2,115 9,987 6,349
17. Belemzinho 17. Braz 17. Pari 17. Perdizes11.79 2,080 9,239 5,974
18. Liberdade 18. Perdizes 18. Tucuruvi 18. Penha11.26 1,983 8,986 5,895
19. Aclimacao 19. Lapa 19. Sta. Ef igenia 19. Sto. Amaro10.62 1,876 8,306 5,658
20. Sta. £figenia 20. Ipiranga 20. Sta. Cecilia 20. Vila Maria10.44 1,858 8,254 4,767
21. V. Madalena 21. Mooca 21. Santana 21. V. Prudente
9.31 1,750 8,025 4,345
22. Bom Retiro 22. Butanta' 22. Vila Maria 22. V. Mariana8.60 1,636 7,517 4,018
23. Saude 23. V. Prudente 23. Indianopolis 23. Barra Funda
8.32 1,583 7,165 3,896
24. Ipiranga 24. Pinheiros 24. Perdizes 24. J. Paulista
8.25 1,550 7,029 3,379





26. Santana 26. Ibirapuera 26. Belemzinho
7.27 1,443 26. J. Paulista 
5,817
3,793
27. ButantaT 27. Cambuci 27. aom «.etiro
6.77 1,168 27. Nossa Sra. 
do 0'
3,666
28. Tatuape 28. Jabaquara 5,767 28. Cambuci
6.70 1,138 28. Consolacao
3, 5fc2
29. Sto. Amaro 29. J. Paulista 5,629 c 29. Santana
6.63 1,001 29. Jabaquara
3,240
30. Se 30. Penha 5,128 30. Butanta'
5.97 883 30. Penha
3,023
31. Braz 31. Pirituba 4,727 31. Ibirapuera
5.80 830 2,400
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Primary Total
at ion Area Income Students Students
birapuera 16., Vila Maria 16. V. Kadalena 16. V. Formosa 16. Butanta
10,406 1,138.9 684.60 12,163 19,085
ossa Sra. 17., Nossa Sra. 17. Mooca 17. Casa Verde 17. Mooca
o O'' do O' 662.31 11,853 18,55105,090 1,099.4
18. Se' 18. Pirituba 18. Casa Verde
erdizes 18., Alto da Mooca 635.90 11,313 18,13201,841 1,095.1
19. Saude 19. Vila Maria 19. Perdizes
asa Verde 19., Penha 626.32 11,099 17,987
93,279 999.0
20. Bom Retiro 20. Capela do 20. V. Matilde
. Paulista 20., Cangaiba 676.24 Socorro 17,428
87,361 902.5 9,50421. Barra Funda 21. Sta. Cecilia
. Mariana 21., Jaragua 675.06 21. Perdizes 17.425
87,172 854.9 9,275
22. Pari 22. Cerqueira
. Formosa 22., J. Paulista 622.11 22. V. Mariana Cesar86,452 845.2 8,745 16.08523. Lapa
irituba 23., Casa Verde 616.72 23. J. Paulista 23 J. Paulista
77,035 753.4 8,380 14,67724. Braz
.iberdade 24., Perdizes 563.13 24. V. Guilherme 24. Jabaquara
70,751 739.7 8,333 14,40025. Belemzinho
,imao 25., Indianopolis 566.46 25. Consolacao 25. Pirituba64,597 726.3 7,198 e 14,18726. Ipiranga
nd ianopolis 26., Pinheiros 530.81 26. Mooca 26. Vila Maria
64,045 717.1 7,027 13,56227. Santana
ta. Cecilia 27., V. Formosa 514.24 27. Limao 27. Libordads
64,044 716.8 7,017 13,49228. Tatuaoe'
srazilandia 28., Mooca 502.42 28. Cerqueira 28. V, Formosa
61,448 714.8 Cesar 13,21029. Alto da Mooca 6,599
Jela Vista 29,, V. Mariana 501.20 29. Jardim America
59,421 612.0 29. Jaragua 11,55630. Sto. Amaro 6,148
Selemzinho 30., Limao 486.69 30. Capela do
57,670 596.0 30. Canaaiba S ocorro
5raz 31., Barra Funda 31. Jabaquara 470.94 6,064 10,72957,529 576= I
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45. Vila Nova 
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Source: Adapted from nochtief, Montreal, DeConsult (1970:20, 
47, 213-25).
j. Autos 100 people
Brazilandi
1.35
Vila 1* ova 
Cachoe iri: 
.16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
321
>io. Autos rublic industrial Service
le per 100 people Servants .Workers jorkegs
ihdia 47. brazilandia 47. Jaragua 47. erazilandia 47. VJ. kaealena
43 1.35 122 312 357
>va 45. Vila Nova - 4c * Vila Nova v ila .<ova — v ila ..ova
jrinha Cachoe ir inha Cachoe irir.ha Cacnoeiri.nna Cachoe irinna
00 .16 ^2 56 12
It (1970:20,






Cachoe irir. ha 62
i n r i u s t r i a l  
'lowers
1 7 .  o r a z i l a n d ia
service
17. v. hsealera
v i l a  .ova 
C ach oe  i r i n n a
Prirrarv
Students
17. oarra funda 
1,197






15. Vila VovaCachoeirinha 
1,361
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* In 1967 the Cruzeiro was devalued, and the New Cruzeiro introduced.
Sources: Bidwell (1970:60-4), Pick (1974).
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Appendix III. Household composition, property and incomes of Santana families interviewed, 1972-1973
I. Household composition
No. withFamily incomes over Adult Maid Maid








y / i y Mo/,A2S/,NcS/,3Bro/ : :
5. 2/6 y / 2 y Mo - -6. 1/1 y - - " • •
Incom es: NCr. 
7.
-2 Jj>8Q.« Qfirft»QPQ,*99
1/3 / / /8. 2/3 - y - No/,Nf . i9. 3/4 • y 1 // - • i10. 1/5 y / 3 - - 1 -11. 1/2 y / - - • - i12. 1/3 • y 2 - - • i13. 2/3 y y 1 - - - i14. 1/2 y / - - - - i15. 1/5 y / 3 « - 1 -16. 2/4 y y 2 - - - i17. 5/6 y y 1 yy Mo/ - i18. 3/5 y / 1 yy - - i19. 2/2 y y - - - i20. 1/4 y /
/
2 - • - -
21. 1/5 y 2 - - • i22. 2/2 - - 2S// - -23. 1/1 • y - - - I -24. 2/3 y / - y - - i25. 1/2 y / - - - - i26. 3/4 y y 1 y * " ■
27.
4.000.00-6.000.00
3/5 / / 1 yy 228. 2/5 y / - yy GdD 1 -29. 1/2 y / - - - 1 130. 3/3 y y - y - 1 -31. 2/4 y y 2 - •32. 3/3 y - yy •33. 2/7 y y 3 - Mo,S 134. 4/4 y - - 2Bro/y
35. 1/4 y / 2
Nc. ✓
36. 3/3 y - yy • -37. 2/3 y / - y • -38. 1/6 y / 4 - - -39. 1/3 / / - y - -40. 2/2 y y - - - 1 -41. 1/2 y / - - * • 1
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No. with Family incomes over No. total in fam.
0. Incomes: NCr. 6.000.00-8.000.00
Adult Maid MaidWife Minors child. -Other Live-in Day
42. 1/5 y / 3 . . i
43. 3 /6 y / i yy - -
44. 2/2 y y - - - 2
45. 1/4 y / 2 - - -
46. 4/5 y y 1 y Ay -
47. 2 /4 y y 2 - - -
48. 1/3 y / 1 - - -
49. 3 /4 y y 1 y - -
50. 2/6 y / 3 y - -
51. 1/4 y / 2 - - -
52. 2/3 y y lad. / - 1
53. 2/5 y / 2 y - -
54. 1/2 y / - - - 1
55. 2/2 y y - - - 1
56. 1/2 y / - - - 1
57. 1/2 y / - - - “
E. Incomes; NCr. 8.000.00-10.000.00
58. 2/3 y / . y - i59. 1/3 y / i - - -60. 1/4 y / 2 - - i61. 1/5 y / 2 / Mo -62. 3/8 y / 4 yy - i63. 2/2 y y - - - -64. 3/6 y / 2nf s yy - -65. 3/6 y / 2gr y Moy i
f. tasw- Wr. l9.999.99-«afiSPaflg
66. 2/4 y / M*8C y -67. 2/6 y / 3 y68. 3/5 y / 1 y No/<$)69. 1/2 y / - - -70. 1/4 / / 2 - -71. 1/4 y / 2 -72. 2/3 y y 1 - -73. 1/3 y / 1 - -74. 1/4 y / 2 • -75. 1/4 y / 2 - -
: NCr, o o o o 0 1 o o o o o
76. 1/2 y / _ •77. 2/4 y y 2 * "
NCr. 14.000.00-16.000.00
78. 1/5 y / 3 -
79. 2/4 y / - -
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J. Incomes: NCr. 18.000.0Q-20.000.00 (0) 


















- "No. with income over total" excludes domestic servants, but does include their dependent children.
- "Minors" includes small children, be they grandchildren, adopted,or maid's children, as well as university students who contributenothing to their support.
- "Day Maid" is a deepest ic worker employed between one or three days a week.
- Mb - Mother- paL - daughter in Law- A - aunt
- S - sister- Nc - niece• Nf - nephew- Bro - brother- GdD - god daughter- M'sc - maid's child
- Gr - grandchildren• ad - adopted
/ - present- V - has an income
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II. Proparties sad nature of incomes.





1 - house plot of land
-B. Incomes; NCr. 2.000.00-4.OQQ.00
7. 2 . - 4houses a
8. 2 o 2hcuses house,plots9. 1 . _ a 2houses
10. 1 1 - a building
11. 1 1 / - plot of land
12. 1 • • apt,hs,str a13. 2 1 a -14. 1 1 a house a15. 3 2 - apt •16. 2 1 / plot,house
17. 2 - / 3hs,2str a18. 2 1 a plot,house19. 1 • / 3houses -
20. 1 1 * a -
21. 1 - - • -
22. 1 - a - •23. 1 - • houses •24. 1 a a -25. 1 • a a plot26. 1 - - -
C. Incomes: NCr. 4.Q0Q.QQ-6.QQQJ3.Q
27. I 1
28. 1 •29. 2 130. 2 131. 1 132. 1 -33. 4 134. 1 -
35. 1 136. 2 -37. 1 -














/ 2stores house.plot / CE - 3 - // * house,plot / CE - 2 1 •/ house,store house / bot - 1 ~ •a house / CE - 1 2 “a store / bot - 2 - •
a / bot - 1 2 •
/ • / inher - 2 - astore,apt / inher - 3 - /
m / inher Id - 1 - -• _ / CE - - 3 “
a . 3house8 / FP - 1 1 -* . • / FP - - 1
* - plot “ / bot - 1
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Family > 3 a  No. ^  “ Productive
1 - - houses
Fori-Prgdusnyg
house
0. Incomes; NCr. 6.000.00-8.000.00
42. 1 1 - - -43. 3 144. 3 2 / 2apts 2housas45. 1 2 - - -46. 1 - • - -47. 3 1 - 2houses house48. 2 1 • house 2houses49. 2 2 / 3houses -50. 2 1 / - -51. 3 2 / 2houses -52. 1 1 -» - -53. 1 2 - 2houses -54. 1 - / 2apts plot55. 1 1 •56. 1 - • offices plot57. 2 1 / 2hs,2apt “
E. Incomes: 8.000.00-10.000.00
58. 4 1 / . apartment59. 2 1 / 3houses house
60. 2 3 / 2houses hs,aptfplot61. 3 2 / house 3houses62. 2 2 2strs,2apts -63. 2 1 / apt,8tr»hs 5plots64. 1 1 - - apartment
65. 2 1 / - house
F. Incomes: 10.000.00-12.000.00
66. 3 2 . 2hs,str,apt housedevelopment
67. 3 1 - - house
68. 2 1 - - -69. 1 • • properties -70. 2 1 / house house»4plots71. 2 1 - house -
72. 1 1 / fazenda.plots -73. 2 1 - house74. 1 1 - apartments -
75. 1 1 / 2h8,apt house
G. Incomes: 12.000.00-14.000.00
76. 4 2 _ 7houses 2houses77. 1 2 / apartimnt -
DWELLINGS
s
/ inher / FP
/ inher / inher / bot 
/ BNH / inher / CE 
/ ni / inher
/ CE
/ CE / bot / inher / CE
/ CE
/ CE / bot 




/ FP - 1/ bot - 1
/ bot - 1/ bot - 1/ BNH - 3_ / 2/ CE 3/ CE - 2
- /








O O . h u
Family > •» u » o •
No. h < m productive Noa-frflflttfitlVg . !2 1
H. Incomesi NCr. 14.000.00-16.000.00
78. 3 I - house - / ni 1 - /79. 2 2 / 2carp, shops - / inher - 2 - /
8 houses
I. Incomes: NCr. 16.000.00^18.000.00
80. 3 2 - 3has, apt s 2plots / inher - 2 - /81. 4 2 -  - - / n i  1 - -82. 3 3 / apt.bldg. 2plots / CE 4 - /
83. 1 1 houses / inher . 1 .84. 1 2 - 4apts plot / FP - 3 185. 1 3 “ 8has,parking lot
2apts,house
plots / inher * 5 1
86. 3 3 . apt,4plot8 / CE . 4 187. 1 1 / store.apts apt,plots / ni - 2 -
88. 2 2 - hss,bar,apts 2apts,plot / CE - 1 -89.
90.**
3 2 30housesgarage apt,plots / inher 1
Notes
** The ninetieth family was added fear convenience.
- ni - no information- carp.shop. - carpentry shop.- inher - inherited.- hs, hss - house, houses.- bot - bought or built.- CE - Caixa Economics.- FP - Forpa Publics*a Caixa Beneficiente.
« apt - apartment.• str - store.







Appendix IV. Supplements to Chapter IV.
A. Meu avb veio no tempo de Dom Pedro. Veio por x
falta de, trabalho no Tyrol. Veio fazer America. A vo 
tava gra'vida com minha mae, a unica brasileira. Dom 
Pedro vinha na casa do vo, pegava a mae no colo, fazia 
bouquet de flores . . • Ele veio com dinheiro de La'. 
O^avo recebeu um terrene na ccicnia e comprou uma por- 
pao de lotes, enormes e quadrados, aqul, em Cambucx, 
Casa Verde, muitos lugares.
Plantavam milho, uva, feijao, cafe'; faziam 
cadeiras empalhadas do brejo e iam a pe' vender ̂ na Prapa 
da Se. Depois de dezoito anos de Brasil foi la com 
os filhos visitar a terra dele.
0 vo tinhaj:anto dinheiro que punha no sol 
numa peneira pra nao mofar. Ele guardava o dinheiro 
no chapeuv  A gente ia a missa descalpo por causa da 
lama, e so' calpava na igreja. Ele chegava la descalpo, 
suado, e tirava o chapeu e o pessoal dava dinheiro 
pensando que era mendigo.
Poderia ser milionario, mas perdeu_tudo. Ele 
morreu na gripe de 1 9 1 8 Era forte, mas nao tinha 
remedio pra dar. A vo' nao entendia portugues, ficou 
desorientada sozinha com os filhos. Foi vendendo, e 
muito foi roubado, grilado. Diziam que era por falta 
de pagar imposto, mas eram todos canalhas.
^A mae e as tias casaram. A mae casou com um 
portugues. Tinham gado leiteiro, burros, tinham empre- 
gados, mas era tudo no terreno da minha vo^ e ela 
foi vendendo e perdendo. Justipa. Sao todos urns 
canalhas. Gastamos um dinheirao. Minha tia ja velha, 
escreveu pro Getulio. Eu tinha recxbos dos lotes e 
fui procurar o engenheiro que fez as plantas. ^Um 
desgracado. Eu mostrei os recxbos dos lotes e ele 
viu que eu reconhecia os lotes. Dax, ele enrolou as 
plantas e nao me deixou mais ver. Ele escondeu as 
plantas.
Gracas a Deus nao faltou nada. Ate que o 
filho da minha irma, hoje e catedratico na faculdade 
de medecina. Eu ja tou velha. Mas nos, aqux, so 
temos a casa.
My grandfather came in Dom Pedro's time. He
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left the Tyrol because there wasn't enough work.
He came to do "America.'1 My grandmother was pregnant 
with my mother, the only Brazilian. Dom Pedro came 
to my grandfather's house, would take my mother on 
his lap, they would make bouquets of flowers . . .
They came with money from there. My grandfather got 
a plot in the colony and bought other plots, big and 
square ones here, in Cambuci, in Casa Verde, in many 
places.
They planted corn, grapes, beans^and coffee; 
they made caned chairs from the marsh grasses, and 
went on foot to sell them at the Praja da Se ^center 
of town/. After eighteen years in Brazil, he returned 
with his children to visit his own land.
My grandfather had so much money he would put 
it in the sun in a sieve so it wouldn't mildew. He 
kept his money in his hat. We would go to church 
barefoot because of the mud, and only put our shoes 
on in church. He would get there barefoot and sweaty 
and when he'd take his hat off, people gave him money 
thinking he was a beggar.
He could have been a millionaire, but every­
thing was lost. He died in the epidemic of 1918. He 
was strong, but there wasn't any medecine to give him. 
My grandmother didn't understand Portuguese and she 
became disoriented alone with the children. She 
started selling, and much was stolen or lost to squat­
ters. They said it was for lack of paying taxes, but 
they were all cads.
Mother and the aunts married. My mother 
married a portuguese. They had dairy cattle, donkeys, 
employees, but it was all on my grandmother's land 
and she was selling and losing it. Justice, They are 
all cads. We spent a fortune. When my aunt was old 
she wrote a letter to Getulio. I had the receipts for 
the lots /the grandfather had bought7 and I went to 
see the engineer who did the survey. He was a disgrace 
--I showed him the receipts for the lots and he saw 
that I recognized the plots and he rolled up the 
survey and wouldn't let me see it again. He hid the 
survey maps.
Thank heavens we didn't lack for anything. My 
sister's son is even a tenured professor at the medical 
school. But we, here, all we have is the house.
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B. A chegada em Sab Paulo e uma lembranga triste. 
Senti os deslocamentos da cidadezinha pra Sab Paulo,
e depois soubs que era uma coisa penosa. Nos locali- 
zamos em Santana porque era um bairro atrasado, pruma 
casa pequena e escura e triste, apertados em dois 
quartos. £ isso depois de uma dessas casas grandes 
do interior. As distrapoes era de olhar da janela, 
sentar na porta, e aos poucos entrar em contato com 
os vizinhos. No interior ter£amos mais facilidade 
pra ter relacoes com familias de nossa posipac^. . , 
no interior serfamos a elite da cidade. Em Sao Paulo 
ficamos marginalizados da vida social do bairro e 
da cidade, salvo no que a igreja permitia.
The arrival in Sao Paulo is a sad memory. I
felt the dislocation from a small town to Sao Paulo, 
and later I discovered it was a sad thing for the 
family. We moved to Santana because it was a backward 
neighborhood, to a small, dark and sad house, squeezed 
into two rooms. This after one of those big houses 
of the interior. The distractions were to look out 
the window, sit on the door step and slowly make 
contact with the neighbors. In the interior we would 
have had greater facility in having relations with 
families of our position. In the interior, we would 
have been the elite of the town. In Sao Paulo we were 
marginalized from the social life of the neighborhood 
and the city, except for those contacts permitted by 
the church.
C. Eu fui muito mimado. Os pais me deram o 
estudo, terminei o gina'sio, mas foi com sacrificio. 
Moravamos numa pensao em frente do colegio la" no cen- 
tro. Eu nao sabia o que^queria ser. A minha oppao 
para a corporapao foi a ultima. Queria ser dentista, 
mas nao pude estudar. _Fui trabalhar no Banco de _ 
Credit© Real, mais a£ nao tinha future. Minha funpao 
era muito simples, e nao tinha condipoes pra seguir 
carreira. Pagava mal, e nao gostava desse tipo de 
servipo. J?iz uma porpao de coisas. Os tios deram 
uma infiuencia pra entrar na For pa. Eu achava que 
nao tinha condicoes pra outra coisa. Foi por necessi- 
dade. 0 comepo nao foi facil. Quando eu entrei, ja' 
era tudo passado, a raiva do povo contra a Forpa 
Publica: depois de '32 houve um desprezo, mas com o 
tempo tudo se esqueceu. Dentro da corporacao as 
portas estavam abertas para o sucesso. Tive muitof 
apoio dos comandantes e dos companheiros, e retribui. 
Dentro da corporapao ha muita uniao, a propria funpao 
exige, obriga ajudar o outro. E'comum um oficial 
tirar o servico do outro pra ajudar. Tambem tem o
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Hospital Militar pro soldado e os familiares, a Cruz 
Azul, a Caixa Beneficiente, com contribuipoes mensais 
para as viuvas e dependentes. 0 fardamento, a comida, 
tudo por conta do estado. Na epcca, era bom caminho 
pro^sucesso. Hoje sou Coronel. Minhas crianpas 
terao melhores chance na vida do que eu. Eu posso 
pagar os estudos.
I was very spoiled. My parents gave me my 
studies. I finished highschool, but it was a sacrifice 
for them. We lived in a rooming house in front of the 
school in the center of the city. I didn't know what 
I wanted to be. My choice for the corporation was the 
last. I wanted to be a dentist, but I couldn't go to 
school. 1 went to work at the Banco de Credito Real 
/a bank/, but there was no future there. My job was 
too simple, and it didn't offer opportunities for a 
career. It paid badly and I didn't like that kind of 
work. I did a bunch of things. My uncles influenced 
me to join the Forca Publica. I didn't think that I 
would have a chance at other things. I joined from 
necessity. The beginning wasn't easy. When I joined, 
it was all in the past, the rage of the people against 
the Forca Publica. They were held in contempt after 
'32, but with time, everything was forgotten. In the 
corporation the doors were open to success. I had a 
lot of support from the commanding officers and my 
companions and I returned it. There is a lot of unity 
in the corporation, our jobs demand it. It is very 
common for an officer to take another man's job to 
help him out. Besides, there is the Military Hospital 
for the soldier and his relatives, the Blue Cross, 
the Caixa Beneficiente. with monthly contributions for 
widows and dependents. Uniforms, food, everything 
paid for by the state. At the time, it was a good road 
to success. Today I am a Colonel. My children will 
have better chances in life than I. I can pay for 
their studies.
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Appendix V. Supplements to Chapter V.
A. 0 comedo nao foi facil. Meu irmao casou, e eu
fiquei mantendo mamae e Januaria. Fazia datilografia, 
e fui ganhar quinhentos mil reis numa firma Americana, 
Ninguem deu nada, Ficou so os quinhentos cruzeiros,
Eu gostava de namorar, tomar sorvete, danpar, mas 
fiquei mantendo mamae, Ja conhecia o Roberto que diz, 
"Os dois scmos pobres, nab ternos despesa, nada, vamos 
casar." Os irmaos nao deram nada, Kao tive enxoval,
Daij/ieram os filhos, e ele cuidou de nos, Januaria^ 
mamae e a mae dele can setecentos cruzeiros, Eu nao 
trabalhei maisv Foi uma vida dura e controlada. A 
casa pequena la perto do quartel, entrava chuva. Era 
uma luta muito grande.
The beginning wasn't easy. My brother married 
and I was left to support mother and Januaria /a sis­
terJ. I was a typist at an American firm and I earned 
five hundred cruzeiros. I liked to flirt, go out for 
ice cream, to dance, but I had to support mother. I 
already knew Robert, who said, "We are both poor, we 
have no expenses, nothing. Let's get married." The 
brothers didn't give us a thing. I didn't have a dow­
ry. Then the children came and he took care of us, 
Januaria, mother and his mother, all with seven hundred 
cruzeiros /that he earned7. 1 didn't work anymore.
It was a hard and controlled life. A small house near 
the /Forca Publica/ headquarters, the roof leaked. It 
was a very great struggle.
Agora eles estao bem, tern patrimonio, os 
filhos estab educados, tudo isso.x Mas foi uma luta. 
viu. Me lembro que o Coronel ia a pe* pro quartel 
pra ter dinheiro pra comprar leite para as crianpas.
Now, they are well off, they have property for 
their children to inherit, their children are all edu­
cated and all that. But it was a struggle, see. I 
remember when the Coronel walked to work so as to have 
money to buy milk for the children.
_ ,Ce ve, tou com tres crianpas, todos na escola, 
e nao da, nao da mesmo, sem grande controle. mandar 
pra escola, comprar as roupas, os materials escolares, 
nao da mesmo.
You see, I have three children, all in school, and I can't, I really can't, without a great deal of 
control, manage to send them to school, buy their
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clothes, their school equipment, I really can't.
B. The following is drawn from field notes.
We walked down an alley to the seamstress's 
house and D. Chica pointed out the house of a friend 
who had been so happy when her daughter graduated 
from Normal School that she got diabetes and died 
from it.
“Mas, D. Chica, sera que e possivel receber diabetes 
de,alegria?" ^
"£ sim. Ela ficou tao alegre pensando que essa parte 
da vida dela tava acabando que logo ficou com diabete .“ 
“Eu acharia o contrario , que quando a gente ta triste 
a 1 que tern mais chance de ficar doente."
"De jeito algum. Qualquer excesso pode matar, dar 
doen^a, tudo^aquilo. Olha, minha filha, eu conheco 
gente que ate pode morrer de felicidade. De tristeza, 
ninguem morre. Quando a pessoa ta meia chumbada, e 
a£ que ela pensa com cuidado o que vai fazer^mas 
nessa euforia a pessoa nao pensa bem no que ta fazenda. 
Por isso que voce ve tanta mocidade morrendo por ais 
sao felizes, eufbricos, e al, minha filha, voce ve, 
ne, morre num desastre, num acidente. Por isso mesmo 
que falei que a felicidade mata. S, meu vizinho que 
tava morando na casa nove era um rapaz, um orfao, 
lutou pra ter sucesso. Dal, ele casou com a namorada, 
que tava namorando desde os treze anos, arrumou^a 
casa bem, ajudou fazer os doces, mandou fazer tres 
ternos no Sr. Jandiro, meu vizinho do outro lado que 
era alfaiate— ele nao queria sair de lua de mel e 
voltar pra bagun^a nenhuma. Dal, ele casou, tava 
na maior alegria, e logo que desceu do onibus, pos 
o pe do onibus em Pocos ,de Caldas, onde iam passar lua 
de mel, caiu morto. Ate que o^nebico,de la faiou pro 
irmao que era isso mesmo. Entab ce ta vendo, ne?
0 sofrimento cansa, mas o que mata e a felicidade."
"But D. Chica, is it possible to get diabetes from 
happiness?"
"Yes, she was so happy thinking that that part of her 
life was over that she soon got diabetes."
"I would have thought the contrary, that one might be 
more likely to get sick when one was unhappy." 
"Absolutely not. Any excess can kill, give diseases, 
all of that. Look, my dear, I know people who can 
even die of happiness. No one dies of sadness. When 
the person is sort of leaden /depressed?, that's when 
he thinks carefully of what to do, but in that euphoria, 
people don't think carefully about what they are doing.
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That's why you see so many young people dying, they are 
happy* euphoric, and then, my dear, you see, don't you, 
they die in an accident, a disaster. That's precisely 
why I said that happiness can kill. Yes, my neighbor 
who was living in the house number nine was a young 
man, an orphan, he struggled to be successful, he and 
his brothers, and he did succeed. Then he married his 
girl friend whom he had been seeing since he was thir­
teen years old. He fixed the house up nicely, helped 
make the sweets/for the wedding7, had three suits 
made by Sr. Jandiro, my neighbor on the other side, who 
was a tailor. He didn't want to go on his honeymoon 
and return to any mess. So he got married and was in 
the greatest happiness. But as soon as he got off the 
bus, put his foot on the ground of Popos de Caldas 
/a resort/ where they were going to spend their honey­
moon, he fell dead. Even the doctor from there told 
his brother that that's what it was /that he died of 
happiness/. So you understand, don't you.. Suffering 
is exhausting, but happiness kills.
C. Aqux estudei, casei-me. Aive filhos, que em
Deus espero, terao melhores dias que os meus.
Here I studied, I married. I had children, 
who, God willing, will have better days than mine.
Quando era rapaz, nao podia encostar em carro, 
nem com um dedo. Agora tudo mundo tern carro.
When I was a boy, I couldn't dream of having 
a car. Now everyone has a car.
Todos melhoraram de vida, todos nossos amigos, 
mesmo os filhos de sapateiro, a Julia Turca, os 
filhos estudaram, estao otimos.
Everyone has improved their lives, all of 
our friends, even the children of the shoemaker, Julia 
Turk's children went to school, they are all very 
well off.
Hoje nos, a classe media, esta estabilizada, 
tem renda boa pra viver, estudar. A baixa que vive 
de teinozLa, e a alta de fazer o dinheiro rolar.
Today we, the middle class, are stabilized, 
it has a good income to live on, to study with. It's 
the lower class that lives off shrewdness, and the 
upper off income.
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D. Hoje em dia ter carro e casa nao e luxo. Quem
depende de horario tem de ter carro. Vajo os onibus 
passar lotados, e nao pode. Quase tudo mundo da classe 
media tem casa, e depois o carro e a regra. A casa, 
o BNH facilita os pagamentos.
Nowadays, to have a house and a car is no 
luxury. Those who must meet schedules have to have a 
car. 1 see the busses pass full to capacity and 
you can't depend on them. Almost everyone of the 
middle class has a house, and after that, getting a 
car is the rule. The BNH /National Housing Bank/ 
facilitates payments for a house.
Vivendo todos os dias, a gente ve o Me£ro, os 
viadutos, a sujeira, tudo isso e progresso. £ um corre 
corre danado, o transito ta' imprevisivel, dificulta 
demais, me irrita, me atrapalha, mas o Brasil vai 
ter um futuro.
On a daily basis, we can see the Metro, the 
viaducts, the dirt, all this is progress. It is a rat 
race, traffic is unpredictable, it makes life compli­
cated, it irritates me, but Brazil will have a future.
0 futuro do Brasil ta muito bonito. Sou 
muito trasileira demais. Eu acho que o brasileiro vai 
ter muito que falar neste mundo. 0 progresso ta de­
mais.
The future of Brazil is lovely. I am very 
fgvo] Brazilian. I think Brazilians will have a lot 
to say in this world. This progress is too much.
Alem dos jornais e das notieias, eu sentx o 
progresso, o creseimento, porque viajei bast ant a na 
Policia Florestal. Nab e so na cidade, nao, Todo o 
interior cresceu, as estradas, fa« uldades novas, 
estao todos no interior. Em So rocaba nab tinha nada, 
poucas ruas asfaltadas, terreno baldio, <jhacaras.
Agora tem escola, as ruas iluminadas, predio^grande.
0 creseimento trouxe um futuro garantido. Nao queremos 
ser potencia guerreira. Queremos# ajudar os outros 
paises, 0 Brasil agora ajuda a A'frica, a Bolivia; 
o Brasil e conhecido agora como na^ao, e nao como 
terra do samba.
Besides from the newspapers and TV news, I 
know about progress and growth because I travelled a
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lot with the Forestry Police. It is not only in the 
cities. The whole interior has grown, with highways, 
new universities, these are all in the interior. In 
Sorrocaba there was nothing, a few paved roads, aban­
doned lots, truck farms. Now there are schools, 
lighted streets, skyscrapers. Growth has brought us 
a guaranteed future. We don't want to be a warlike 
power. We want to help other countries. Brazil now 
helps Africa, Bolivia; Brazil is now known as a nation 
and not as the land of the samba.
Tudo mundo tem melhorado, tem casa e carro.
Eu acho que car. ambi^ac a gente vâ i se meiherar em 
tudo, emprego, casa, estudo. E so olhar em volta 
mesmo, olha como Santana ta. Antigamente, Santana , 
nao tinha predio de apartamento fino. 0 progresso ta 
demais.
Everyone has improved, has a house, has a 
car. I think that with ambition, people will improve 
in everything, in their jobs, their houses, their 
studies. You just have to look around you: see what 
Santana has become. In the old days Santana didn't 
have fine apartment houses. Progress is too much. 
r
E. E a classe media que mais sofre. Nao quer
descer e nao pode se comparar com os ricos e os seus 
privilegios. Fica expremida entre o desejo de ser e 
as dificuldades de conseguir.
The middle class suffers most. It doesn't 
want to fall /Into the lower clas§7 and it cannot 
compare itself with the rich and their privileges.
It is squeezed between the desire to be and the diffi­
culties of achieving.
A classe media e justamente a classe do sanduiehe 
que sofre mais. 0 rico tem ttd<* o pobre nada.
The middle class is precisely the class of the 
sandwich which suffers most. The rich have everything, 
the poor nothing.
E a nossa classe media que sofre demais. Nao 
quero que mude nada, nab, porque se mudar, so muda pro 
pior.
It is our middle class which suffers most. I 
don't want anything to change, because changes are all 
for the worst.
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0 rico e uma imundice, e o pobre e sujeira,
A classe media e o repcsitorio disso tudo, e e a classe 
media que sofre mais.
The rich are filth and the poor are dirt. The
middle class is the recipient for all this, and it is
the middle class which suffers most,
F, A semana passada fomos grum jantar muito jale-
gante na casa do irmao do meu sogro. Me senti pessima, 
insignificante, nao podia conversar das viagems que 
tinha feito, e so tinha o yestido feito pela costu- 
reira, sem joias nsihunia; e uma vida muito futil, viu. 
Essa gente nao faz nada.
Last week we went to a very elegant dinner at
my father in law's brother's house. I felt awful,
insignificant, I couldn't speak of the trips I had 
taken, and I only had the dress made by the seamstress, 
without any jewels; it is a very futile life, see.
Those people don't do a thing.
✓ XEu tenho uma prima jjue e rica. 0 marido e 
medico, ate que tem projepao. Levam uma vida social 
bem mais intensa, assim, a cl£nica rende muito. 0 
casamento da^filha foi um espetaculo. Mais eu nao^ 
vejo muito nao. Moram longe, no Jardim Europa, tab 
sempre fora, e ficam as meninas pequenas com as empre- 
gadas. Tem de telefonar pra ver se tab em casa.
Tivemos no casamento da filha, mas . . .
1 have a cousin who is rich. Her husband, a 
doctor, is actually quite well known. They lead a much 
more intense social life, his clinic makes a lot of 
money. His daughter's wedding was a /magnificent/ 
spectacle. But I don't see them often. They live far 
away in Jardim Europa [a neighborhood in Sao Paulo/, 
they are always out, and only the little girls and
the maids are home. You have to phone and see if they 
will be home. We were at the daughter's wedding, but
^ y Nao sei bem como e que ele ficou rico. Meu 
irmao e muito transeiro, ele fiea la com a turma dele. 
Levamos com certa reserva. Ce ve, em vinte anos de 
casamento, a semana passada foi a primeira vez que 
ele convidou pra jantar. Sei la, deve ser porque 
voces sao americanos.
I don't know how he made his money. My bro­
ther is a wheeler-dealer and he stays with his own 
friends /in another wealthier neighborhood/• We
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take him with a bit of reserve. You see, in the 
twenty years we've been married, last week was the 
first time he asked us to dinner. I don't know, it 
must be because you are Americans.
G. Infelizmente, com o^progresso os baixos sobem
assim. Nos somos de tradipao, uma famllia de estudiop 
sos. Os tios eram escritores, nao ficaram ricos. Nao 
e'c-omo a classe baixa qua so come banana e pode ficar 
rico. Filhos de imigrantes nao tern de ligar.
Unfortunately with progress, the low ones come 
up like that. We are of tradition, a family of studious 
people. The uncles were writers, they weren't rich.
It is not like the lower class that only eats bananas 
and can became rich, the sons of immigrants who don't 
have to care.
Agora a classe baixa^esta estudando, ce ve os 
deputados brigando, j>orque sao filhos de verdureiro, 
tern cultura, mais nao e^de Jjer^o. Hoje urn casamento 
com medico, advogado, ja nao e muito, tern tanta 
gentinha. Podem ter berpo muito humilde. E bom de 
convidar, ai ee ve como ele senta, mastiga, usa garfo, 
e a£ nao precisa os pais implicar. A mo^a ve sozinha.
Now the lower class is studying, you see the 
deputies fighting because they are the children of 
green grocers. They have culture, but it's not from 
the cradle. Today a marriage with a lawyer or a 
doctor isn't much because there are so many little 
people around. They could have had very humble origins. 
It's a good thing to invite them /prospective sons in 
law7 and then you can see how he sits, chews, uses a 
fork, and then the parents don't have to say a thing.
The girl can see for herself.
These distinctions are made even within close­
ly knit families: the following is abridged from my 
field notes.
On D. Claudia's birthday all of her children 
and grandchildren came to celebrate it with her at 
lunchtime. In the evening neighbors and associates 
from her husband's bureaucracy would drop by to con­
gratulate her and drink port out of the colored wine 
glasses in the breakfront. Lunch was not such a for­
mal occasion. Each of her daughters in law had brought 
a dessert, and the table was laden with food: a roast, 
cus-cus, rice, beans, macaroni, roast potatoes, roast 
chicken, condiments, fruit and various sweets. There 
were children everywhere. There was no room to seat
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everyone at the table* The men sat around the table, 
the children took their plates to the coffee tables 
and the women, after everyone was served, sat in the 
living room area. After lunch one of the sons in law 
took a niece on his knee and proposed that she invest 
some of her allowance in a calf. He explained why 
it was a good investment. He would buy the calf for 
X NCr., raise it for her for free on his farm, and 
then sell it when it was grown for 6X NCr, It was 
clearly a good deal, and the little girl, about ten 
years old, was excited. She asked her parents if she 
could accept it, and they had no objections. Her 
mother, who had gone to the bank before lunch, passed 
her some money under the table. The uncle saw and 
said, "Oh, no, it has to be your money, not your 
parents* money." He insisted that she should go to 
her bank and draw on her savings account. The little 
girl wanted to, but her parents would not let her miss 
afternoon school. The uncle said he would wait for 
her at the train station the next morning at eight 
o'clock, and if she could get the money to him before 
he returned to his farm, the deal was on,
1 knew that this was a large and affectionate 
family, and that the uncle and the girl's father were 
good friends. I was curious about the insistence by 
the uncle on keeping the parents' money out of the 
deal and on the child using her own money, although it 
was clearly inconvenient for her to get to the bank 
before eight in the morning. I asked D. Claudia why 
he was being so difficult. She leaned over and said 
softly:
Ce ve, minha filha, ale esta fazendo certo, insis- 
tindo que negocio cada urn faz por si mesmo, que 
ate parente pode aproveitar, _ Mas e diferente 
da nossa classe media: nos nab temos o espirito 
comercial. Nos damos muito mais importantia aos 
estudos do que ao espirito comercial. Sao imigran- 
tes, fizeram fortune a base do comercio. Nos nao, 
Atingimos o nosso nivel de cultura por estudo, e 
o meu filho faz bem de nao deixar ela faltar aula.
You see, my dear, he is doing the right thing, 
insisting that business one does for one's self, 
and that even relatives can take advantage. But it 
is different with our middle class: we don't have 
the commercial spirit. We give much more importance 
to studies than to the commercial spirit. They are 
immigrants, they made their fortune on the basis of 
commerce. Not us. We have attained our level of
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culture through studiousness, and my son is 
quite right not to let her skip school.
H, 0 dinheiro ate que cria problems. Teve o,
caso de uma lavadeira de Goias, ee entende, nao e 
que lavava roupa, s'que era pobre. Ela ganhou na 
loteria, ate que trouxe maleficio pra ela. Teve de 
aprender a fazer sala, usar garfo . . .
Money can even create problems. There was 
the case of the washerwoman from Goias, you understand, 
itfe not that she literally washed clothes, ids that 
she was poor. She won the lottery and it brought 
ill fortune. She had to learn how to make polite conversation, to use a fork . . .
Ah, se corrompe o dinheiro. Mem cunhado era 
um canalha, mais^a inteligencia dele foi corrompida 
pelo dinheiro. Ele era corretor de cambio, lidava 
com o dinheiro dos outros, de grandes banqueiros. , 
Tinha o vxcio de mulheres. Elas exploravam ele ate 
o ultimo fio do cabelo. Como ele era mulherengo, 
fazia agiotagem ilicita, parou na cadeia varias 
vezes, e trocava de mulher como a gente troca de roupa. 
Vendeu o terreno do filho quando arrumou outra mulher, 
uma casada, con o marido canalhao que sabia^ e pedia 
dinheiro. Deu um apartamanto Luis XV pra mae dela, 
um a^ougue pro irmdo, e uma casa pra ela. E pro 
filho, vendeu o terreno e deixou o nome sujo. Ele 
se suicidou. Tava pra ir para^a cadeia outra vez, 
por falsifica^ao, e se matou la no escritorio. Quando 
chegaram la, estava jogado como um cao. Usou formicida 
com soda caustica. So tinha sangue. Se sofreu, raere- 
ceu, e merecia sofrer maisi
Ah, does money corrupt. My brother in law 
was a scoundrel, his intelligence was corrupted by 
money. He was an exchange broker, he dealt with 
other people*s money, great bankers. He had the 
vice of women, and they exploited him to the last 
hair on his head. Since he was a womanizer, he did 
illegal speculating, he went to jail several times, 
and changed women the way we change clothes. He sold 
his son's land when he got another woman, a married 
woman, with a rogue for a husband, who knew and asked 
for money. He gave a Louis XV apartment to her mother, 
a butcher shop to her brother and a house to her. To 
his son he left a dirty name, and sold his inheritance. 
He killed himself. He was going to jail again for 
forgery and he killed himself at the office. When 
they arrived, there he was, thrown like a dog. He 
used fermicid® and caustic soda. There was blood all 
over. If he suffered, he deserved it, and he deserved
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to suffer morel
Todos os problemas desse casamento vem da 
bondade^do Luis. £le achou que devia dar dinheiro^ 
pra esposa, que ela nao devia pedir. Fez jum casarao 
pra ela, deu um livro de cheque, e veja so, nam dorme 
junto com o marido. Nao a de se esperar que um homem 
desses vai se contentar com as quatro parades.
All the problems in that marriage come from 
Luis's goodness, **e felt that he should give his wife 
money, that she should* have to ask. He made her a huge 
house, gave her a check bock, and imagine, she doesn't 
even sleep with her husband. One can't expect a man 
like that to be content with the four walls.
Hoje em dia ta desquitando de mais, A £ entra 
a independencia monetaria da mulher. Elas podem fazer, 
ter casa; o que que vai prender ao homem?^ So se tiver 
q, espirito religiose, de abnegaqao, de mae, Masisso 
e raro. Essa questao de dinheiro e um perigo, viu.
Ahere are too many divorces today. Here the 
financial independence of women is important. They 
can have or build their houses; what will keep them 
with the man? Only if they have a religious spirit, 
a spirit of abnegation, of motherhood. But that is 
rare. This matter of money is dangerous, see,
I. Esse Tio foi capitalists: nunca fez nada.
That uncle was a capitalist: he never did
anything.
A classe rica se interessa mais^ no dinheiro 
do que no sen$imento. V|.ve a vida e nao auer, saber. Enxergam a vida de maneira aiferente. Eu nao podia 
sair . . .  sao mais esclarecidos.
The rich class is more interested in money 
than in sentiment. It lives its life and doesn't 
want to know. They see life in a different way. I wouldn't be able to participate . . . they are more 
enlightened.
^ Ce pode entrar em contato com pessoas que sao
tao ricas, e que, nao tem nada pra dar, nera um sorriso. 
Quantas vezes ta numa reuniab, eu via que pessoas se 
pegava com cqisas tao insignificantes, com a parte 
material. Nao podem entender o que seja uma vida, o 
que faz uma fam£lia. Nao sabem dar o tratamento 
certo pro marido, veem marido como uma maquina de 
dinheiro.
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You can come into contact with persons who 
are so rich and have nothing to give, not even a 
smile. How many times you might be at a meeting, 1 
would see that people were attached to such insignfi- 
cant things, with the material part. They cannot 
understand what a life is, what a family does. They 
don't know how to treat husbands correctly, they see 
husbands as money machines.
Considero rica uma pessoa que vive so' de 
rendimento.  ̂Enquanto que a gente tern de trabalhar pra 
viver, nao e rico nao, ne. A gente tern conforto, 
mas o dia que parar de trabalhar, vai indo pra traz.
Eles tern tana vida social muito intensa. Parece que 
diminuiu muito. Antes era so recep^ao, por qualquer 
motive, ate ^ro anivers£rio do cachorrinho. E uma 
vida muito futil. Mais diminuiu com o accrete do 
imp os to de renda, que o Governo fica de olho pra quern 
dar festas assim.
I consider rich a person who lives only off 
income, that doesn't have to work and who lives well. 
While we have to work, we aren't rich. We are comfor­
table, but the day we stop working we slip backwards. 
They have a very intense social life. It seems it has diminished a lot. Before, it was always receptions for any reason, even for their lap dog's birthday. A 
very futile life. But it has diminished with the 
income tax decree, because the government keeps an eye 
on people who give that sort of party.
Existe uma dist incpao grande nas convivencias 
das faixas culturais. A gente procure conviver na 
mesma faixa cultural. Se fossemos milionarios, e 
quizesse ,penetrar nessa classe rica, nab terxamos chance: ja e outra conversa, outra maneira de conduta social . . . Se forj?ra encontrar? Haveria um atrito, 
a classe superior nao se deixaria involver.^ Nos 
encaramos a vida com mais realismo. Eles sao bem 
mais voluveis, contam piadas diferentes, tcmam liber- 
dades com os maridos dos outros. Nos damos formaqao 
mais solida aos filhos, eles saem em turminhas, ou ficam can as empregadas. Os pais nao ligam pra onde 
vao. E/uma vida social muito intensa, e nao da tempo.
There is a great distinction in the way people from different cultural strata relate to each other.
We try to relate to people in our own cultural stratum. 
If we were millionaires and wanted to penetrate the 
rich class, we wouldn't have a chance. It's a different 
conversation, a different way of behaving . . .  If we 
were to meet? There would be trouble. The upper class 
would not become involved. We see life with more real- 
ii«, They are mors voluble, tell different jokes, take
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liberties with other women's husbands* We give our 
children more solid upbringings. Theirs go out in 
little gangs, or stay with the maids. The parents 
don't care where they go. It's a very intense social 
life, and they don't have time.
J. A empregada sai, ta* dificil. Tenho medo de
ladra, de tudo. Tem de pegar as chucas lâ  do interior 
quando nao sabem nada, e depois vab embora. Eu tenho 
de ensinar como escovar dente, usar Modess, desodorizante. 
E as melhores sao muito exigentes. Ja' nao posso mandar, 
tem de pedir . . .
Maids leave and it's difficult. I am afraid of 
getting a thief, everything. I have to get the hill­
billies from the interior, who don't know anything, 
and then they go away. I have to teach them to brush 
their teeth, use Modess, deodorant. And the best are 
very demanding. I can't order them anymore, I have 
to ask them . . .
Salario minimo nao e obrigado, ferias remunera- 
das a crite'rio do remunerador. Nao e obrigado estipular . 
horario de servipo. Vai ser obrigado recolher pro INP3 
uma porcentagem do salario. Them de trabalhar doze 
mezes consecutivos. E dificil, que empregada geralmente 
nao para. Ouvi no radio . . .  a impossivel, cada casa 
tem tipo de vidjt diferente, nao pode com tanta diferen^a. 
Por enquanto nao deve ser salario minimo. Que nab sab 
boas, voce ensina, ajuda, e dai ela vai procurer um 
emprego melhor. At^ que voce ensina tudo, e^uma luta. 
E^quando ta jeitosinha, ela da o fora--pra que salario 
minimo.
A minimum wage /for domestic servants/ is not 
required, paid vacations are at the discretion of the 
employer. One is not obliged to stipulate working 
hours. One will be obliged /by the government/ to 
collect a percentage of their salaries for INPS /"Social 
Security/, but they have to work fin one place/ for 
twelve consecutive months, and it's hard, because maids 
generally don't stay /that long/. I heard all this on the 
radio . . . it's impossible, every house has a different 
kind of life and there can be no /regulations/ with such 
differences. For the time being they should not receive 
minimum wages. They are no good, you teach them, help 
them, and then she leaves to find a better job. And it's 
a struggle to teach them. And when she knows how to do 
things nicely, she leaves. What do you want to give 
them a minimum wage for?
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K. The following is a condensation of notes madeon the three spiritist sessions which X attended:
Cel. Paulo and D. Maria had come early to take me to the session. D. Maria had been to the hairdresser. 
They wanted to meet me, interview me, explain about 
spiritism, and warn me not to be frightened at any noises I might hear or perturbations (perturbaeoes)
I might feel._ They explained that their cent&r was part of the Sao Paulo Federation of Spiritists, which had a day care center, an orphanage, a school tor retarded children, all of which were run on contribu­tions by the members as well as by the government.
Then Cel. Paulo explained that every person had a 
spirit which survived the body's death: that happiness 
was impossible in this world, which was a place for 
expiation. Spirits were reincarnated into this world 
until they had progressed and then they moved on to a higher plane. The object of the sessions we were attending was to help the spirits who had left this 
world, to tell those spirits who might not know it 
that they were dead and no longer of this world. These 
spirits, in their ignorance, could harm living people. 
Healing sessions, dealing specifically with the ills inflicted by spirits on the living oeccored on sepa­
rate occasions.
When we arrived at the center '•passes1' were being 
done to the people entering the garage for the meeting. 
The mediums closed their eyes, felt the vibrations of 
the person being "passed" and performed a series of 
wiping gestures around the person's body. This was 
explained to me as a kind of blessing and cleansing of 
the spirit. Fifty to sixty people, of which twelve were 
men, were "passed." When everyone was in the garage, 
the mediums "passed" each other, came into the garage 
and sat around the table.
The ceremony opened with a general talk by Cel. 
Paulo on the amount of misery and unemployment in 
Sao Paulo, on the need for tolerance of people of 
color, including Indians, and on how evil spirits should 
be considered as children to be led and shown the light 
of reason. The president and the government wore 
blessed. The talk closed with a warning that any emo­
tional disturbances that the assistentes might feel 
during the session were not to be confused with medio- 
nidade. or the ability to receive spirits. This 
ability required a great deal of control and training.
He sat, the record was changed to another religious 
piece and one of the mediums stood to explain that in addition to the incorporation of spirits, the mediums
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were also going to write and draw what a spirit might 
dictate* She sat, and for a while the room was 
quiet, except for coughs and shifts of position among 
the assistentes. The mediums sat with bowed heads.
Slowly the room became noisy with unintelligible speech. On one occasion the noise was increased by 
rain on the tin roof which also leaked in spots. It 
was hard to tell which medium had been possessed. The 
noise grew louder and it was possible to follow only 
one or two spirits at a time because of it. A young 
man at the table was possessed by the spirit of a 
gambler. He rocked back and forth repeating M£u ore-
IgfifHTn W, B F S g i S , " U  must gamble, I must gamble). Others were possessed by spirits whose 
bodies had died in automobile accidents and the direc­
trix would quiet their sobbing by telling them they 
were dead. Periodically the room was filled with 
sobbing, both from the mediums and from the assistentes. 
and with uncontrolled laughter. One spirit was par­
ticularly troublesome.
He had possessed D. Maria, whose voice became 
harsh and guttural. Much of what he said I could not 
understand. The directrix's explanations that he was 
dead would not quieten him. He demanded eacha^a (cane 
liquor) and screamed 11 Eu nao peeo. eu mando. eu__sou 
Paus11 (I don't ask, I command, I am God). After much 
laughter and unintelligible shouting he said 11 Eu sou 
o aue sou. um trabalbador** (I am that 1 am, a worker). 
The directrix seemed to become very angry and said 
loudly 11 Voce ia falou demajg. vai.embgra11 (You have 
spoken too much, go away). He did so, but only after 
some grumbling and cackling, and 0. Maria was returned 
to herself.
Slowly the other spirits subsided. The room was 
silent for a second and then a number of the assistentes 
began to weep quietly. Cel. Paulo rose and read a 
list of names of people who had died recently and whose 
spirits needed help. Then the two mediums who had been 
writing read their pieces. One had as a theme "ainda 
se fa la nas f lores11 (flowers are still spoken of), 
which was repeated between references to unemployment 
and political strife. After this the mediums who had 
been drawing exhibited primitive sketches by the spi­
rits who had possessed them. One was a picture of a 
black slave being beaten and another was of a baby in 
the womb. The medium who had "drawn" the latter was a
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young pregnant woman, and she and others believed she 
had been possessed by the spirit of her unborn child.
Many of the assistentes were amazed at the draw­
ings and repeated among themselves “Mais eu sei que 
nao sao artistes** (but I know they aren't artists - 
with the implication that only spirits could have made 
them draw). The assistentes were asked if they had 
seen anything. A sallow young man in his early twen­
ties said he had seen colors, lights and rain, a holy 
bath, and flowers over the writing and drawing mediums.
It had been very dark, he said, in the areas where the 
mediums were physically possessed. An older woman 
mumbled her agreement. “hen it was clear that no one 
had more to add, a closing prayer was said, again to 
Gounod's Ave Maria.
In the car, on the way back, Cel. Paulo and D.
Maria were anxious that 1 had not been frightened and 
were mildly apologetic at the low order of spirits 
who had appeared that day. On subsequent occasions, 
when the spirits were of just as "low” an order, they 
explained in great detail that these mandoes. or bossy 
spirits, were responsible for the political strife in 
Sao Paulo. I asked what they meant and they told me 
they meant the terrorists and the strikers, although no 
spirit of a terrorist or a striker had ever appeared 
at their sessions, and the last great strike in Sao 
Paulo ocurred in 1968 (Weffort, 1968).
L. A maioria de Sao Paulo e da classe media. Os
pobres de antigamente sao agora os medios.
Most of Sab Paulo is middle class. The poor of 
the old days are now the middle class.
Sao Paulo tem mudade bastante, acho que os anseios 
da classe media s£b bem diferente Ha vinte anos atras , 
a classe media pensava somente em economizer o sen 
dinheirinho, numa casinha, o carrinho: agora e viagems,
uma vida bem sossegada.
Sao Paulo has changed a lot. I think the anxieties 
of the middle class are very different now. Twenty 
years ago the middle class thought only of economizing 
a little money, a little house, a little car. Now 
it?s trips, a very relaxed life.
Ha vinte anos atras, Sao Paulo era cidade mopta. 
Depois de '30, Sao Paulo cresceu por causa da industria, 
o comercio desenvolveu. Sao Paulo creceu desordenada- 
mente, e comeparam surgir as classes. Naquele tempo,
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so havia tres classes, alta, media e baixa.^ Agora a 
classe media cresceu tremendamente: temos tres subdi- 
visoes da classe media, a media alta, a media media e 
a media baixa. A media alta tem propriedade, um or- 
denado muito alto. Nab e rico, mas tem meios pra 
aplicar o dinheiro^ Um funcionario publico alto, por 
exemplo, o Cel. Joao ... ele nao a rico, mas ganha 
bem, tem varias construpoes. A classe media ampliou 
bastante. Agora a maioria de Sab Paulo e da classe 
media.
Twenty years ago, Sao Paulo was a dead city. After 
*30 it grew because of industry and commerce developed. 
Sao Paulo grew in a disorderly manner, and the classes 
began to emerge. At that time there were only three 
classes, the high, the middle and the lower. Now the 
middle class has grown tremendously. We have three 
subdivisions of the middle class, the upper middle, the 
middle middle, and the lower middle. The upper middle 
class has property, a high salary. Such a person is 
not rich, but he has the means to invest money. A 
high public servant, for instance, Cel. Joao fa neigh­
bor/. • . he isn't rich, but he earns well, has various 
constructions. The middle class has grown a lot. Now 
most of Sao Paulo is middle class.
Sao Paulo ,tem uma elite que e uma minorla. A 
classe media ta no meio e ta sempre crescendo. Depois 
e o proletariado, que grapas a eles tem esse progresso, 
e os par las que vem de outros lugares, pens am que Sao 
Paulo e uma Nova Colorado e formam essas favelas.
Eu enxergo assim no meu mundo. Pode ser que seja 
diferente.
Sab Paulo has an elite, which is a minority, The 
middle class is in the middle and const.a ntly growing. 
Then there is the proletariat, thanks to whom there is 
this progress, and the pariahs who come from other 
places thinking that Sao Paulo is a New Colorado /Ame­
rica/ and form these favelas. In my world this is the 
way I see it. It may be different.
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